Chapter 11 A Consumer Surplus Defense in Merger Control
Author:
- Sven-Olof FridolfssonSFSven-Olof Fridolfsson
- 1 January 2007
- book chapter
- Published by Emerald Publishing
- p. 287-302
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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