Adrian F. Ward
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Adrian F. Ward has a total of 32 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Daniel M. Wegner
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
3 shared publications - Kurt Gray
The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA
3 shared publications Daniel M. Wegner
Harvard University, USA
2 shared publicationsMichael I. Norton
Marketing Unit, Harvard Business School
2 shared publicationsAndrew S. Olsen
University of Pennsylvania
1 shared publication- Ayelet Gneezy
Rady School of Management, University of California San Diego
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 May 2025
- Published by Hogrefe Publishing Group in Journal of Media Psychology
- Vol. 37 (3) , 129-143
Mind or Machine?
Searching for and accessing online information through search engines causes digital media users to become overconfident in their own knowledge – in a sense, to attribute online knowledge to themselves. If searching the internet via search engine leads people to conflate digital information as self-produced, what happens when features of our devices turn information search into an interpersonal situation? The proliferation of anthropomorphic technology underpinned by artificial intelligence (AI) may challenge the current view of search-induced cognitive overconfidence. In two experiments, we investigate how using digital agents to search for information moderates the misattribution of online information to one’s own memory. We find that, in contrast to using a search engine, using a digital agent to access online information does not lead to higher estimations of cognitive self-esteem (Experiment 1). Moreover, using a humanized digital agent may lead to lower cognitive self-esteem than using a non-humanized digital agent or thinking alone (Experiment 2). Whereas internet searches can make people overconfident in their cognitive abilities, accessing information through a conversational digital agent appears to clarify boundaries between internal and external knowledge.
- 1 May 2025
- Published by Hogrefe Publishing Group in Journal of Media Psychology
- Vol. 37 (3) , 129-143
Mind or Machine?
Searching for and accessing online information through search engines causes digital media users to become overconfident in their own knowledge – in a sense, to attribute online knowledge to themselves. If searching the internet via search engine leads people to conflate digital information as self-produced, what happens when features of our devices turn information search into an interpersonal situation? The proliferation of anthropomorphic technology underpinned by artificial intelligence (AI) may challenge the current view of search-induced cognitive overconfidence. In two experiments, we investigate how using digital agents to search for information moderates the misattribution of online information to one’s own memory. We find that, in contrast to using a search engine, using a digital agent to access online information does not lead to higher estimations of cognitive self-esteem (Experiment 1). Moreover, using a humanized digital agent may lead to lower cognitive self-esteem than using a non-humanized digital agent or thinking alone (Experiment 2). Whereas internet searches can make people overconfident in their cognitive abilities, accessing information through a conversational digital agent appears to clarify boundaries between internal and external knowledge.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 1 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in PNAS Nexus
- Vol. 4 (2) , pgaf017
Blocking mobile internet on smartphones improves sustained attention, mental health, and subjective well-being
Smartphones enable people to access the online world from anywhere at any time. Despite the benefits of this technology, there is growing concern that smartphone use could adversely impact cognitive functioning and mental health. Correlational and anecdotal evidence suggests that these concerns may be well-founded, but causal evidence remains scarce. We conducted a month-long randomized controlled trial to investigate how removing constant access to the internet through smartphones might impact psychological functioning. We used a mobile phone application to block all mobile internet access from participants’ smartphones for 2 weeks and objectively track compliance. This intervention specifically targeted the feature that makes smartphones “smart” (mobile internet) while allowing participants to maintain mobile connection (through texts and calls) and nonmobile access to the internet (e.g. through desktop computers). The intervention improved mental health, subjective well-being, and objectively measured ability to sustain attention; 91% of participants improved on at least one of these outcomes. Mediation analyses suggest that these improvements can be partially explained by the intervention's impact on how people spent their time; when people did not have access to mobile internet, they spent more time socializing in person, exercising, and being in nature. These results provide causal evidence that blocking mobile internet can improve important psychological outcomes, and suggest that maintaining the status quo of constant connection to the internet may be detrimental to time use, cognitive functioning, and well-being.
