Hector Chade
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Hector Chade has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Edward E. Schleeand
Department of Economics Arizona State University U.S.A.
1 shared publication Ilse Lindenlaub
Yale University
1 shared publication- Jan Eeckhout
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104
1 shared publication - Jorge Aseff
Brown Brothers & Harriman;
1 shared publication - Lones Smith
Dept. of Economics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109‐1220, U.S.A.;, http://www.umich.edu/~lones
1 shared publication - Virginia N. Vera De Serio
Faculty of Economics, I.C.B., Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, Centro Universitario-M5502JMA, Mendoza, Argentina
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 10 June 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Review of Economic Studies
- Vol. 89 (2) , 626-665
Risky Matching
We develop a model where risk-averse workers can costly invest in their skills before matching with heterogenous firms. At the investment stage, workers face multiple sources of risk. They are uncertain about how skilled they will turn out and also about their income shock realizations at the time of employment. We analyse the equilibria of two versions of the model that depend on when uncertainty resolves, which determines the available risk-sharing possibilities between workers and firms. We provide a thorough analysis of equilibrium comparative statics regarding changes in risk, worker and firm heterogeneity, and technology. We derive conditions on the match output function and risk attitudes under which these shifts lead to more investment and show how this affects matching and wages. To illustrate the applied relevance of our theory, we provide a stylized quantitative assessment of the model and analyse the sources (risk, heterogeneity, or technology) of rising U.S. wage inequality. We find that changes in risk were the most important driver behind the surge in inequality, followed by technological change. We show that these conclusions are significantly altered if one neglects the key feature of our model, which is that educational investment is endogenous.
- 10 June 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Review of Economic Studies
- Vol. 89 (2) , 626-665
Risky Matching
We develop a model where risk-averse workers can costly invest in their skills before matching with heterogenous firms. At the investment stage, workers face multiple sources of risk. They are uncertain about how skilled they will turn out and also about their income shock realizations at the time of employment. We analyse the equilibria of two versions of the model that depend on when uncertainty resolves, which determines the available risk-sharing possibilities between workers and firms. We provide a thorough analysis of equilibrium comparative statics regarding changes in risk, worker and firm heterogeneity, and technology. We derive conditions on the match output function and risk attitudes under which these shifts lead to more investment and show how this affects matching and wages. To illustrate the applied relevance of our theory, we provide a stylized quantitative assessment of the model and analyse the sources (risk, heterogeneity, or technology) of rising U.S. wage inequality. We find that changes in risk were the most important driver behind the surge in inequality, followed by technological change. We show that these conclusions are significantly altered if one neglects the key feature of our model, which is that educational investment is endogenous.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2018
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 13 (1) , 377-414
Matching information
We analyze the optimal allocation of experts to teams, where experts differ in the precision of their information, and study the assortative matching properties of the resulting assignment. The main insight is that in general it is optimal to diversify the composition of the teams, ruling out positive assortative matching. This diversification leads to negative assortative matching when teams consist of pairs of experts. And when experts' signals are conditionally independent, all teams have similar precision. We also show that if we allow experts to join multiple teams, then it is optimal to allocate them equally across all teams. Finally, we analyze how to endogenize the size of the teams, and we extend the model by introducing heterogeneous firms in which the teams operate.
- 1 January 2018
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 13 (1) , 377-414
Open AccessMatching information
We analyze the optimal allocation of experts to teams, where experts differ in the precision of their information, and study the assortative matching properties of the resulting assignment. The main insight is that in general it is optimal to diversify the composition of the teams, ruling out positive assortative matching. This diversification leads to negative assortative matching when teams consist of pairs of experts. And when experts' signals are conditionally independent, all teams have similar precision. We also show that if we allow experts to join multiple teams, then it is optimal to allocate them equally across all teams. Finally, we analyze how to endogenize the size of the teams, and we extend the model by introducing heterogeneous firms in which the teams operate.
- Open Access
- 1 September 2012
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 7 (3) , 571-607
Optimal insurance with adverse selection
We solve the principal-agent problem of a monopolist insurer selling to an agent whose riskiness (loss chance) is private information, a problem introduced in Stiglitz's (1977) seminal paper. For an \emph{arbitrary} type distribution, we prove several properties of optimal menus, such as efficiency at the top and downward distortions elsewhere. We show that these results extend beyond the insurance problem we emphasize. We also prove that the principal always prefers an agent facing a larger loss, and a poorer one if the agent's risk aversion decreases with wealth. For the standard case of a continuum of types and a smooth density, we show that, under the mild assumptions of a log-concave density and decreasing absolute risk aversion, the optimal premium is \emph{backwards-S shaped} in the amount of coverage, first concave, then convex. This curvature result implies that quantity discounts are consistent with adverse selection in insurance, contrary to the conventional wisdom from competitive models
- 1 September 2012
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 7 (3) , 571-607
Open AccessOptimal insurance with adverse selection
We solve the principal-agent problem of a monopolist insurer selling to an agent whose riskiness (loss chance) is private information, a problem introduced in Stiglitz's (1977) seminal paper. For an \emph{arbitrary} type distribution, we prove several properties of optimal menus, such as efficiency at the top and downward distortions elsewhere. We show that these results extend beyond the insurance problem we emphasize. We also prove that the principal always prefers an agent facing a larger loss, and a poorer one if the agent's risk aversion decreases with wealth. For the standard case of a continuum of types and a smooth density, we show that, under the mild assumptions of a log-concave density and decreasing absolute risk aversion, the optimal premium is \emph{backwards-S shaped} in the amount of coverage, first concave, then convex. This curvature result implies that quantity discounts are consistent with adverse selection in insurance, contrary to the conventional wisdom from competitive models
- 16 September 2008
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 39 (3) , 731-746
An optimal auction with identity‐dependent externalities
We analyze the problem of a seller of multiple identical units of a good who faces a set of buyers with unit demands, private information, and identity‐dependent externalities. We derive the seller's optimal mechanism and characterize its main properties. We show that the probability that a buyer obtains a unit is an increasing function of the externalities he generates and enjoys. Also, the seller's allocation of the units of the good need not be ex post efficient. As an illustration, we apply the model to the problem faced by a developer of a shopping mall who wants to allocate and price its retail space among anchor and non‐anchor stores. We show that a commonly used sequential mechanism is not optimal unless externalities are large enough.
- 16 September 2008
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 39 (3) , 731-746
An optimal auction with identity‐dependent externalities
We analyze the problem of a seller of multiple identical units of a good who faces a set of buyers with unit demands, private information, and identity‐dependent externalities. We derive the seller's optimal mechanism and characterize its main properties. We show that the probability that a buyer obtains a unit is an increasing function of the externalities he generates and enjoys. Also, the seller's allocation of the units of the good need not be ex post efficient. As an illustration, we apply the model to the problem faced by a developer of a shopping mall who wants to allocate and price its retail space among anchor and non‐anchor stores. We show that a commonly used sequential mechanism is not optimal unless externalities are large enough.
- 1 September 2006
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 74 (5) , 1293-1307
Simultaneous Search
- 1 September 2006
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 74 (5) , 1293-1307
Simultaneous Search
- 1 October 2002
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 20 (3) , 637-644
Risk aversion, moral hazard, and the principal's loss
- 1 October 2002
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 20 (3) , 637-644
Risk aversion, moral hazard, and the principal's loss
- 1 February 2002
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 19 (2) , 333-353
Pricing, learning, and strategic behavior in a single-sale model
- 1 February 2002
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 19 (2) , 333-353
Pricing, learning, and strategic behavior in a single-sale model