Steven Hecht Orzack
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Steven Hecht Orzack has a total of 20 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
J. William Stubblefield
Fresh Pond Research Institute, Cambridge, MA 02140
2 shared publicationsShripad Tuljapurkar
Fresh Pond Research Inst., Cambridge, MA 02140, USA
2 shared publications- Ulrich Karl Steiner
Freie Universität Berlin, Institute of Biology
2 shared publications - W. G. S. Hines
Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ont., Canada N1G 2W1
2 shared publications - Brian McLoone
Department of Philosophy, Auburn University, Auburn, USA
1 shared publication Daniel Gusfield
Department of Computer Science, University of California, Davis, California 95616
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 31 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 15 (3) , 1-18
The epistemic status of derivational robustness
A proposition is derivationally robust precisely when it is a prediction of each model in an ensemble of models. We show that a recent and influential Bayesian defense of the epistemic merits of derivational robustness analysis faces substantial obstacles. The main reason for this is that a Bayesian characterization of derivational robustness requires one to condition on a logical or mathematical truth. Standardly, however, conditioning on a logical or mathematical truth cannot raise or lower the probability of any proposition, which means confirmation in such cases is impossible. What is required for a Bayesian defense of derivational robustness to be plausible is the adoption of a non-standard probability calculus, but the details of such an account have yet to be worked out in sufficient detail. We close by arguing against the view that agreement among multiple models has a confirmatory status that is the same or similar to agreement among multiple measurements of some quantity. It is straightforward to show that agreement among measurements has epistemic significance. This is not true for derivational robustness.
- 31 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 15 (3) , 1-18
Open AccessThe epistemic status of derivational robustness
A proposition is derivationally robust precisely when it is a prediction of each model in an ensemble of models. We show that a recent and influential Bayesian defense of the epistemic merits of derivational robustness analysis faces substantial obstacles. The main reason for this is that a Bayesian characterization of derivational robustness requires one to condition on a logical or mathematical truth. Standardly, however, conditioning on a logical or mathematical truth cannot raise or lower the probability of any proposition, which means confirmation in such cases is impossible. What is required for a Bayesian defense of derivational robustness to be plausible is the adoption of a non-standard probability calculus, but the details of such an account have yet to be worked out in sufficient detail. We close by arguing against the view that agreement among multiple models has a confirmatory status that is the same or similar to agreement among multiple measurements of some quantity. It is straightforward to show that agreement among measurements has epistemic significance. This is not true for derivational robustness.
- Top Cited Papers
- 30 March 2015
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 112 (16) , E2102-E2111
The human sex ratio from conception to birth
We describe the trajectory of the human sex ratio from conception to birth by analyzing data from (i) 3- to 6-d-old embryos, (ii) induced abortions, (iii) chorionic villus sampling, (iv) amniocentesis, and (v) fetal deaths and live births. Our dataset is the most comprehensive and largest ever assembled to estimate the sex ratio at conception and the sex ratio trajectory and is the first, to our knowledge, to include all of these types of data. Our estimate of the sex ratio at conception is 0.5 (proportion male), which contradicts the common claim that the sex ratio at conception is male-biased. The sex ratio among abnormal embryos is male-biased, and the sex ratio among normal embryos is female-biased. These biases are associated with the abnormal/normal state of the sex chromosomes and of chromosomes 15 and 17. The sex ratio may decrease in the first week or so after conception (due to excess male mortality); it then increases for at least 10–15 wk (due to excess female mortality), levels off after ∼20 wk, and declines slowly from 28 to 35 wk (due to excess male mortality). Total female mortality during pregnancy exceeds total male mortality. The unbiased sex ratio at conception, the increase in the sex ratio during the first trimester, and total mortality during pregnancy being greater for females are fundamental insights into early human development. Significance The human sex ratio has long interested cell biologists, developmental biologists, demographers, epidemiologists, evolutionary biologists, gynecologists, and statisticians. Nonetheless, the trajectory of the human sex ratio from conception to birth has been poorly characterized. We present the most comprehensive analysis of this trajectory ever done. Our dataset is the largest ever assembled to estimate the sex ratio at conception and is the first, to our knowledge, to include data from 3- to- 6-d-old embryos, induced abortions, chorionic villus sampling, amniocentesis, and fetal deaths and live births. Our results indicate that the sex ratio at conception is unbiased, the proportion of males increases during the first trimester, and total female mortality during pregnancy exceeds total male mortality; these are fundamental insights into early human development.
