Kin Lo
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Kin Lo has a total of 19 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Stephen Brown
University of Maryland - Department of Accounting & Information Assurance
9 shared publicationsQiang Cheng
4 shared publications- Stephen A. Hillegeist
Arizona State University (ASU) - W. P. Carey School of Business, School of Accountancy
4 shared publications Serena Shuo Wu
Queen's University
3 shared publicationsThomas Z. Lys
3 shared publicationsStephen A. Hillegeist
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Management Forecasts and Litigation Risk *
We examine the influence of the ex ante risk of class action securities litigation on firms' decisions to issue management earnings forecasts as well as the characteristics of those forecasts. We find that litigation risk is positively associated with the likelihood of issuing a forecast for both good-and bad-news firms. While the association is marginally stronger for firms with bad earnings news, our results suggest that litigation risk is unlikely to explain the observed preponderance of bad-news forecasts. We examine the effect of litigation risk on the amount of the total earnings news released in the forecast, on forecast horizon, and on forecast precision. These results indicate that higher litigation risk is associated with a higher proportion of news being released when firms have bad news. Finally, higher litigation risk is associated with forecasts being released earlier and being more precise.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessManagement Forecasts and Litigation Risk *
We examine the influence of the ex ante risk of class action securities litigation on firms' decisions to issue management earnings forecasts as well as the characteristics of those forecasts. We find that litigation risk is positively associated with the likelihood of issuing a forecast for both good-and bad-news firms. While the association is marginally stronger for firms with bad earnings news, our results suggest that litigation risk is unlikely to explain the observed preponderance of bad-news forecasts. We examine the effect of litigation risk on the amount of the total earnings news released in the forecast, on forecast horizon, and on forecast precision. These results indicate that higher litigation risk is associated with a higher proportion of news being released when firms have bad news. Finally, higher litigation risk is associated with forecasts being released earlier and being more precise.
- 11 June 2021
- Published by Wiley in Accounting Perspectives
- Vol. 20 (3) , 403-419
OneFeather Mobile Wallet: A Digital Solution for Indigenous Peoples in Canada?*
OneFeather is a real company located in British Columbia. The company aims to provide much‐needed services to Indigenous peoples, specifically those in Canada. This case involves a proposed digital wallet specifically designed for the needs of Indigenous peoples in Canada. Students are tasked to consider how the digital wallet needs to consider the unique circumstances of Indigenous peoples, the applicable tax laws, the appropriate technological foundation for the product, and strategies to roll out the product and attract users.
- 11 June 2021
- Published by Wiley in Accounting Perspectives
- Vol. 20 (3) , 403-419
OneFeather Mobile Wallet: A Digital Solution for Indigenous Peoples in Canada?*
OneFeather is a real company located in British Columbia. The company aims to provide much‐needed services to Indigenous peoples, specifically those in Canada. This case involves a proposed digital wallet specifically designed for the needs of Indigenous peoples in Canada. Students are tasked to consider how the digital wallet needs to consider the unique circumstances of Indigenous peoples, the applicable tax laws, the appropriate technological foundation for the product, and strategies to roll out the product and attract users.
- Open Access
- 1 July 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Public Policy
- Vol. 39 (4)
Understanding accounting discretion in China: An analysis of fair value reporting for investment property
- 1 July 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Public Policy
- Vol. 39 (4)
Open AccessUnderstanding accounting discretion in China: An analysis of fair value reporting for investment property
- 1 October 2017
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 93 (4) , 309-333
The Impact of Seasonal Affective Disorder on Financial Analysts
We examine the impact of Seasonal Affective Disorder (SAD) on financial analysts. We hypothesize and find that analysts are more pessimistic, less precise, and more asymmetric in their boldness in the fall, as indicated by their forecasts of quarterly earnings. The effects are apparent in all forecast horizons analyzed and robust across multiple specifications. Importantly, pessimism in fall forecast revisions shows analyst-specific persistence, providing a strong indication that the effect is a result of SAD rather than other coincident factors. We also find evidence of a reversal in pessimism in the spring. Additional analyses show that analyst forecasts exhibit less seasonality than equity returns, and that the presence of analyst forecasts in the fall is associated with attenuation in the seasonal pattern in stock returns. Overall, the evidence suggests that SAD affects both financial analysts and equity investors, but the effect on the latter is stronger. JEL Classifications: G11; G12; G14; G41; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources cited in the text.
