Kutsal Yesilkagit
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Kutsal Yesilkagit has a total of 41 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Brendan Carroll
Leiden University
4 shared publications- Sanneke Kuipers
Leiden University
4 shared publications - Brendan Carroll
Institute of Public Administration Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs Leiden University Leiden the Netherlands
3 shared publications - Dimiter Toshkov
Institute of Public Administration, Leiden University, The Netherlands
2 shared publications - Johan Christensen
Leiden University
2 shared publications - Julia Fleischer
University of Potsdam
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 19 March 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- p. 1-29
Is crisis on the rise? An empirical study of the evolution of crisis in the European Union between 1980 and 2023
- 19 March 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- p. 1-29
Open AccessIs crisis on the rise? An empirical study of the evolution of crisis in the European Union between 1980 and 2023
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 15 March 2026
- Published by Wiley in Governance
- Vol. 39 (2)
Beyond Democratic Backsliding: Bureaucracy, Elite Dynamics and Administrative Change in Authoritarian Transitions
This paper examines how political and administrative elites shape regime transformations under authoritarian rule, proposing an elite‐centered analytical perspective that complements prevailing accounts of “democratic backsliding.” We show how embedding political–administrative relations within a broader elite‐theoretical framework clarifies the mechanisms through which elite reconfiguration underwrites institutional erosion. Drawing on classical and contemporary elite theory, we argue that shifts in elite coalitions among politicians, bureaucrats, and economic actors drive regime changes more than institutional erosion or ideological movements. Through comparative historical analysis of interwar Italy and Germany, we illustrate distinct elite‐driven pathways to authoritarian consolidation: Mussolini's Italy involved strategic alliances with traditional elites, while Hitler's Germany pursued radical elite replacement. Our findings highlight the critical role of elite realignments in transforming institutions and economic policies, often maintaining a façade of electoral legitimacy. This elite‐theoretical approach offers nuanced insights into contemporary shifts toward autocratic governance, emphasizing the importance of analyzing elite networks and interactions to comprehend the deeper mechanics of political transformation. Our findings thus contribute to public administration scholarship by theorizing how elite realignments transform bureaucratic structures and alter the nature of political‐administrative relationships under authoritarian conditions.
- 15 March 2026
- Published by Wiley in Governance
- Vol. 39 (2)
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessBeyond Democratic Backsliding: Bureaucracy, Elite Dynamics and Administrative Change in Authoritarian Transitions
This paper examines how political and administrative elites shape regime transformations under authoritarian rule, proposing an elite‐centered analytical perspective that complements prevailing accounts of “democratic backsliding.” We show how embedding political–administrative relations within a broader elite‐theoretical framework clarifies the mechanisms through which elite reconfiguration underwrites institutional erosion. Drawing on classical and contemporary elite theory, we argue that shifts in elite coalitions among politicians, bureaucrats, and economic actors drive regime changes more than institutional erosion or ideological movements. Through comparative historical analysis of interwar Italy and Germany, we illustrate distinct elite‐driven pathways to authoritarian consolidation: Mussolini's Italy involved strategic alliances with traditional elites, while Hitler's Germany pursued radical elite replacement. Our findings highlight the critical role of elite realignments in transforming institutions and economic policies, often maintaining a façade of electoral legitimacy. This elite‐theoretical approach offers nuanced insights into contemporary shifts toward autocratic governance, emphasizing the importance of analyzing elite networks and interactions to comprehend the deeper mechanics of political transformation. Our findings thus contribute to public administration scholarship by theorizing how elite realignments transform bureaucratic structures and alter the nature of political‐administrative relationships under authoritarian conditions.