- 1 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in PNAS Nexus
- Vol. 4 (2) , pgaf017
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessBlocking mobile internet on smartphones improves sustained attention, mental health, and subjective well-being
Smartphones enable people to access the online world from anywhere at any time. Despite the benefits of this technology, there is growing concern that smartphone use could adversely impact cognitive functioning and mental health. Correlational and anecdotal evidence suggests that these concerns may be well-founded, but causal evidence remains scarce. We conducted a month-long randomized controlled trial to investigate how removing constant access to the internet through smartphones might impact psychological functioning. We used a mobile phone application to block all mobile internet access from participants’ smartphones for 2 weeks and objectively track compliance. This intervention specifically targeted the feature that makes smartphones “smart” (mobile internet) while allowing participants to maintain mobile connection (through texts and calls) and nonmobile access to the internet (e.g. through desktop computers). The intervention improved mental health, subjective well-being, and objectively measured ability to sustain attention; 91% of participants improved on at least one of these outcomes. Mediation analyses suggest that these improvements can be partially explained by the intervention's impact on how people spent their time; when people did not have access to mobile internet, they spent more time socializing in person, exercising, and being in nature. These results provide causal evidence that blocking mobile internet can improve important psychological outcomes, and suggest that maintaining the status quo of constant connection to the internet may be detrimental to time use, cognitive functioning, and well-being.
- Open Access
- 31 August 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
- Vol. 115
Fairness revisionism: Reducing discrimination for the future reduces perceived unfairness in the past
- 31 August 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
- Vol. 115
Open AccessFairness revisionism: Reducing discrimination for the future reduces perceived unfairness in the past
- 12 August 2022
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Consumer Psychology
- Vol. 33 (3) , 469-488
I share, therefore I know? Sharing online content ‐ even without reading it ‐ inflates subjective knowledge
Billions of people across the globe use social media to acquire and share information. A large and growing body of research examines how consuming online content affects what people know. The present research investigates a complementary, yet previously unstudied question: how might sharing online content affect what people think they know? Sharing signals expertise, and people frequently internalize their public behavior into their private self‐concepts. We therefore posit that sharing information on social media may cause people to believe they are as knowledgeable as their posts make them appear. We examine this possibility in the context of “sharing without reading,” a phenomenon that allows us to isolate the effect of sharing on subjective knowledge from any influence of reading or objective knowledge. Six studies provide correlational (study 1) and causal (studies 2, 2a) evidence that sharing—even without reading—increases subjective knowledge, and test the internalization mechanism by varying the degree to which sharing publicly commits the sharer to an expert identity (studies 3–5). A seventh study investigates potential consequences of sharing‐inflated subjective knowledge on downstream behavior in the domain of financial decision‐making.
- 12 August 2022
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Consumer Psychology
- Vol. 33 (3) , 469-488
I share, therefore I know? Sharing online content ‐ even without reading it ‐ inflates subjective knowledge
Billions of people across the globe use social media to acquire and share information. A large and growing body of research examines how consuming online content affects what people know. The present research investigates a complementary, yet previously unstudied question: how might sharing online content affect what people think they know? Sharing signals expertise, and people frequently internalize their public behavior into their private self‐concepts. We therefore posit that sharing information on social media may cause people to believe they are as knowledgeable as their posts make them appear. We examine this possibility in the context of “sharing without reading,” a phenomenon that allows us to isolate the effect of sharing on subjective knowledge from any influence of reading or objective knowledge. Six studies provide correlational (study 1) and causal (studies 2, 2a) evidence that sharing—even without reading—increases subjective knowledge, and test the internalization mechanism by varying the degree to which sharing publicly commits the sharer to an expert identity (studies 3–5). A seventh study investigates potential consequences of sharing‐inflated subjective knowledge on downstream behavior in the domain of financial decision‐making.