- 1 October 2017
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 93 (4) , 309-333
The Impact of Seasonal Affective Disorder on Financial Analysts
We examine the impact of Seasonal Affective Disorder (SAD) on financial analysts. We hypothesize and find that analysts are more pessimistic, less precise, and more asymmetric in their boldness in the fall, as indicated by their forecasts of quarterly earnings. The effects are apparent in all forecast horizons analyzed and robust across multiple specifications. Importantly, pessimism in fall forecast revisions shows analyst-specific persistence, providing a strong indication that the effect is a result of SAD rather than other coincident factors. We also find evidence of a reversal in pessimism in the spring. Additional analyses show that analyst forecasts exhibit less seasonality than equity returns, and that the presence of analyst forecasts in the fall is associated with attenuation in the seasonal pattern in stock returns. Overall, the evidence suggests that SAD affects both financial analysts and equity investors, but the effect on the latter is stronger. JEL Classifications: G11; G12; G14; G41; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources cited in the text.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 1 February 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 63 (1) , 1-25
Earnings management and annual report readability
- 1 February 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 63 (1) , 1-25
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessEarnings management and annual report readability
- 11 August 2015
- Published by Wiley in Corporate Governance: An International Review
- Vol. 24 (1) , 5-23
Private Information in Executive Compensation: The Information Role vs. The Monitoring Role of the Board
Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: This paper examines the effect of boards of directors’ characteristics on the use of private information in executive compensation.Research Findings/Insights: We predict and find that boards’ competence both in information acquisition and in monitoring influences the extent to which boards use private performance measures in CEO compensation. Specifically, smaller and more independent boards with their CEOs as the board chair are found to rely more heavily on private performance measures. The documented effects of board characteristics disappear after the passage of SOX, likely due to the homogenized composition of boards and compensation committees brought by the legislated changes.Theoretical/Academic Implications: The paper extends the literature on the board's role in executive compensation. Although prior evidence is abundant on how boards affect the alignment of CEO compensation with public performance measures, little is known about boards’ use of private information to compensate CEOs. It also extends the literature on the role of corporate boards by examining both their monitoring and information roles.Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study offers insights to regulators regarding the role of boards of directors in monitoring and their role in private information acquisition. It highlights the importance of considering the tradeoff between these two roles when regulating corporate governance rules.
- 11 August 2015
- Published by Wiley in Corporate Governance: An International Review
- Vol. 24 (1) , 5-23
Private Information in Executive Compensation: The Information Role vs. The Monitoring Role of the Board
Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: This paper examines the effect of boards of directors’ characteristics on the use of private information in executive compensation.Research Findings/Insights: We predict and find that boards’ competence both in information acquisition and in monitoring influences the extent to which boards use private performance measures in CEO compensation. Specifically, smaller and more independent boards with their CEOs as the board chair are found to rely more heavily on private performance measures. The documented effects of board characteristics disappear after the passage of SOX, likely due to the homogenized composition of boards and compensation committees brought by the legislated changes.Theoretical/Academic Implications: The paper extends the literature on the board's role in executive compensation. Although prior evidence is abundant on how boards affect the alignment of CEO compensation with public performance measures, little is known about boards’ use of private information to compensate CEOs. It also extends the literature on the role of corporate boards by examining both their monitoring and information roles.Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study offers insights to regulators regarding the role of boards of directors in monitoring and their role in private information acquisition. It highlights the importance of considering the tradeoff between these two roles when regulating corporate governance rules.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
'Say-on-Pay' Votes and Compensation Practices
We examine the causes and consequences of “say-on-pay” votes mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. We hypothesize and find that shareholder disapproval increa
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open Access'Say-on-Pay' Votes and Compensation Practices
We examine the causes and consequences of “say-on-pay” votes mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. We hypothesize and find that shareholder disapproval increa
- 21 June 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 17 (3) , 642-648
What do analysts do? Discussion of “Information interpretation or information discovery: which role of analysts do investors value more?”
- 21 June 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 17 (3) , 642-648
What do analysts do? Discussion of “Information interpretation or information discovery: which role of analysts do investors value more?”
- 1 April 2010
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 49 (3) , 206-226
On the relationship between analyst reports and corporate disclosures: Exploring the roles of information discovery and interpretation
- 1 April 2010
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 49 (3) , 206-226
On the relationship between analyst reports and corporate disclosures: Exploring the roles of information discovery and interpretation
- Open Access
- 19 March 2010
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Impact of Seasonal Affective Disorder on Financial Analysts and Equity Market Returns
We examine three related issues on the impact of seasonal affective disorder (SAD) on financial markets. First, we hypothesize and find that analysts are more pessimistic in the fall season, as indicated by their earnings forecasts and forecast revisions. Second, we show that equity returns fail to anticipate the downward impact of SAD on forecast revisions. Finally, we find that firms with analyst revisions in the fall experience less negative abnormal returns during the fall, compared with those without analyst revisions. Overall, the evidence suggests that both analysts and equity investors are affected by SAD, but forecasts by analysts helps to mitigate the depressing effects of SAD.
- 19 March 2010
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Impact of Seasonal Affective Disorder on Financial Analysts and Equity Market Returns
We examine three related issues on the impact of seasonal affective disorder (SAD) on financial markets. First, we hypothesize and find that analysts are more pessimistic in the fall season, as indicated by their earnings forecasts and forecast revisions. Second, we show that equity returns fail to anticipate the downward impact of SAD on forecast revisions. Finally, we find that firms with analyst revisions in the fall experience less negative abnormal returns during the fall, compared with those without analyst revisions. Overall, the evidence suggests that both analysts and equity investors are affected by SAD, but forecasts by analysts helps to mitigate the depressing effects of SAD.