Barbara A. Bliss
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Barbara A. Bliss has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
David J. Denis
3 shared publicationsYingmei Cheng
3 shared publications- Mitch Warachka
University of San Diego
2 shared publications - Alok Kumar
University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida 33146
1 shared publication - Andrew Grant
University of Sydney
1 shared publication Biljana Nikolic
University of San Diego
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 29 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 192
The 52-week high liquidity mirage: How behavioral convergence impairs price discovery
- 29 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 192
Open AccessThe 52-week high liquidity mirage: How behavioral convergence impairs price discovery
- Open Access
- 26 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
´On Demand’ Parenting Advantage: How Top Managers Can Create Value for Internal Corporate Ventures
Prior corporate venturing research highlights the positive effect of top management support on parenting advantage. However, it remains unclear whether top managers should promote more integrative mechanisms or provide more entrepreneurial freedom. Based on data of 203 ventures, our findings suggest that organizational integration and organizational differentiation significantly increase parenting advantage, both individually and in combination. Yet, we also find that the positive effect of organizational integration on parenting advantage diminishes at higher levels of organizational integration. Additional qualitative data from 170 interviews with firms and ventures provide further explanatory insights suggesting managerial benefits from using an ‘on-demand’ approach.
- 26 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open Access´On Demand’ Parenting Advantage: How Top Managers Can Create Value for Internal Corporate Ventures
Prior corporate venturing research highlights the positive effect of top management support on parenting advantage. However, it remains unclear whether top managers should promote more integrative mechanisms or provide more entrepreneurial freedom. Based on data of 203 ventures, our findings suggest that organizational integration and organizational differentiation significantly increase parenting advantage, both individually and in combination. Yet, we also find that the positive effect of organizational integration on parenting advantage diminishes at higher levels of organizational integration. Additional qualitative data from 170 interviews with firms and ventures provide further explanatory insights suggesting managerial benefits from using an ‘on-demand’ approach.
- Open Access
- 18 October 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
How Do Households Set Prices? Evidence from College Football Rivalries and Airbnb
We find Airbnb hosts in college towns increase their listing prices more than hotels on games against rival football teams. These abnormally high listing prices lower the rental incomes of Airbnb hosts, suggesting that these household financial decisions are influenced by non-pecuniary preferences. We also find evidence that financial constraints mitigate these anti-rival preferences.
- 18 October 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessHow Do Households Set Prices? Evidence from College Football Rivalries and Airbnb
We find Airbnb hosts in college towns increase their listing prices more than hotels on games against rival football teams. These abnormally high listing prices lower the rental incomes of Airbnb hosts, suggesting that these household financial decisions are influenced by non-pecuniary preferences. We also find evidence that financial constraints mitigate these anti-rival preferences.
- Open Access
- 26 November 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Information Bundling and Securities Litigation
We examine two distinct forms of information bundling that can occur when a firm releases a restatement: “positive bundling,” the release of good news with the restatement, and “negative bundling,” the release of additional bad news. We use a triple differences testing approach to exploit the exogenous shock of a 2005 U.S. Supreme Court decision that heightened the loss causation requirements in securities class actions to examine how information bundling affects litigation risk and outcomes. We find that positive bundling offsets the stock decline at the restatement announcement, and significantly reduces the likelihood of litigation. In contrast, negative bundling magnifies the stock price decline accompanying a restatement, but makes litigation less attractive, by confounding the evidence about which piece of bad news caused the decline. On average, non-bundled restatements are 5.94 times more likely to result in litigation compared to bundled restatements in our set of treatment firms. Among restatements that lead to lawsuits, bundled restatements are 8.17 times more likely to be dismissed and are associated with approximately $20 to $24 million lower average settlement amounts.
- 26 November 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessInformation Bundling and Securities Litigation
We examine two distinct forms of information bundling that can occur when a firm releases a restatement: “positive bundling,” the release of good news with the restatement, and “negative bundling,” the release of additional bad news. We use a triple differences testing approach to exploit the exogenous shock of a 2005 U.S. Supreme Court decision that heightened the loss causation requirements in securities class actions to examine how information bundling affects litigation risk and outcomes. We find that positive bundling offsets the stock decline at the restatement announcement, and significantly reduces the likelihood of litigation. In contrast, negative bundling magnifies the stock price decline accompanying a restatement, but makes litigation less attractive, by confounding the evidence about which piece of bad news caused the decline. On average, non-bundled restatements are 5.94 times more likely to result in litigation compared to bundled restatements in our set of treatment firms. Among restatements that lead to lawsuits, bundled restatements are 8.17 times more likely to be dismissed and are associated with approximately $20 to $24 million lower average settlement amounts.
- Open Access
- 5 October 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Geography, Diversity, and Accuracy of Crowdsourced Earnings Forecasts
Using a novel dataset containing the forecasts of both buy-side and sell-side analysts, and individual investors, we find that crowdsourced earnings forecasts are more accurate than expert forecasts of sell-side analysts. Examining the economic mechanisms that generate superior crowd forecasts, we find that the diversity of contributors and their geographical proximity to firm locations improve forecast accuracy. The crowdsourced consensus is a better measure of the market’s true earnings expectations as earnings surprise based on this consensus generates stronger market reactions. A trading strategy based on the difference between the two consensus estimates yields an abnormal 10-day return of 0.465-1.975%.