- 1 January 2022
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of the Association for Consumer Research
- Vol. 7 (1) , 54-62
How Childhood Adversity Shapes Susceptibility to COVID-19 Scams
- 1 January 2022
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of the Association for Consumer Research
- Vol. 7 (1) , 54-62
How Childhood Adversity Shapes Susceptibility to COVID-19 Scams
- Top Cited Papers
- 22 October 2021
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 118 (43)
People mistake the internet’s knowledge for their own
People frequently search the internet for information. Eight experiments (n = 1,917) provide evidence that when people “Google” for online information, they fail to accurately distinguish between knowledge stored internally—in their own memories—and knowledge stored externally—on the internet. Relative to those using only their own knowledge, people who use Google to answer general knowledge questions are not only more confident in their ability to access external information; they are also more confident in their own ability to think and remember. Moreover, those who use Google predict that they will know more in the future without the help of the internet, an erroneous belief that both indicates misattribution of prior knowledge and highlights a practically important consequence of this misattribution: overconfidence when the internet is no longer available. Although humans have long relied on external knowledge, the misattribution of online knowledge to the self may be facilitated by the swift and seamless interface between internal thought and external information that characterizes online search. Online search is often faster than internal memory search, preventing people from fully recognizing the limitations of their own knowledge. The internet delivers information seamlessly, dovetailing with internal cognitive processes and offering minimal physical cues that might draw attention to its contributions. As a result, people may lose sight of where their own knowledge ends and where the internet’s knowledge begins. Thinking with Google may cause people to mistake the internet’s knowledge for their own. Significance In the current digital age, people are constantly connected to online information. The present research provides evidence that on-demand access to external information, enabled by the internet and search engines like Google, blurs the boundaries between internal and external knowledge, causing people to believe they could—or did—remember what they actually just found. Using Google to answer general knowledge questions artificially inflates peoples’ confidence in their own ability to remember and process information and leads to erroneously optimistic predictions regarding how much they will know without the internet. When information is at our fingertips, we may mistakenly believe that it originated from inside our heads.
- 22 October 2021
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 118 (43)
Top Cited PapersPeople mistake the internet’s knowledge for their own
People frequently search the internet for information. Eight experiments (n = 1,917) provide evidence that when people “Google” for online information, they fail to accurately distinguish between knowledge stored internally—in their own memories—and knowledge stored externally—on the internet. Relative to those using only their own knowledge, people who use Google to answer general knowledge questions are not only more confident in their ability to access external information; they are also more confident in their own ability to think and remember. Moreover, those who use Google predict that they will know more in the future without the help of the internet, an erroneous belief that both indicates misattribution of prior knowledge and highlights a practically important consequence of this misattribution: overconfidence when the internet is no longer available. Although humans have long relied on external knowledge, the misattribution of online knowledge to the self may be facilitated by the swift and seamless interface between internal thought and external information that characterizes online search. Online search is often faster than internal memory search, preventing people from fully recognizing the limitations of their own knowledge. The internet delivers information seamlessly, dovetailing with internal cognitive processes and offering minimal physical cues that might draw attention to its contributions. As a result, people may lose sight of where their own knowledge ends and where the internet’s knowledge begins. Thinking with Google may cause people to mistake the internet’s knowledge for their own. Significance In the current digital age, people are constantly connected to online information. The present research provides evidence that on-demand access to external information, enabled by the internet and search engines like Google, blurs the boundaries between internal and external knowledge, causing people to believe they could—or did—remember what they actually just found. Using Google to answer general knowledge questions artificially inflates peoples’ confidence in their own ability to remember and process information and leads to erroneously optimistic predictions regarding how much they will know without the internet. When information is at our fingertips, we may mistakenly believe that it originated from inside our heads.
