Elliott Sober
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Elliott Sober has a total of 45 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- William Roche
Department of Philosophy, Texas Christian University, Fort Worth, USA
5 shared publications - Mike Steel
Biomathematics Research Centre, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand
3 shared publications Matthew J. Maxwell
2 shared publicationsAlan Millar
UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, CB2 1RP, United Kingdom CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, United Kingdom 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA 10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia
1 shared publicationAndrew Whiten
Cambridge University
1 shared publicationAnthony B. Atkinson
Cambridge University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 21 July 2026
- Published by PubPub
Ockham’s Razor
Ockham’s razor (also known as the principle of parsimony or the principle of simplicity) encompasses a variety of possible principles, all of which regard the simplicity of a theory as a virtue. The central question about the razor is when and why parsimony is epistemically relevant to the evaluatio
- 21 July 2026
- Published by PubPub
Open AccessOckham’s Razor
Ockham’s razor (also known as the principle of parsimony or the principle of simplicity) encompasses a variety of possible principles, all of which regard the simplicity of a theory as a virtue. The central question about the razor is when and why parsimony is epistemically relevant to the evaluatio
- 30 April 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- Vol. 2981, 1-12
Retrodiction in Evolutionary Genomics: A Philosophical Perspective
I begin with an intuitively plausible principle: if proposition H retrodicts or predicts that proposition D is true, then Pr(D|H) > ½. I then consider the difference between forward-directed and backward-directed conditional probabilities. Until the 1980s, population genetics theory was dominated by the former; the situation changed with the appearance of coalescent theory, which deploys the latter. A forward-directed probability model cannot retrodict, and a backward-directed model cannot predict. A Bayesian model will do both if it deploys both types of conditional probability. I then describe ideas from model selection theory in statistics that throw doubt on the idea that true models of a process will always be more accurate predictors or retrodictors than false models of that process. I then discuss theorems in information theory that show how the passage of time degrades information in a causal chain. The rate of information loss can be reduced and even cancelled by the branching process in phylogenetic trees. The separation of within-lineage from across-lineage assessments of information loss is an instance of Simpson’s paradox.
- 30 April 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- Vol. 2981, 1-12
Retrodiction in Evolutionary Genomics: A Philosophical Perspective
I begin with an intuitively plausible principle: if proposition H retrodicts or predicts that proposition D is true, then Pr(D|H) > ½. I then consider the difference between forward-directed and backward-directed conditional probabilities. Until the 1980s, population genetics theory was dominated by the former; the situation changed with the appearance of coalescent theory, which deploys the latter. A forward-directed probability model cannot retrodict, and a backward-directed model cannot predict. A Bayesian model will do both if it deploys both types of conditional probability. I then describe ideas from model selection theory in statistics that throw doubt on the idea that true models of a process will always be more accurate predictors or retrodictors than false models of that process. I then discuss theorems in information theory that show how the passage of time degrades information in a causal chain. The rate of information loss can be reduced and even cancelled by the branching process in phylogenetic trees. The separation of within-lineage from across-lineage assessments of information loss is an instance of Simpson’s paradox.
