Competition in Treasury Auctions
- 1 February 2019
- journal article
- research article
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 11 (1) , 157-184
Abstract
We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. Austria’s EU accession led to an increase in the number of banks participating in treasury auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders’ private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction performance. We find robust evidence that bidders’ surplus dropped sharply after EU accession, but less than reduced form estimates would suggest. The difference can be explained by reduced form estimates not taking into account the increase in valuations upon EU accession. (JEL D44, E63, G21, H63)Keywords
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