- 30 March 2015
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 112 (16) , E2102-E2111
Top Cited PapersThe human sex ratio from conception to birth
We describe the trajectory of the human sex ratio from conception to birth by analyzing data from (i) 3- to 6-d-old embryos, (ii) induced abortions, (iii) chorionic villus sampling, (iv) amniocentesis, and (v) fetal deaths and live births. Our dataset is the most comprehensive and largest ever assembled to estimate the sex ratio at conception and the sex ratio trajectory and is the first, to our knowledge, to include all of these types of data. Our estimate of the sex ratio at conception is 0.5 (proportion male), which contradicts the common claim that the sex ratio at conception is male-biased. The sex ratio among abnormal embryos is male-biased, and the sex ratio among normal embryos is female-biased. These biases are associated with the abnormal/normal state of the sex chromosomes and of chromosomes 15 and 17. The sex ratio may decrease in the first week or so after conception (due to excess male mortality); it then increases for at least 10–15 wk (due to excess female mortality), levels off after ∼20 wk, and declines slowly from 28 to 35 wk (due to excess male mortality). Total female mortality during pregnancy exceeds total male mortality. The unbiased sex ratio at conception, the increase in the sex ratio during the first trimester, and total mortality during pregnancy being greater for females are fundamental insights into early human development. Significance The human sex ratio has long interested cell biologists, developmental biologists, demographers, epidemiologists, evolutionary biologists, gynecologists, and statisticians. Nonetheless, the trajectory of the human sex ratio from conception to birth has been poorly characterized. We present the most comprehensive analysis of this trajectory ever done. Our dataset is the largest ever assembled to estimate the sex ratio at conception and is the first, to our knowledge, to include data from 3- to- 6-d-old embryos, induced abortions, chorionic villus sampling, amniocentesis, and fetal deaths and live births. Our results indicate that the sex ratio at conception is unbiased, the proportion of males increases during the first trimester, and total female mortality during pregnancy exceeds total male mortality; these are fundamental insights into early human development.
- 25 January 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Biology & Philosophy
- Vol. 29 (2) , 259-270
A commentary on “The Formal Darwinism Project”: there is no grandeur in this view of life
- 25 January 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Biology & Philosophy
- Vol. 29 (2) , 259-270
A commentary on “The Formal Darwinism Project”: there is no grandeur in this view of life
- 28 February 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Population Biology
- Vol. 83, 64-81
Resource transfers and evolution: Helpful offspring and sex allocation
- 28 February 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Population Biology
- Vol. 83, 64-81
Resource transfers and evolution: Helpful offspring and sex allocation
- 19 January 2012
- Published by The Royal Society in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Vol. 367 (1586) , 170-180
The philosophy of modelling or does the philosophy of biology have any use?
Biologists in search of answers to real-world issues such as the ecological consequences of global warming, the design of species' conservation plans, understanding landscape dynamics and understanding gene expression make decisions constantly that are based on a ‘philosophical’ stance as to how to create and test explanations of an observed phenomenon. For better or for worse, some kind of philosophy is an integral part of the doing of biology. Given this, it is more important than ever to undertake a practical assessment of what philosophy does mean and should mean to biologists. Here, I address three questions: should biologists pay any attention to ‘philosophy’; should biologists pay any attention to ‘philosophy of biology’; and should biologists pay any attention to the philosophy of biology literature on modelling? I describe why the last question is easily answered affirmatively, with the proviso that the practical benefits to be gained by biologists from this literature will be directly proportional to the extent to which biologists understand ‘philosophy’ to be a part of biology, not apart from biology.
- 19 January 2012
- Published by The Royal Society in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Vol. 367 (1586) , 170-180
The philosophy of modelling or does the philosophy of biology have any use?
