Investigating discretion in executive contracting: extracting private information from valuation allowance decisions
- 6 January 2022
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 28 (2) , 533-569
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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