Peer Monitoring, Social Ties and Moral Hazard in Group Lending Programs: Evidence from Eritrea
Authors:
- 1 January 2005
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in World Development
- Vol. 33 (1) , 149-169
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
- Joint Liability and Peer Monitoring under Group LendingThe B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2002
- Group Lending under Dynamic Incentives as a Borrower Discipline DeviceReview of Development Economics, 2001
- A study of group lending and incentives in BoliviaInternational Journal of Social Economics, 2000
- The Microfinance PromiseJournal of Economic Literature, 1999
- The economics of lending with joint liability: theory and practiceJournal of Development Economics, 1999
- On the design of a credit agreement with peer monitoringJournal of Development Economics, 1999
- Can Social Cohesion be Harnessed to Repair Market Failures? Evidence from Group Lending in GuatemalaThe Economic Journal, 1999
- The performance of village intermediaries in rural credit delivery under changing penalty regimes: Evidence from SenegalThe Journal of Development Studies, 1998
- Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateralJournal of Development Economics, 1995
- Peer Monitoring and Credit MarketsThe World Bank Economic Review, 1990