- Open Access
- 9 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 207 (2)
Comparing the strengths of two causes of an effect − zeroing-out, adding-in, and the need for baselines
Suppose 50-year-old Sue now has lung cancer, due to the fact that C = c & A = g (meaning that Sue smoked c cigarettes and inhaled g grams of asbestos over the previous 30 years), and that neither cause caused the other. Given this, a retrospective question arises – did one of those actual causes have a stronger influence than the other on her getting lung cancer? We propose a “zeroing-out” criterion for making sense of this question; it says that C = c was a stronger causal influence than A = g precisely when Pr(lung cancer | C = c & A = g) – Pr(lung cancer | C = 0 & A = g) > Pr(lung cancer | C = c & A = g) – Pr(lung cancer | C = c & A = 0). Zeroing-out uses Pr(lung cancer | C = c & A = g) as a baseline and relates that baseline to two counterfactual probabilities. We discuss how zeroing-out applies to three evolutionary examples − the influences of selection and drift on the fixation of an allele, the influences of group and individual selection on the evolution of altruism, and the influences of stabilizing selection and ancestral influence (aka “phylogenetic inertia”) on the evolution of tetrapody in land vertebrates. Zeroing-out differs from an “adding-in” criterion, which uses Sue’s probability of having lung cancer at age 50, given her actual state at age 20 (at which time she was cancer free and C = 0 & A = 0) as a baseline and asks whether her risk of having lung cancer at age 50 would be greater if C = c were true of the 30 years in between than it would be if A = g were true of those years. Zeroing-out and adding-in generate identical criteria for comparing causal influences in this example because the probabilities are related “monotonically” (a concept we define). We then describe examples in which monotonicity fails and the two criteria differ. We prove theorems that describe when the two criteria disagree and when they do not. We then consider how zeroing-out and adding-in are related to six quantitative measures of causal strength that have been proposed. Inter alia, we discuss how our framework is related to interventionism.
- 9 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 207 (2)
Open AccessComparing the strengths of two causes of an effect − zeroing-out, adding-in, and the need for baselines
Suppose 50-year-old Sue now has lung cancer, due to the fact that C = c & A = g (meaning that Sue smoked c cigarettes and inhaled g grams of asbestos over the previous 30 years), and that neither cause caused the other. Given this, a retrospective question arises – did one of those actual causes have a stronger influence than the other on her getting lung cancer? We propose a “zeroing-out” criterion for making sense of this question; it says that C = c was a stronger causal influence than A = g precisely when Pr(lung cancer | C = c & A = g) – Pr(lung cancer | C = 0 & A = g) > Pr(lung cancer | C = c & A = g) – Pr(lung cancer | C = c & A = 0). Zeroing-out uses Pr(lung cancer | C = c & A = g) as a baseline and relates that baseline to two counterfactual probabilities. We discuss how zeroing-out applies to three evolutionary examples − the influences of selection and drift on the fixation of an allele, the influences of group and individual selection on the evolution of altruism, and the influences of stabilizing selection and ancestral influence (aka “phylogenetic inertia”) on the evolution of tetrapody in land vertebrates. Zeroing-out differs from an “adding-in” criterion, which uses Sue’s probability of having lung cancer at age 50, given her actual state at age 20 (at which time she was cancer free and C = 0 & A = 0) as a baseline and asks whether her risk of having lung cancer at age 50 would be greater if C = c were true of the 30 years in between than it would be if A = g were true of those years. Zeroing-out and adding-in generate identical criteria for comparing causal influences in this example because the probabilities are related “monotonically” (a concept we define). We then describe examples in which monotonicity fails and the two criteria differ. We prove theorems that describe when the two criteria disagree and when they do not. We then consider how zeroing-out and adding-in are related to six quantitative measures of causal strength that have been proposed. Inter alia, we discuss how our framework is related to interventionism.
- Open Access
- 3 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal for General Philosophy of Science
- p. 1-39
Inference to the Best Explanation, Bayesianism, and the Screening-Off Challenge: A Critical Review
In their 2013 paper, William Roche and Elliott Sober used Bayesian confirmation theory and the probabilistic concept of screening-off to pose problems for the epistemological theory of Inference to the Best Explanation. Several philosophers replied to those criticisms and Roche and Sober refined and extended their critique in subsequent papers. This article assesses where the debate now stands.
- 3 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal for General Philosophy of Science
- p. 1-39
Open AccessInference to the Best Explanation, Bayesianism, and the Screening-Off Challenge: A Critical Review
In their 2013 paper, William Roche and Elliott Sober used Bayesian confirmation theory and the probabilistic concept of screening-off to pose problems for the epistemological theory of Inference to the Best Explanation. Several philosophers replied to those criticisms and Roche and Sober refined and extended their critique in subsequent papers. This article assesses where the debate now stands.