- 12 March 2026
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 77-92
Public service bargains
- Open Access
- 31 December 2025
- Published by Kamu Yönetimi Derneği in Publicus
- No. 4,p. 1-22
Koruyucu Devlet: Halk Egemenliği ile Anayasal Sadakat Arasında Liberal Demokrasinin Korunması
- 31 December 2025
- Published by Kamu Yönetimi Derneği in Publicus
- No. 4,p. 1-22
Open AccessKoruyucu Devlet: Halk Egemenliği ile Anayasal Sadakat Arasında Liberal Demokrasinin Korunması
- Open Access
- 14 March 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
The Global Retreat of the Regulatory State? The Populist Challenge and the Future of Regulatory Governance
The regulatory state is under severe stress. The rise of populism, at times with authoritarian tendencies, is challenging the very fundamentals of the regulatory state and regulatory governance. Populist leaders do not simply politicize and undermine regulatory governance, but they tend to transform the regulatory state. Despite the rich and ever-expanding debate about the impact of the populist ascent and democratic backsliding on public administration, bureaucracy, and public policy, research on the effect of populist rule on regulatory governance and the regulatory state is still scant. In this paper, we show how to address this gap and present two major contributions to guide future research agenda. First, we revisit the populist ascent and map out the current state of our (limited) knowledge. Second, we discuss five avenues scholars could follow in order to develop empirical and/or conceptual insights in order to better understand the transforming regulatory state: populist strategies for controlling regulatory agencies, the politics of regulatory design, market responses to regulatory instability, the role of transgovernmental networks and international constraints, and regulatory agency responses and adaptation to the populist ascent.
- 14 March 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessThe Global Retreat of the Regulatory State? The Populist Challenge and the Future of Regulatory Governance
The regulatory state is under severe stress. The rise of populism, at times with authoritarian tendencies, is challenging the very fundamentals of the regulatory state and regulatory governance. Populist leaders do not simply politicize and undermine regulatory governance, but they tend to transform the regulatory state. Despite the rich and ever-expanding debate about the impact of the populist ascent and democratic backsliding on public administration, bureaucracy, and public policy, research on the effect of populist rule on regulatory governance and the regulatory state is still scant. In this paper, we show how to address this gap and present two major contributions to guide future research agenda. First, we revisit the populist ascent and map out the current state of our (limited) knowledge. Second, we discuss five avenues scholars could follow in order to develop empirical and/or conceptual insights in order to better understand the transforming regulatory state: populist strategies for controlling regulatory agencies, the politics of regulatory design, market responses to regulatory instability, the role of transgovernmental networks and international constraints, and regulatory agency responses and adaptation to the populist ascent.
- Open Access
- 10 January 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
The Guardian State: Strengthening the Public Service against Democratic Backsliding
This article addresses the vulnerability of liberal democracy to illiberal political movements and the gradual erosion of democratic institutions. While free and fair elections are central to democracy, backsliding politicians can exploit them to legitimate their undemocratic actions. To safeguard liberal democracy, we propose the concept of the Guardian State, which embraces liberal principles while acting as a defensive barrier against illiberal tendencies. This requires strong administrative institutions, i.e., an empowered civil service that upholds liberal democratic norms and resists pressures from populist politicians. Institutionalizing guardianship as the key norm within the civil service fortifies democratic institutions against backsliding. It acknowledges the challenges posed by the principle of neutrality, which cannot ensure that only liberal citizens come to power. Structural measures at the individual and organizational levels are essential to fortify the foundations of the Guardian State and protect liberal democracy against evolving threats. We conclude that proactive efforts are necessary to defend and strengthen the public service to ensure the long-term viability of democratic governance. The Guardian State, then, rooted in liberal democratic values, provides a framework for protecting against illiberal and authoritarian forces, and places the bureaucracy in a key role in preserving the core principles of democracy.
- 10 January 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessThe Guardian State: Strengthening the Public Service against Democratic Backsliding
This article addresses the vulnerability of liberal democracy to illiberal political movements and the gradual erosion of democratic institutions. While free and fair elections are central to democracy, backsliding politicians can exploit them to legitimate their undemocratic actions. To safeguard liberal democracy, we propose the concept of the Guardian State, which embraces liberal principles while acting as a defensive barrier against illiberal tendencies. This requires strong administrative institutions, i.e., an empowered civil service that upholds liberal democratic norms and resists pressures from populist politicians. Institutionalizing guardianship as the key norm within the civil service fortifies democratic institutions against backsliding. It acknowledges the challenges posed by the principle of neutrality, which cannot ensure that only liberal citizens come to power. Structural measures at the individual and organizational levels are essential to fortify the foundations of the Guardian State and protect liberal democracy against evolving threats. We conclude that proactive efforts are necessary to defend and strengthen the public service to ensure the long-term viability of democratic governance. The Guardian State, then, rooted in liberal democratic values, provides a framework for protecting against illiberal and authoritarian forces, and places the bureaucracy in a key role in preserving the core principles of democracy.