- 3 June 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Customer Needs and Solutions
- Vol. 7 (3-4) , 90-101
Technology-Augmented Choice: How Digital Innovations Are Transforming Consumer Decision Processes
- 3 June 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Customer Needs and Solutions
- Vol. 7 (3-4) , 90-101
Technology-Augmented Choice: How Digital Innovations Are Transforming Consumer Decision Processes
- 1 May 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
- Vol. 76, 161-168
Media usage diminishes memory for experiences
- 1 May 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
- Vol. 76, 161-168
Media usage diminishes memory for experiences
- Open Access
- 24 April 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Consumer Research
- Vol. 45 (5) , 1013-1036
On a Need-to-Know Basis: How the Distribution of Responsibility Between Couples Shapes Financial Literacy and Financial Outcomes
Many consumers suffer from low levels of financial literacy, and attempts to increase this dimension of consumer expertise via educational interventions are typically unsuccessful. We argue that many of these apparent deficits are caused by the distribution of responsibility for knowledge and decision-making between relationship partners. Early in relationships, responsibility for financial matters is often determined not by differences in financial expertise, but by differences in relative contributions to other domains (study 3). Although responsibility may be initially unrelated to ability, responsibility predicts learning of new financial information (study 4). Cross-sectional data from consumers in long-term relationships show that as relationships lengthen, high levels of financial responsibility are associated with increases in financial literacy, whereas low levels of financial responsibility are not (study 1). These diverging trajectories of expertise cannot be explained by role switching or changes in the sample over time (study 2). The resulting gap in financial literacy is linked to corresponding differences in both financial decision-making and financial information search (studies 5, 5a). Consumers develop expertise on a “need to know” basis. Offloading responsibility to a relationship partner may eliminate this need in the present, while simultaneously creating barriers to developing expertise when needed in the future.
- 24 April 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Consumer Research
- Vol. 45 (5) , 1013-1036
Open AccessOn a Need-to-Know Basis: How the Distribution of Responsibility Between Couples Shapes Financial Literacy and Financial Outcomes
Many consumers suffer from low levels of financial literacy, and attempts to increase this dimension of consumer expertise via educational interventions are typically unsuccessful. We argue that many of these apparent deficits are caused by the distribution of responsibility for knowledge and decision-making between relationship partners. Early in relationships, responsibility for financial matters is often determined not by differences in financial expertise, but by differences in relative contributions to other domains (study 3). Although responsibility may be initially unrelated to ability, responsibility predicts learning of new financial information (study 4). Cross-sectional data from consumers in long-term relationships show that as relationships lengthen, high levels of financial responsibility are associated with increases in financial literacy, whereas low levels of financial responsibility are not (study 1). These diverging trajectories of expertise cannot be explained by role switching or changes in the sample over time (study 2). The resulting gap in financial literacy is linked to corresponding differences in both financial decision-making and financial information search (studies 5, 5a). Consumers develop expertise on a “need to know” basis. Offloading responsibility to a relationship partner may eliminate this need in the present, while simultaneously creating barriers to developing expertise when needed in the future.
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 April 2017
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of the Association for Consumer Research
- Vol. 2 (2) , 140-154
Brain Drain: The Mere Presence of One’s Own Smartphone Reduces Available Cognitive Capacity
Our smartphones enable—and encourage—constant connection to information, entertainment, and each other. They put the world at our fingertips, and rarely leave our sides. Although these devices have immense potential to improve welfare, their persistent presence may come at a cognitive cost. In this research, we test the “brain drain” hypothesis that the mere presence of one’s own smartphone may occupy limited-capacity cognitive resources, thereby leaving fewer resources available for other tasks and undercutting cognitive performance. Results from two experiments indicate that even when people are successful at maintaining sustained attention—as when avoiding the temptation to check their phones—the mere presence of these devices reduces available cognitive capacity. Moreover, these cognitive costs are highest for those highest in smartphone dependence. We conclude by discussing the practical implications of this smartphone-induced brain drain for consumer decision-making and consumer welfare.
- 1 April 2017
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of the Association for Consumer Research
- Vol. 2 (2) , 140-154
Top Cited PapersBrain Drain: The Mere Presence of One’s Own Smartphone Reduces Available Cognitive Capacity
Our smartphones enable—and encourage—constant connection to information, entertainment, and each other. They put the world at our fingertips, and rarely leave our sides. Although these devices have immense potential to improve welfare, their persistent presence may come at a cognitive cost. In this research, we test the “brain drain” hypothesis that the mere presence of one’s own smartphone may occupy limited-capacity cognitive resources, thereby leaving fewer resources available for other tasks and undercutting cognitive performance. Results from two experiments indicate that even when people are successful at maintaining sustained attention—as when avoiding the temptation to check their phones—the mere presence of these devices reduces available cognitive capacity. Moreover, these cognitive costs are highest for those highest in smartphone dependence. We conclude by discussing the practical implications of this smartphone-induced brain drain for consumer decision-making and consumer welfare.