- Open Access
- 31 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 15 (3) , 1-18
The epistemic status of derivational robustness
A proposition is derivationally robust precisely when it is a prediction of each model in an ensemble of models. We show that a recent and influential Bayesian defense of the epistemic merits of derivational robustness analysis faces substantial obstacles. The main reason for this is that a Bayesian characterization of derivational robustness requires one to condition on a logical or mathematical truth. Standardly, however, conditioning on a logical or mathematical truth cannot raise or lower the probability of any proposition, which means confirmation in such cases is impossible. What is required for a Bayesian defense of derivational robustness to be plausible is the adoption of a non-standard probability calculus, but the details of such an account have yet to be worked out in sufficient detail. We close by arguing against the view that agreement among multiple models has a confirmatory status that is the same or similar to agreement among multiple measurements of some quantity. It is straightforward to show that agreement among measurements has epistemic significance. This is not true for derivational robustness.
- 31 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 15 (3) , 1-18
Open AccessThe epistemic status of derivational robustness
A proposition is derivationally robust precisely when it is a prediction of each model in an ensemble of models. We show that a recent and influential Bayesian defense of the epistemic merits of derivational robustness analysis faces substantial obstacles. The main reason for this is that a Bayesian characterization of derivational robustness requires one to condition on a logical or mathematical truth. Standardly, however, conditioning on a logical or mathematical truth cannot raise or lower the probability of any proposition, which means confirmation in such cases is impossible. What is required for a Bayesian defense of derivational robustness to be plausible is the adoption of a non-standard probability calculus, but the details of such an account have yet to be worked out in sufficient detail. We close by arguing against the view that agreement among multiple models has a confirmatory status that is the same or similar to agreement among multiple measurements of some quantity. It is straightforward to show that agreement among measurements has epistemic significance. This is not true for derivational robustness.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Centre for Evaluation in Education and Science (CEON/CEES) in Belgrade Philosophical Annual
- Vol. 38 (2) , 53-61
C. Lloyd Morgan's good argument for his canon
C. Lloyd Morgan's Canon says that a higher mental faculty should not be postulated to explain an organism's behavior if the behavior can be explained by the hypothesis that it has a lower faculty. This epistemological principle strongly influenced and continues to influence cognitive science. The focus of this paper is on Morgan's own argument for the Canon, which philosophers have generally held to be fatally flawed. We disagree. Morgan's good argument for his canon is grounded in Morgan's assumption that an organism that has a higher mental faculty must also have a lower one, together with his belief that a new mental faculty evolves only if it provides a new adaptive advantage. Our main goal here is not to defend Morgan's canon or his argument for it, but to identify the argument's logical location in Morgan's larger framework.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Centre for Evaluation in Education and Science (CEON/CEES) in Belgrade Philosophical Annual
- Vol. 38 (2) , 53-61
Open AccessC. Lloyd Morgan's good argument for his canon
C. Lloyd Morgan's Canon says that a higher mental faculty should not be postulated to explain an organism's behavior if the behavior can be explained by the hypothesis that it has a lower faculty. This epistemological principle strongly influenced and continues to influence cognitive science. The focus of this paper is on Morgan's own argument for the Canon, which philosophers have generally held to be fatally flawed. We disagree. Morgan's good argument for his canon is grounded in Morgan's assumption that an organism that has a higher mental faculty must also have a lower one, together with his belief that a new mental faculty evolves only if it provides a new adaptive advantage. Our main goal here is not to defend Morgan's canon or his argument for it, but to identify the argument's logical location in Morgan's larger framework.