- 14 June 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 67 (3)
Mapping and Unpacking Global Governance Bodies: A Cross Sectional and Cross Organizational Analysis
Several recent studies have pointed to the increasing relevance of relatively informal, non-treaty-based global governance bodies (GGBs). Yet, a systematic fine-grained assessment of these bodies and their implications for global governance are still pending. To what extent, do non-treaty-based GGBs constitute a truly novel type of governance body, distinct from traditional treaty-based international organizations (IOs)? How do the distinctive features of GGBs affect their role in global governance? To what extent are GGB’s patterns of emergence and development specific to policy sectors? This article tackles these questions, drawing on an original dataset on GGBs in five distinct policy areas (banking and finance, energy, global health, Internet, and migration policy). We combine a micro-organizational perspective with a meso-level network approach to unpack the main features of non-treaty-based GGBs vis-à-vis, traditional IOs. Our results provide support to the general expectation that non-treaty-based GGBs offer distinctive opportunities for global governance with respect to traditional IOs. However, importantly, this relationship is not dichotomous. We find that GGBs exist on a continuum of fit-to-purpose designs ranging from hard, formal, and intergovernmental models to a soft, informal, and multistakeholder-based form of governance. Lastly, we also find notable variations across policy areas, where global health stands out given its decentralized network structure.
- 14 June 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 67 (3)
Mapping and Unpacking Global Governance Bodies: A Cross Sectional and Cross Organizational Analysis
Several recent studies have pointed to the increasing relevance of relatively informal, non-treaty-based global governance bodies (GGBs). Yet, a systematic fine-grained assessment of these bodies and their implications for global governance are still pending. To what extent, do non-treaty-based GGBs constitute a truly novel type of governance body, distinct from traditional treaty-based international organizations (IOs)? How do the distinctive features of GGBs affect their role in global governance? To what extent are GGB’s patterns of emergence and development specific to policy sectors? This article tackles these questions, drawing on an original dataset on GGBs in five distinct policy areas (banking and finance, energy, global health, Internet, and migration policy). We combine a micro-organizational perspective with a meso-level network approach to unpack the main features of non-treaty-based GGBs vis-à-vis, traditional IOs. Our results provide support to the general expectation that non-treaty-based GGBs offer distinctive opportunities for global governance with respect to traditional IOs. However, importantly, this relationship is not dichotomous. We find that GGBs exist on a continuum of fit-to-purpose designs ranging from hard, formal, and intergovernmental models to a soft, informal, and multistakeholder-based form of governance. Lastly, we also find notable variations across policy areas, where global health stands out given its decentralized network structure.
- Open Access
- 17 August 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 29 (10) , 1677-1697
Entangled agencies and embedded preferences: National Regulatory Agencies in multi-level European governance
The emergence of trans-governmental policy regimes in Europe has fundamentally changed the role of National Regulatory Agencies (NRAs). Here we move away from the idea that there is a meaningful divide between the domestic and the European levels of governance and suggest that a different logic has emerged in recent decades, combining multiple chains of delegation and innovative coordination schemes. NRAs have come to occupy a ‘broker’ or intermediary position between domestic and European polities, that is no longer adequately described by the prevailing, mainly dyadic models of bureaucratic autonomy conceived just for national states. In this paper, we build the concept of entangled agencies to make sense of the linkages between NRAs and European Agencies (EAs) and provide some preliminary empirical evidence to show how they effectively articulate various levels of government, presenting empirical findings on the connections that ties NRAs representatives with EAs management boards.
