Daniel M. Wegner
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Daniel M. Wegner has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Adrian F. Ward
McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin, TX, USA
3 shared publications Betsy Sparrow
2 shared publications- Betsy Sparrow
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
2 shared publications Megan Kozak
Harvard University and
2 shared publicationsJames A.K. Erskine
University of Hertfordshire, UK
1 shared publicationLea Winerman
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Psychology
- Vol. 4, 650
Mind-blanking: when the mind goes away
People often feel like their minds and their bodies are in different places. Far from an exotic experience, this phenomenon seems to be a ubiquitous facet of human life (e.g., Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010). Many times, people's minds seem to go “somewhere else”—attention becomes disconnected from perception, and people's minds wander to times and places removed from the current environment (e.g., Schooler et al., 2004). At other times, however, people's minds may seem to go nowhere at all—they simply disappear. This mental state—mind-blanking—may represent an extreme decoupling of perception and attention, one in which attention fails to bring any stimuli into conscious awareness. In the present research, we outline the properties of mind-blanking, differentiating this mental state from other mental states in terms of phenomenological experience, behavioral outcomes, and underlying cognitive processes. Seven experiments suggest that when the mind seems to disappear, there are times when we have simply failed to monitor its whereabouts—and there are times when it is actually gone.
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Psychology
- Vol. 4, 650
Open AccessMind-blanking: when the mind goes away
People often feel like their minds and their bodies are in different places. Far from an exotic experience, this phenomenon seems to be a ubiquitous facet of human life (e.g., Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010). Many times, people's minds seem to go “somewhere else”—attention becomes disconnected from perception, and people's minds wander to times and places removed from the current environment (e.g., Schooler et al., 2004). At other times, however, people's minds may seem to go nowhere at all—they simply disappear. This mental state—mind-blanking—may represent an extreme decoupling of perception and attention, one in which attention fails to bring any stimuli into conscious awareness. In the present research, we outline the properties of mind-blanking, differentiating this mental state from other mental states in terms of phenomenological experience, behavioral outcomes, and underlying cognitive processes. Seven experiments suggest that when the mind seems to disappear, there are times when we have simply failed to monitor its whereabouts—and there are times when it is actually gone.
- 1 November 2011
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in American Psychologist
- Vol. 66 (8) , 671-680
Setting free the bears: Escape from thought suppression.
A person who is asked to think aloud while trying not to think about a white bear will typically mention the bear once a minute. So how can people suppress unwanted thoughts? This article examines a series of indirect thought suppression techniques and therapies that have been explored for their efficacy as remedies for unwanted thoughts of all kinds and that offer some potential as means for effective suppression. The strategies that have some promise include focused distraction, stress and load avoidance, thought postponement, exposure and paradoxical approaches, acceptance and commitment, meditation, mindfulness, focused breathing, attention training, self-affirmation, hypnosis, and disclosure and writing. Many of these strategies entail thinking about and accepting unwanted thoughts rather than suppressing them--and so, setting free the bears. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 November 2011
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in American Psychologist
- Vol. 66 (8) , 671-680
Setting free the bears: Escape from thought suppression.
A person who is asked to think aloud while trying not to think about a white bear will typically mention the bear once a minute. So how can people suppress unwanted thoughts? This article examines a series of indirect thought suppression techniques and therapies that have been explored for their efficacy as remedies for unwanted thoughts of all kinds and that offer some potential as means for effective suppression. The strategies that have some promise include focused distraction, stress and load avoidance, thought postponement, exposure and paradoxical approaches, acceptance and commitment, meditation, mindfulness, focused breathing, attention training, self-affirmation, hypnosis, and disclosure and writing. Many of these strategies entail thinking about and accepting unwanted thoughts rather than suppressing them--and so, setting free the bears. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved).
- 3 July 2009
- Published by American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in Science
- Vol. 325 (5936) , 48-50
How to Think, Say, or Do Precisely the Worst Thing for Any Occasion
Did I Really Do That?: Most of us believe that our daily actions occur because we exert conscious effort to make them happen; nevertheless, we sometimes seem to end up doing the precise thing we had hoped to avoid. Wegner (p. 48 ) reviews the recent psychological research on ironic processes. The findings support the view that the unwanted outcomes are held in working memory and that the monitoring centers that usually ensure correct behavior can be distracted or exhausted, allowing the taboo idea to escape.
- 3 July 2009
- Published by American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in Science
- Vol. 325 (5936) , 48-50
How to Think, Say, or Do Precisely the Worst Thing for Any Occasion
Did I Really Do That?: Most of us believe that our daily actions occur because we exert conscious effort to make them happen; nevertheless, we sometimes seem to end up doing the precise thing we had hoped to avoid. Wegner (p. 48 ) reviews the recent psychological research on ironic processes. The findings support the view that the unwanted outcomes are held in working memory and that the monitoring centers that usually ensure correct behavior can be distracted or exhausted, allowing the taboo idea to escape.