- 3 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Asian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 3 (1) , 1-11
Thoughts on Jun Otsuka’s Thinking about Statistics – the Philosphical Foundations
- 3 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Asian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 3 (1) , 1-11
Thoughts on Jun Otsuka’s Thinking about Statistics – the Philosphical Foundations
- 8 May 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 118-126
Darwin's model of sex ratio evolution in the first edition of Descent of Man and his mysterious retraction in the second
In the first edition of Descent of Man, Darwin presents a model of how natural selection causes the sex ratio in a population to evolve. The key idea in his model is that selection favors an even sex ratio when there is monogamy and a female-biased sex ratio when there is polygyny. In the second edition, Darwin withdraws his endorsement of this model, but does not explain why. Here I explain Darwin’s model and describe how it traces back to John Arbuthnot’s 1710 article “An Argument for Divine Providence, Taken from the Constant Regularity Observ’d in the Births of Both Sexes”, which Darwin learned about from reading William Paley’s 1795 book The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy. I offer two possible explanations of Darwin’s retraction. The first involves a style of phylogenetic reasoning that Darwin used multiple times in the Origin. The second involves an idea that Darwin recognized in other contexts, that what matters to a trait’s evolving by natural selection is its average effect on survival and reproduction; looking exclusively at the worst effect a trait can have is a mistake.
- 8 May 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 118-126
Darwin's model of sex ratio evolution in the first edition of Descent of Man and his mysterious retraction in the second
In the first edition of Descent of Man, Darwin presents a model of how natural selection causes the sex ratio in a population to evolve. The key idea in his model is that selection favors an even sex ratio when there is monogamy and a female-biased sex ratio when there is polygyny. In the second edition, Darwin withdraws his endorsement of this model, but does not explain why. Here I explain Darwin’s model and describe how it traces back to John Arbuthnot’s 1710 article “An Argument for Divine Providence, Taken from the Constant Regularity Observ’d in the Births of Both Sexes”, which Darwin learned about from reading William Paley’s 1795 book The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy. I offer two possible explanations of Darwin’s retraction. The first involves a style of phylogenetic reasoning that Darwin used multiple times in the Origin. The second involves an idea that Darwin recognized in other contexts, that what matters to a trait’s evolving by natural selection is its average effect on survival and reproduction; looking exclusively at the worst effect a trait can have is a mistake.
- Open Access
- 17 January 2024
- Published by The Royal Society in Royal Society Open Science
- Vol. 11 (1) , 231532
Still little evidence sex differences in spatial navigation are evolutionary adaptations
A putative male advantage in wayfinding ability is the most widely documented sex difference in human cognition and has also been observed in other animals. The common interpretation, the sex-specific adaptation hypothesis, posits that this male advantage evolved as an adaptive response to sex differences in home range size. A previous study a decade ago tested this hypothesis by comparing sex differences in home range size and spatial ability among 11 species and found no relationship. However, the study was limited by the small sample size, the lack of species with a larger female home range and the lack of non-Western human data. The present study represents an update that addresses all of these limitations, including data from 10 more species and from human subsistence cultures. Consistent with the previous result, we found little evidence that sex differences in spatial navigation and home range size are related. We conclude that sex differences in spatial ability are more likely due to experiential factors and/or unselected biological side effects, rather than functional outcomes of natural selection.
- 17 January 2024
- Published by The Royal Society in Royal Society Open Science
- Vol. 11 (1) , 231532
Open AccessStill little evidence sex differences in spatial navigation are evolutionary adaptations
A putative male advantage in wayfinding ability is the most widely documented sex difference in human cognition and has also been observed in other animals. The common interpretation, the sex-specific adaptation hypothesis, posits that this male advantage evolved as an adaptive response to sex differences in home range size. A previous study a decade ago tested this hypothesis by comparing sex differences in home range size and spatial ability among 11 species and found no relationship. However, the study was limited by the small sample size, the lack of species with a larger female home range and the lack of non-Western human data. The present study represents an update that addresses all of these limitations, including data from 10 more species and from human subsistence cultures. Consistent with the previous result, we found little evidence that sex differences in spatial navigation and home range size are related. We conclude that sex differences in spatial ability are more likely due to experiential factors and/or unselected biological side effects, rather than functional outcomes of natural selection.
- 28 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Biology & Philosophy
- Vol. 38 (2) , 1-22
Gradualism, natural selection, and the randomness of mutation–fisher, Kimura, and Orr, connecting the dots
- 28 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Biology & Philosophy
- Vol. 38 (2) , 1-22
Gradualism, natural selection, and the randomness of mutation–fisher, Kimura, and Orr, connecting the dots