Biologists in search of answers to real-world issues such as the ecological consequences of global warming, the design of species' conservation plans, understanding landscape dynamics and understanding gene expression make decisions constantly that are based on a ‘philosophical’ stance as to how to create and test explanations of an observed phenomenon. For better or for worse, some kind of philosophy is an integral part of the doing of biology. Given this, it is more important than ever to undertake a practical assessment of what philosophy does mean and should mean to biologists. Here, I address three questions: should biologists pay any attention to ‘philosophy’; should biologists pay any attention to ‘philosophy of biology’; and should biologists pay any attention to the philosophy of biology literature on modelling? I describe why the last question is easily answered affirmatively, with the proviso that the practical benefits to be gained by biologists from this literature will be directly proportional to the extent to which biologists understand ‘philosophy’ to be a part of biology, not apart from biology.
- Open Access
Static and dynamic expression of life history traits in the northern fulmar Fulmarus glacialis
Understanding the static and dynamic expression of life history traits is a prerequisite for the development of a causal theory of the evolution of aging and of life histories. We analyzed the statics and dynamics of reproduction and survival in a wild population of the northern fulmar, Fulmarus glacialis (Procellaridae). Survival rate is most influenced by year as compared to age and cohort. When temporal variation is ignored, survival rate increases slowly with age and then declines more rapidly at late ages. Survival rate contingent upon reproductive ‘stratum’ (producing an egg, hatching an egg, fledging a hatchling) also exhibits this pattern. Survival and reproduction have a positive static association in that survival rate increases as the apparent energy allocated to reproduction increases (as indexed by stratum). There is a broad distribution of realized lifetime reproductive success, which could be due to ‘fixed’ heterogeneity, with some individuals always having low survival and reproduction and others always having high survival and reproduction, or be due to ‘dynamic’ heterogeneity, with all individuals having the same expected reproductive and survival rates. Analysis of stochastic stratum dynamics indicates that individuals do not remain long in any given stratum and suggest that the variation among individuals with respect to lifetime reproductive success is due to dynamic heterogeneity. The probability of producing an egg increases with age for both sexes, whereas the probability of producing a fledgling initially declines with age and then increases. These results underscore the necessity of understanding the static and dynamic expression of demographic traits when making a causal claim about their evolution.
Open AccessStatic and dynamic expression of life history traits in the northern fulmar Fulmarus glacialis
Understanding the static and dynamic expression of life history traits is a prerequisite for the development of a causal theory of the evolution of aging and of life histories. We analyzed the statics and dynamics of reproduction and survival in a wild population of the northern fulmar, Fulmarus glacialis (Procellaridae). Survival rate is most influenced by year as compared to age and cohort. When temporal variation is ignored, survival rate increases slowly with age and then declines more rapidly at late ages. Survival rate contingent upon reproductive ‘stratum’ (producing an egg, hatching an egg, fledging a hatchling) also exhibits this pattern. Survival and reproduction have a positive static association in that survival rate increases as the apparent energy allocated to reproduction increases (as indexed by stratum). There is a broad distribution of realized lifetime reproductive success, which could be due to ‘fixed’ heterogeneity, with some individuals always having low survival and reproduction and others always having high survival and reproduction, or be due to ‘dynamic’ heterogeneity, with all individuals having the same expected reproductive and survival rates. Analysis of stochastic stratum dynamics indicates that individuals do not remain long in any given stratum and suggest that the variation among individuals with respect to lifetime reproductive success is due to dynamic heterogeneity. The probability of producing an egg increases with age for both sexes, whereas the probability of producing a fledgling initially declines with age and then increases. These results underscore the necessity of understanding the static and dynamic expression of demographic traits when making a causal claim about their evolution.
- Open Access
- 1 April 2009
- Published by Wiley in Molecular Ecology
- Vol. 18 (8) , 1553-1555
The consensus approach to resolving heterogeneity among haplotype inferrals: a comment on Huang et al. (2008)
- 1 April 2009
- Published by Wiley in Molecular Ecology
- Vol. 18 (8) , 1553-1555
Open AccessThe consensus approach to resolving heterogeneity among haplotype inferrals: a comment on Huang et al. (2008)
- Open Access
- 9 December 2008
- Published by Wiley in Ecology Letters
- Vol. 12 (1) , 93-106
Dynamic heterogeneity in life histories
Longitudinal data on natural populations have been analysed using multistage models in which survival depends on reproductive stage, and individuals change stages according to a Markov chain. These models are special cases of stage‐structured population models. We show that stage‐structured models generate dynamic heterogeneity: life‐history differences produced by stochastic stratum dynamics. We characterize dynamic heterogeneity in a range of species across taxa by properties of the Markov chain: the entropy, which describes the extent of heterogeneity, and the subdominant eigenvalue, which describes the persistence of reproductive success during the life of an individual. Trajectories of reproductive stage determine survivorship, and we analyse the variance in lifespan within and between trajectories of reproductive stage. We show how stage‐structured models can be used to predict realized distributions of lifetime reproductive success. Dynamic heterogeneity contrasts with fixed heterogeneity: unobserved differences that generate variation between life histories. We show by an example that observed distributions of lifetime reproductive success are often consistent with the claim that little or no fixed heterogeneity influences this trait. We propose that dynamic heterogeneity provides a ‘neutral’ model for assessing the possible role of unobserved ‘quality’ differences between individuals. We discuss fitness for dynamic life histories, and the implications of dynamic heterogeneity for the evolution of life histories and senescence.
