Philipp Schmidt-Dengler
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Philipp Schmidt-Dengler has a total of 29 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Rossella Argenziano
University of Essex
3 shared publications - Christine Zulehner
University of Vienna
2 shared publications Claudio Lucarelli
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, United States; Leonard Davis Institute of Health Economics, United States; Universidad de los Andes, Chile
2 shared publicationsHelmut Elsinger
Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Otto-Wagner-Platz 3, A-1090 Vienna, Austria ( )
2 shared publicationsBernhard Felderer
Institute for Advanced Studies
1 shared publicationBiliana Yontcheva
Vienna University of Economics and Business Austria
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 20 January 2020
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
- Vol. 61 (2) , 871-899
INFORMATION AND PRICE DISPERSION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
Limited information is the key element generating price dispersion in models of homogeneous‐goods markets. We show that the global relationship between information and price dispersion is an inverse‐U shape. We test this mechanism for the retail gasoline market using a new measure of information based on commuter data from Austria. Commuters sample gasoline prices on their commuting route, providing us with spatial variation in the share of informed consumers. Our empirical estimates are in line with the theoretical predictions. We also quantify how information affects average prices paid and the distribution of surplus in the gasoline market.
- 20 January 2020
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
- Vol. 61 (2) , 871-899
Open AccessINFORMATION AND PRICE DISPERSION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
Limited information is the key element generating price dispersion in models of homogeneous‐goods markets. We show that the global relationship between information and price dispersion is an inverse‐U shape. We test this mechanism for the retail gasoline market using a new measure of information based on commuter data from Austria. Commuters sample gasoline prices on their commuting route, providing us with spatial variation in the share of informed consumers. Our empirical estimates are in line with the theoretical predictions. We also quantify how information affects average prices paid and the distribution of surplus in the gasoline market.
- 1 February 2019
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 11 (1) , 157-184
Competition in Treasury Auctions
We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. Austria’s EU accession led to an increase in the number of banks participating in treasury auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders’ private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction performance. We find robust evidence that bidders’ surplus dropped sharply after EU accession, but less than reduced form estimates would suggest. The difference can be explained by reduced form estimates not taking into account the increase in valuations upon EU accession. (JEL D44, E63, G21, H63)
- 1 February 2019
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 11 (1) , 157-184
Competition in Treasury Auctions
We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. Austria’s EU accession led to an increase in the number of banks participating in treasury auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders’ private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction performance. We find robust evidence that bidders’ surplus dropped sharply after EU accession, but less than reduced form estimates would suggest. The difference can be explained by reduced form estimates not taking into account the increase in valuations upon EU accession. (JEL D44, E63, G21, H63)
- 1 March 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 58, 110-122
Can amputation save the hospital? The impact of the Medicare Rural Flexibility Program on demand and welfare
- 1 March 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 58, 110-122
Can amputation save the hospital? The impact of the Medicare Rural Flexibility Program on demand and welfare
- 1 November 2017
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 100, 193-214
The impact of state aid on the survival and financial viability of aided firms
- 1 November 2017
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 100, 193-214
The impact of state aid on the survival and financial viability of aided firms
- 31 July 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal of Law and Economics
- Vol. 44 (3) , 385-422
Registered cartels in Austria: an overview
- 31 July 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal of Law and Economics
- Vol. 44 (3) , 385-422
Registered cartels in Austria: an overview
- 12 July 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Empirica
- Vol. 44 (3) , 405-406
Economic policy in a dynamic environment
- 12 July 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Empirica
- Vol. 44 (3) , 405-406
Economic policy in a dynamic environment
- 1 February 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Competition in Treasury Auctions
We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. Austria's EU accession led to an increase in the number of banks participating in treasury auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders' private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction performance: We find that increased competition reduced bidder surplus substantially, but less than reduced form estimates would suggest. A significant component of the surplus reduction is due to more aggressive bidding. Counterfactuals establish that as competition increases, concerns regarding auction format play a smaller role.
- 1 February 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Competition in Treasury Auctions
We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. Austria's EU accession led to an increase in the number of banks participating in treasury auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders' private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction performance: We find that increased competition reduced bidder surplus substantially, but less than reduced form estimates would suggest. A significant component of the surplus reduction is due to more aggressive bidding. Counterfactuals establish that as competition increases, concerns regarding auction format play a smaller role.
- Open Access
- 1 December 2014
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Entry and Shakeout in Dynamic Oligopoly
In many industries, the number of firms evolves non-monotonically over time. A phase of rapid entry is followed by an industry shakeout: a large number of firms exit within a short period. We present a simple timing game of entry and exit with an exogenous technological process governing firm efficiency. We calibrate our model to data from the post World War II penicillin industry. The equilibrium dynamics of the calibrated model closely match the patterns observed in many industries. In particular, our model generates richer and more realistic dynamics than competitive models previously analyzed. The entry phase is characterized by preemption motives while the shakeout phase mimics a war of attrition. We show that dynamic strategic incentives accelerate early entry and trigger the shakeout by comparing a Markov Perfect Equilibrium to an Open-loop Equilibrium.
- 1 December 2014
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessEntry and Shakeout in Dynamic Oligopoly
In many industries, the number of firms evolves non-monotonically over time. A phase of rapid entry is followed by an industry shakeout: a large number of firms exit within a short period. We present a simple timing game of entry and exit with an exogenous technological process governing firm efficiency. We calibrate our model to data from the post World War II penicillin industry. The equilibrium dynamics of the calibrated model closely match the patterns observed in many industries. In particular, our model generates richer and more realistic dynamics than competitive models previously analyzed. The entry phase is characterized by preemption motives while the shakeout phase mimics a war of attrition. We show that dynamic strategic incentives accelerate early entry and trigger the shakeout by comparing a Markov Perfect Equilibrium to an Open-loop Equilibrium.
- Open Access
- 3 February 2014
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 12 (2) , 368-396
CLUSTERING INN-PLAYER PREEMPTION GAMES
- 3 February 2014
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 12 (2) , 368-396
Open AccessCLUSTERING INN-PLAYER PREEMPTION GAMES
- 1 September 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 120 (3) , 509-512
Competition, timing of entry and welfare in a preemption game
- 1 September 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 120 (3) , 509-512
Competition, timing of entry and welfare in a preemption game