We study how firms manage the exogenous shock to the supply of credit during the financial crisis of 2008-2009 by examining their changes in corporate payout, cash holdings, and investments. Rising financing frictions and costs increase the marginal benefit of cash retention, causing firms to reallocate funds that would otherwise be distributed to shareholders. We find that firms with greater financial constraints and are more dependent on external capital, i.e., high leverage and low cash balances, are more likely to cut their payout to the shareholders during the financial crisis. We observe that the most commonly stated reason for payout reduction is to improve liquidity/cash balance. Firms use the proceeds from the reduction in payout to maintain cash levels and fund investments. If firms had not reduced their payout, they would have been operating at a below- normal cash level. Firms cutting dividends mainly use the funds to boost working capital, while firms reducing repurchases mainly use the cash saved to fund investments. Compared to firms who paid out during the crisis, the matched non-paying firms are able to conduct more investments during the crisis. Our results demonstrate that firms quickly alter their payout policy when the supply of external capital is subject to an adverse shock.