- 9 December 2008
- Published by Wiley in Ecology Letters
- Vol. 12 (1) , 93-106
Open AccessDynamic heterogeneity in life histories
Longitudinal data on natural populations have been analysed using multistage models in which survival depends on reproductive stage, and individuals change stages according to a Markov chain. These models are special cases of stage‐structured population models. We show that stage‐structured models generate dynamic heterogeneity: life‐history differences produced by stochastic stratum dynamics. We characterize dynamic heterogeneity in a range of species across taxa by properties of the Markov chain: the entropy, which describes the extent of heterogeneity, and the subdominant eigenvalue, which describes the persistence of reproductive success during the life of an individual. Trajectories of reproductive stage determine survivorship, and we analyse the variance in lifespan within and between trajectories of reproductive stage. We show how stage‐structured models can be used to predict realized distributions of lifetime reproductive success. Dynamic heterogeneity contrasts with fixed heterogeneity: unobserved differences that generate variation between life histories. We show by an example that observed distributions of lifetime reproductive success are often consistent with the claim that little or no fixed heterogeneity influences this trait. We propose that dynamic heterogeneity provides a ‘neutral’ model for assessing the possible role of unobserved ‘quality’ differences between individuals. We discuss fitness for dynamic life histories, and the implications of dynamic heterogeneity for the evolution of life histories and senescence.
- Open Access
- 1 October 2005
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Evolution
- Vol. 59 (10) , 2063-2072
ASSESSING CURRENT ADAPTATION AND PHYLOGENETIC INERTIA AS EXPLANATIONS OF TRAIT EVOLUTION:THE NEED FOR CONTROLLED COMPARISONS
- 1 October 2005
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Evolution
- Vol. 59 (10) , 2063-2072
Open AccessASSESSING CURRENT ADAPTATION AND PHYLOGENETIC INERTIA AS EXPLANATIONS OF TRAIT EVOLUTION:THE NEED FOR CONTROLLED COMPARISONS
- 1 July 2005
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 72 (3) , 479-485
Discussion: What, If Anything, Is “The Strategy of Model Building in Population Biology?” A Comment on Levins (1966) and Odenbaugh (2003)*
In our 1993 paper, “A Critical Look,” Elliott Sober and I concluded that the famous claim about model formulation and constraints made by Richard Levins in his influential 1966 article on model building in population biology is neither true nor normative. Here, I comment upon the claim of Odenbaugh (2003) that the conclusions of “A Critical Look” are incorrect. My conclusions remain that Levins’ claim about the tradeoff between model properties (1) lacks logical coherence, (2) generates an arbitrary model classification, and (3) lacks normative utility. Accordingly, I view his claim as providing no useful insight into the nature of models and model building in population biology.
- 1 July 2005
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 72 (3) , 479-485
Discussion: What, If Anything, Is “The Strategy of Model Building in Population Biology?” A Comment on Levins (1966) and Odenbaugh (2003)*
In our 1993 paper, “A Critical Look,” Elliott Sober and I concluded that the famous claim about model formulation and constraints made by Richard Levins in his influential 1966 article on model building in population biology is neither true nor normative. Here, I comment upon the claim of Odenbaugh (2003) that the conclusions of “A Critical Look” are incorrect. My conclusions remain that Levins’ claim about the tradeoff between model properties (1) lacks logical coherence, (2) generates an arbitrary model classification, and (3) lacks normative utility. Accordingly, I view his claim as providing no useful insight into the nature of models and model building in population biology.