- 23 February 2007
- Published by American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in Science
- Vol. 315 (5815) , 1078
Dangers of Brain-o-vision
Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?. Susan Pockett, William P. Banks, and Shaun Gallagher, Eds.. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006. 372 pp. $50, £32.95. ISBN 9780262162371. Approaching the link between consciousness and behavior from a variety of perspectives, the contributors consider recent findings from psychology and neuroscience, philosophical suppositions, and legal, social, and moral implications.
- 23 February 2007
- Published by American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in Science
- Vol. 315 (5815) , 1078
Dangers of Brain-o-vision
Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?. Susan Pockett, William P. Banks, and Shaun Gallagher, Eds.. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006. 372 pp. $50, £32.95. ISBN 9780262162371. Approaching the link between consciousness and behavior from a variety of perspectives, the contributors consider recent findings from psychology and neuroscience, philosophical suppositions, and legal, social, and moral implications.
- 1 October 2006
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 29 (5) , 528-529
The United States of Repression
Erdelyi's account of thought suppression, which he equates with the Freudian construct of repression, is that it is mostly successful, and that it undermines memory for the suppressed material. Erdelyi has neglected to consider evidence from two decades of research on suppression which renders both these claims invalid. Contrary to Erdelyi's thesis, suppression often enhances the accessibility of unwanted material.
- 1 October 2006
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 29 (5) , 528-529
The United States of Repression
Erdelyi's account of thought suppression, which he equates with the Freudian construct of repression, is that it is mostly successful, and that it undermines memory for the suppressed material. Erdelyi has neglected to consider evidence from two decades of research on suppression which renders both these claims invalid. Contrary to Erdelyi's thesis, suppression often enhances the accessibility of unwanted material.
- 1 January 2005
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA)
Unpriming: The deactivation of thoughts through expression
- 1 January 2005
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA)
Unpriming: The deactivation of thoughts through expression
- 1 January 2005
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA)
The experience of authorship in co-action
- 1 January 2005
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA)
The experience of authorship in co-action
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 October 2004
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 27 (5) , 649-659
Précis of The illusion of conscious will
The experience of conscious will is the feeling that we are doing things. This feeling occurs for many things we do, conveying to us again and again the sense that we consciously cause our actions. But the feeling may not be a true reading of what is happening in our minds, brains, and bodies as our actions are produced. The feeling of conscious will can be fooled. This happens in clinical disorders such as alien hand syndrome, dissociative identity disorder, and schizophrenic auditory hallucinations. And in people without disorders, phenomena such as hypnosis, automatic writing, Ouija board spelling, water dowsing, facilitated communication, speaking in tongues, spirit possession, and trance channeling also illustrate anomalies of will – cases when actions occur without will or will occurs without action. This book brings these cases together with research evidence from laboratories in psychology to explore a theory of apparent mental causation. According to this theory, when a thought appears in consciousness just prior to an action, is consistent with the action, and appears exclusive of salient alternative causes of the action, we experience conscious will and ascribe authorship to ourselves for the action. Experiences of conscious will thus arise from processes whereby the mind interprets itself – not from processes whereby mind creates action. Conscious will, in this view, is an indication that we think we have caused an action, not a revelation of the causal sequence by which the action was produced.
- 1 October 2004
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 27 (5) , 649-659
Top Cited PapersPrécis of The illusion of conscious will
The experience of conscious will is the feeling that we are doing things. This feeling occurs for many things we do, conveying to us again and again the sense that we consciously cause our actions. But the feeling may not be a true reading of what is happening in our minds, brains, and bodies as our actions are produced. The feeling of conscious will can be fooled. This happens in clinical disorders such as alien hand syndrome, dissociative identity disorder, and schizophrenic auditory hallucinations. And in people without disorders, phenomena such as hypnosis, automatic writing, Ouija board spelling, water dowsing, facilitated communication, speaking in tongues, spirit possession, and trance channeling also illustrate anomalies of will – cases when actions occur without will or will occurs without action. This book brings these cases together with research evidence from laboratories in psychology to explore a theory of apparent mental causation. According to this theory, when a thought appears in consciousness just prior to an action, is consistent with the action, and appears exclusive of salient alternative causes of the action, we experience conscious will and ascribe authorship to ourselves for the action. Experiences of conscious will thus arise from processes whereby the mind interprets itself – not from processes whereby mind creates action. Conscious will, in this view, is an indication that we think we have caused an action, not a revelation of the causal sequence by which the action was produced.