- 5 October 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessGeography, Diversity, and Accuracy of Crowdsourced Earnings Forecasts
Using a novel dataset containing the forecasts of both buy-side and sell-side analysts, and individual investors, we find that crowdsourced earnings forecasts are more accurate than expert forecasts of sell-side analysts. Examining the economic mechanisms that generate superior crowd forecasts, we find that the diversity of contributors and their geographical proximity to firm locations improve forecast accuracy. The crowdsourced consensus is a better measure of the market’s true earnings expectations as earnings surprise based on this consensus generates stronger market reactions. A trading strategy based on the difference between the two consensus estimates yields an abnormal 10-day return of 0.465-1.975%.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Impact of Market Price Dissemination on Price Efficiency and Systematic Risk
The stock ticker was one of the earliest forms of information technology to affect financial markets. This device disseminated stock prices to brokerage offices with a ticker subscription. We find that an increased number of ticker subscriptions in a state strengthened return continuation and return co-movement among firms headquartered in the state. Therefore, price dissemination appears to have decreased price efficiency by increasing uninformed trading (trend chasing). Despite disseminating information on non-local stocks, an increase in ticker subscriptions did not mitigate local investment bias.
- 1 January 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Impact of Market Price Dissemination on Price Efficiency and Systematic Risk
The stock ticker was one of the earliest forms of information technology to affect financial markets. This device disseminated stock prices to brokerage offices with a ticker subscription. We find that an increased number of ticker subscriptions in a state strengthened return continuation and return co-movement among firms headquartered in the state. Therefore, price dissemination appears to have decreased price efficiency by increasing uninformed trading (trend chasing). Despite disseminating information on non-local stocks, an increase in ticker subscriptions did not mitigate local investment bias.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Corporate Payout, Cash Retention, and the Supply of Credit: Evidence from the 2008-09 Credit Crisis
Using the financial crisis as a natural experiment, we analyze the extent to which firms adjust financial policies on the margin in response to a credit supply
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCorporate Payout, Cash Retention, and the Supply of Credit: Evidence from the 2008-09 Credit Crisis
Using the financial crisis as a natural experiment, we analyze the extent to which firms adjust financial policies on the margin in response to a credit supply
- Open Access
- 15 March 2012
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Corporate Payout, Cash Retention, and the Supply of Credit: Evidence from the 2008-09 Credit Crisis
We study how firms manage the exogenous shock to the supply of credit during the financial crisis of 2008-2009 by examining their changes in corporate payout, cash holdings, and investments. Rising financing frictions and costs increase the marginal benefit of cash retention, causing firms to reallocate funds that would otherwise be distributed to shareholders. We find that firms with greater financial constraints and are more dependent on external capital, i.e., high leverage and low cash balances, are more likely to cut their payout to the shareholders during the financial crisis. We observe that the most commonly stated reason for payout reduction is to improve liquidity/cash balance. Firms use the proceeds from the reduction in payout to maintain cash levels and fund investments. If firms had not reduced their payout, they would have been operating at a below- normal cash level. Firms cutting dividends mainly use the funds to boost working capital, while firms reducing repurchases mainly use the cash saved to fund investments. Compared to firms who paid out during the crisis, the matched non-paying firms are able to conduct more investments during the crisis. Our results demonstrate that firms quickly alter their payout policy when the supply of external capital is subject to an adverse shock.
- 15 March 2012
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCorporate Payout, Cash Retention, and the Supply of Credit: Evidence from the 2008-09 Credit Crisis
We study how firms manage the exogenous shock to the supply of credit during the financial crisis of 2008-2009 by examining their changes in corporate payout, cash holdings, and investments. Rising financing frictions and costs increase the marginal benefit of cash retention, causing firms to reallocate funds that would otherwise be distributed to shareholders. We find that firms with greater financial constraints and are more dependent on external capital, i.e., high leverage and low cash balances, are more likely to cut their payout to the shareholders during the financial crisis. We observe that the most commonly stated reason for payout reduction is to improve liquidity/cash balance. Firms use the proceeds from the reduction in payout to maintain cash levels and fund investments. If firms had not reduced their payout, they would have been operating at a below- normal cash level. Firms cutting dividends mainly use the funds to boost working capital, while firms reducing repurchases mainly use the cash saved to fund investments. Compared to firms who paid out during the crisis, the matched non-paying firms are able to conduct more investments during the crisis. Our results demonstrate that firms quickly alter their payout policy when the supply of external capital is subject to an adverse shock.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2011
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Corporate Payout, Information Asymmetry, and the Financial Crisis
We study the effect of the recent financial crisis on corporate payout policy, in the framework of information asymmetry. The firm-level information asymmetry increases significantly in the financial crisis. As the benefits of cash retention increase due to the deepened information asymmetry and the reduced supply of external capital, corporate payout declines significantly in the crisis. Firms with larger increases in information asymmetry are more likely to cut payout in the crisis. Firms who pay out regularly have less severe asymmetric information problem than firms who do not pay out regularly. The corporate payout is more concentrated in regular paying firms during the crisis than in the non-crisis period. The market reacts to the buyback announcements more favorably in the crisis than in the non-crisis period, and the buyback announcements by occasional repurchasers receive stronger reaction from the investors than those by the regular repurchasers.
- 1 January 2011
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCorporate Payout, Information Asymmetry, and the Financial Crisis
We study the effect of the recent financial crisis on corporate payout policy, in the framework of information asymmetry. The firm-level information asymmetry increases significantly in the financial crisis. As the benefits of cash retention increase due to the deepened information asymmetry and the reduced supply of external capital, corporate payout declines significantly in the crisis. Firms with larger increases in information asymmetry are more likely to cut payout in the crisis. Firms who pay out regularly have less severe asymmetric information problem than firms who do not pay out regularly. The corporate payout is more concentrated in regular paying firms during the crisis than in the non-crisis period. The market reacts to the buyback announcements more favorably in the crisis than in the non-crisis period, and the buyback announcements by occasional repurchasers receive stronger reaction from the investors than those by the regular repurchasers.