Bruno Tuffin
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Bruno Tuffin has a total of 55 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Patrick Maillé
UMR CNRS IRISA 6074 Rennes France
41 shared publications Patrick Maillé
13 shared publications- Pierre L'Ecuyer
Université de Montréal
6 shared publications - Gwendal Simon
Synamedia
4 shared publications - Marvin K. Nakayama
Department of Computer Science, New Jersey Institute of Technology, Newark, New Jersey 07102
4 shared publications - Burak Kara
Inria, Rennes, France
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 2 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation
Efficiency of Estimating Smooth Functions of Parameters in Rare-Event Contexts
Consider an estimand that is a known smooth function of an unknown vector of parameters, such as means, probabilities, quantiles, etc. Some but not necessarily all of the parameters relate to rare events, which typically make them difficult to estimate with naive Monte Carlo, so variance-reduction techniques must be applied to obtain efficient estimators of those parameters. We develop conditions ensuring that the overall estimand can be efficiently estimated, providing both sufficient and necessary-and-sufficient conditions. The paper illustrates the applicability of the theory through many examples and numerical results.
- 2 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation
Open AccessEfficiency of Estimating Smooth Functions of Parameters in Rare-Event Contexts
Consider an estimand that is a known smooth function of an unknown vector of parameters, such as means, probabilities, quantiles, etc. Some but not necessarily all of the parameters relate to rare events, which typically make them difficult to estimate with naive Monte Carlo, so variance-reduction techniques must be applied to obtain efficient estimators of those parameters. We develop conditions ensuring that the overall estimand can be efficiently estimated, providing both sufficient and necessary-and-sufficient conditions. The paper illustrates the applicability of the theory through many examples and numerical results.
- Open Access
- 14 August 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Modeling and Performance Evaluation of Computing Systems
- Vol. 11 (3) , 1-25
Environmental Regulation in CDN Market: A Game-Theoretic Framework
This article examines how environmental regulation shapes pricing, capacity allocation, and infrastructure investment in the competitive Content Delivery Network (CDN) market. We develop a hierarchical game-theoretic framework modeling strategic interactions among multiple CDNs, a service provider, and end-users, capturing both economic and environmental objectives. Using backward induction, we analyze equilibrium behavior under two regulatory regimes—a baseline scenario without intervention and a regulated scenario, where CDNs incur taxes proportional to dirty capacity usage. Our analysis yields four principal findings. First, a structural tax threshold τ * , governed by the gap between renewable and fossil-fuel energy costs, determines the transition from carbon-intensive to clean infrastructure. Second, a moderate tax slightly above τ * achieves near-complete clean adoption at a total welfare loss of only 6.5,%. Third, government revenue is non-monotonic in the tax rate, peaking at low levels and collapsing as CDNs shift to untaxed clean capacity. Fourth, since the infrastructure-transition threshold is governed by the energy-cost gap of each provider, a uniform carbon tax imposes asymmetric burdens once these costs are heterogeneous across CDNs, motivating tiered tax designs. These results provide insights for policymakers seeking to align sustainability objectives with competitive dynamics in the content delivery market.
- 14 August 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Modeling and Performance Evaluation of Computing Systems
- Vol. 11 (3) , 1-25
Open AccessEnvironmental Regulation in CDN Market: A Game-Theoretic Framework
This article examines how environmental regulation shapes pricing, capacity allocation, and infrastructure investment in the competitive Content Delivery Network (CDN) market. We develop a hierarchical game-theoretic framework modeling strategic interactions among multiple CDNs, a service provider, and end-users, capturing both economic and environmental objectives. Using backward induction, we analyze equilibrium behavior under two regulatory regimes—a baseline scenario without intervention and a regulated scenario, where CDNs incur taxes proportional to dirty capacity usage. Our analysis yields four principal findings. First, a structural tax threshold τ * , governed by the gap between renewable and fossil-fuel energy costs, determines the transition from carbon-intensive to clean infrastructure. Second, a moderate tax slightly above τ * achieves near-complete clean adoption at a total welfare loss of only 6.5,%. Third, government revenue is non-monotonic in the tax rate, peaking at low levels and collapsing as CDNs shift to untaxed clean capacity. Fourth, since the infrastructure-transition threshold is governed by the energy-cost gap of each provider, a uniform carbon tax imposes asymmetric burdens once these costs are heterogeneous across CDNs, motivating tiered tax designs. These results provide insights for policymakers seeking to align sustainability objectives with competitive dynamics in the content delivery market.
- 2 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 417-424
Detection of Non-neutrality in Video Streaming: Demonstrating and Evaluating the Wehe Tool
- 2 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 417-424
Detection of Non-neutrality in Video Streaming: Demonstrating and Evaluating the Wehe Tool
- Open Access
Statistical Methods within Network Neutrality Monitoring Tools
Network neutrality is a sensitive topic worldwide. Laws are passed and regulators are expected to monitor providers activities to check if they conform to the enacted rules. Therefore, tools need to be designed towards that goal but require strong theoretical validations if used for justifying legal actions. Our goal is to review the statistical grounds of the proposed tools, focusing in particular on Wehe, co-designed by the French regulator ARCEP. We provide a statistical analysis of the method used in Wehe, compared with standard ones.
