Strategic Bandwidth Pricing and Allocation in a 5G/6G Network Slicing Stackelberg Game (Extended Version with Proofs)
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Abstract
Network slicing, a key feature of next-generation mobile networks, has underexplored economic implications. We model a Stackelberg game where a mobile operator sells a slice to a service provider offering two service tiers, showing that slicing boosts revenues and improves resource allocation.Keywords
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