- 17 August 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 29 (10) , 1677-1697
Open AccessEntangled agencies and embedded preferences: National Regulatory Agencies in multi-level European governance
The emergence of trans-governmental policy regimes in Europe has fundamentally changed the role of National Regulatory Agencies (NRAs). Here we move away from the idea that there is a meaningful divide between the domestic and the European levels of governance and suggest that a different logic has emerged in recent decades, combining multiple chains of delegation and innovative coordination schemes. NRAs have come to occupy a ‘broker’ or intermediary position between domestic and European polities, that is no longer adequately described by the prevailing, mainly dyadic models of bureaucratic autonomy conceived just for national states. In this paper, we build the concept of entangled agencies to make sense of the linkages between NRAs and European Agencies (EAs) and provide some preliminary empirical evidence to show how they effectively articulate various levels of government, presenting empirical findings on the connections that ties NRAs representatives with EAs management boards.
- Open Access
- 1 February 2022
- Published by Wiley in Governance
- Vol. 36 (1) , 255-274
The politics of government reorganization inWestern Europe
The reorganization of governments is crucial for parties to express their policy preferences once they reach office. Yet these activities are not confined to the direct aftermath of general elections or to wide‐ranging structural reforms. Instead, governments reorganize and adjust their machinery of government all the time. This paper aims to assess these structural choices with a particular focus at the core of the state, comparing four Western European democracies (Germany, France, the Netherlands, and United Kingdom) from 1980 to 2013. Our empirical analysis shows that stronger shifts in cabinets' ideological profiles in the short‐ and long‐term as well as the units' proximity to political executives yield significant effects. In contrast, Conservative governments, commonly regarded as key promoters of reorganizing governments, are not significant for the likelihood of structural change. We discuss the effects of this politics of government reorganization for different research debates assessing the inner workings of governments.
- 1 February 2022
- Published by Wiley in Governance
- Vol. 36 (1) , 255-274
Open AccessThe politics of government reorganization inWestern Europe
The reorganization of governments is crucial for parties to express their policy preferences once they reach office. Yet these activities are not confined to the direct aftermath of general elections or to wide‐ranging structural reforms. Instead, governments reorganize and adjust their machinery of government all the time. This paper aims to assess these structural choices with a particular focus at the core of the state, comparing four Western European democracies (Germany, France, the Netherlands, and United Kingdom) from 1980 to 2013. Our empirical analysis shows that stronger shifts in cabinets' ideological profiles in the short‐ and long‐term as well as the units' proximity to political executives yield significant effects. In contrast, Conservative governments, commonly regarded as key promoters of reorganizing governments, are not significant for the likelihood of structural change. We discuss the effects of this politics of government reorganization for different research debates assessing the inner workings of governments.
- Open Access
- 7 January 2022
- Published by Wiley in Public Administration
- Vol. 100 (4) , 1091-1106
What's in a name? The politics of name changes inside bureaucracy
In this article, we examine the effects of political change on name changes of units within central government ministries. We expect that changes regarding the policy position of a government will cause changes in the names of ministerial units. To this end we formulate hypotheses combining the politics of structural choice and theories of portfolio allocation to examine the effects of political changes at the cabinet level on the names of intra‐ministerial units. We constructed a dataset containing more than 17,000 observations on name changes of ministerial units between 1980 and 2013 from the central governments of Germany, the Netherlands, and France. We regress a series of generalized estimating equations (GEE) with population averaging models for binary outcomes. Finding variations across the three political‐bureaucratic systems, we overall report positive effects of governmental change and ideological positions on name changes within ministries.
- 7 January 2022
- Published by Wiley in Public Administration
- Vol. 100 (4) , 1091-1106
Open AccessWhat's in a name? The politics of name changes inside bureaucracy
In this article, we examine the effects of political change on name changes of units within central government ministries. We expect that changes regarding the policy position of a government will cause changes in the names of ministerial units. To this end we formulate hypotheses combining the politics of structural choice and theories of portfolio allocation to examine the effects of political changes at the cabinet level on the names of intra‐ministerial units. We constructed a dataset containing more than 17,000 observations on name changes of ministerial units between 1980 and 2013 from the central governments of Germany, the Netherlands, and France. We regress a series of generalized estimating equations (GEE) with population averaging models for binary outcomes. Finding variations across the three political‐bureaucratic systems, we overall report positive effects of governmental change and ideological positions on name changes within ministries.