Open AccessStatistical Methods within Network Neutrality Monitoring Tools
Network neutrality is a sensitive topic worldwide. Laws are passed and regulators are expected to monitor providers activities to check if they conform to the enacted rules. Therefore, tools need to be designed towards that goal but require strong theoretical validations if used for justifying legal actions. Our goal is to review the statistical grounds of the proposed tools, focusing in particular on Wehe, co-designed by the French regulator ARCEP. We provide a statistical analysis of the method used in Wehe, compared with standard ones.
- Open Access
- 18 February 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 69-70
Modeling Energy Regulations for CDN Economics
- 18 February 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 69-70
Open AccessModeling Energy Regulations for CDN Economics
- 6 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 94-99
How to Accommodate Network Slicing and Network Neutrality?
- 6 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 94-99
How to Accommodate Network Slicing and Network Neutrality?
- 21 January 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 73-82
Impact of Regulation and the Digital Markets Act on Competing Platforms
- 21 January 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 73-82
Impact of Regulation and the Digital Markets Act on Competing Platforms
- Open Access
Strategic Bandwidth Pricing and Allocation in a 5G/6G Network Slicing Stackelberg Game (Extended Version with Proofs)
Network slicing, a key feature of next-generation mobile networks, has underexplored economic implications. We model a Stackelberg game where a mobile operator sells a slice to a service provider offering two service tiers, showing that slicing boosts revenues and improves resource allocation.
Open AccessStrategic Bandwidth Pricing and Allocation in a 5G/6G Network Slicing Stackelberg Game (Extended Version with Proofs)
Network slicing, a key feature of next-generation mobile networks, has underexplored economic implications. We model a Stackelberg game where a mobile operator sells a slice to a service provider offering two service tiers, showing that slicing boosts revenues and improves resource allocation.
- Open Access
Sellers' Pay-for-Ranking Strategies on Platforms
Digital platforms shape users' choices and opinions through the ranking of the displayed items, the top-ranked ones being more likely to be considered than the next ones. While we expect the ranking to be based on some sort of relevance, there is a suspicion that platforms could alter their ranking to promote some content for financial or economic reasons, among other possibilities. We consider a model of a ranking platform implementing revenue-maximizing rankings, and analyze the strategy of sellers paying to be ranked higher for a better exposition, thereby increasing sales. We investigate the impact of such strategic behaviors on revenues, overall click rates for all actors, and global relevance perceived by users.
Open AccessSellers' Pay-for-Ranking Strategies on Platforms
Digital platforms shape users' choices and opinions through the ranking of the displayed items, the top-ranked ones being more likely to be considered than the next ones. While we expect the ranking to be based on some sort of relevance, there is a suspicion that platforms could alter their ranking to promote some content for financial or economic reasons, among other possibilities. We consider a model of a ranking platform implementing revenue-maximizing rankings, and analyze the strategy of sellers paying to be ranked higher for a better exposition, thereby increasing sales. We investigate the impact of such strategic behaviors on revenues, overall click rates for all actors, and global relevance perceived by users.
- Open Access
Economic analysis of DMA-constrained data sharing strategies among platforms
To stimulate innovation and competition in the digital sector, the European Commission has adopted the Digital Markets Act (DMA), that aims at limiting the gatekeeping power of the biggest actors. For instance, such prevailing platforms may be forced to share with their competitors some, or all, of the data they collected on users that can help improve service quality. This paper proposes a model to analyze the impacts of such a regulation, by comparing (i) a laisser-faire situation where prevailing platforms are free to sell data to newcomer service providers, (ii) the case when platforms can decide to share data but charging newcomers is prohibited, and (iii) a scenario where data sharing is imposed and enforced by the regulator. We investigate the impacts of those scenarios on key metrics like User Welfare, provider revenues, and user demand repartition.
Open AccessEconomic analysis of DMA-constrained data sharing strategies among platforms
To stimulate innovation and competition in the digital sector, the European Commission has adopted the Digital Markets Act (DMA), that aims at limiting the gatekeeping power of the biggest actors. For instance, such prevailing platforms may be forced to share with their competitors some, or all, of the data they collected on users that can help improve service quality. This paper proposes a model to analyze the impacts of such a regulation, by comparing (i) a laisser-faire situation where prevailing platforms are free to sell data to newcomer service providers, (ii) the case when platforms can decide to share data but charging newcomers is prohibited, and (iii) a scenario where data sharing is imposed and enforced by the regulator. We investigate the impacts of those scenarios on key metrics like User Welfare, provider revenues, and user demand repartition.