Optimal insurance with adverse selection
Open Access
- 1 September 2012
- journal article
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 7 (3) , 571-607
Abstract
We solve the principal-agent problem of a monopolist insurer selling to an agent whose riskiness (loss chance) is private information, a problem introduced in Stiglitz's (1977) seminal paper. For an \emph{arbitrary} type distribution, we prove several properties of optimal menus, such as efficiency at the top and downward distortions elsewhere. We show that these results extend beyond the insurance problem we emphasize. We also prove that the principal always prefers an agent facing a larger loss, and a poorer one if the agent's risk aversion decreases with wealth. For the standard case of a continuum of types and a smooth density, we show that, under the mild assumptions of a log-concave density and decreasing absolute risk aversion, the optimal premium is \emph{backwards-S shaped} in the amount of coverage, first concave, then convex. This curvature result implies that quantity discounts are consistent with adverse selection in insurance, contrary to the conventional wisdom from competitive modelsKeywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 37 references indexed in Scilit:
- Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible ChoiceAmerican Economic Review, 2007
- Asymmetric information in insurance: general testable implicationsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2006
- Asymmetric Information and Learning: Evidence from the Automobile Insurance MarketReview of Economics and Statistics, 2005
- Bertrand and Walras Equilibria under Moral HazardJournal of Political Economy, 2003
- Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value EnvironmentEconometrica, 2000
- Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance MarketsJournal of Political Economy, 2000
- An Empirical Examination of Information Barriers to Trade in InsuranceAmerican Economic Review, 1999
- Randomization with Asymmetric InformationThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1988
- The Maximum Principle under Minimal HypothesesSIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 1976
- Properties of Probability Distributions with Monotone Hazard RateThe Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 1963