Beyond Democratic Backsliding: Bureaucracy, Elite Dynamics and Administrative Change in Authoritarian Transitions
Top Cited Papers
Open Access
- 15 March 2026
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Governance
- Vol. 39 (2)
Abstract
This paper examines how political and administrative elites shape regime transformations under authoritarian rule, proposing an elite‐centered analytical perspective that complements prevailing accounts of “democratic backsliding.” We show how embedding political–administrative relations within a broader elite‐theoretical framework clarifies the mechanisms through which elite reconfiguration underwrites institutional erosion. Drawing on classical and contemporary elite theory, we argue that shifts in elite coalitions among politicians, bureaucrats, and economic actors drive regime changes more than institutional erosion or ideological movements. Through comparative historical analysis of interwar Italy and Germany, we illustrate distinct elite‐driven pathways to authoritarian consolidation: Mussolini's Italy involved strategic alliances with traditional elites, while Hitler's Germany pursued radical elite replacement. Our findings highlight the critical role of elite realignments in transforming institutions and economic policies, often maintaining a façade of electoral legitimacy. This elite‐theoretical approach offers nuanced insights into contemporary shifts toward autocratic governance, emphasizing the importance of analyzing elite networks and interactions to comprehend the deeper mechanics of political transformation. Our findings thus contribute to public administration scholarship by theorizing how elite realignments transform bureaucratic structures and alter the nature of political‐administrative relationships under authoritarian conditions.Keywords
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