Stephen A. Hillegeist
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Stephen A. Hillegeist has a total of 32 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Stephen Brown
University of Maryland - Department of Accounting & Information Assurance
5 shared publications- Kin Lo
University of British Columbia (UBC) - Sauder School of Business
4 shared publications - Lucile Faurel
W.P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85287
3 shared publications Lyungmae Choi
3 shared publications- Fernando Penalva
IESE Business School, University of Navarra, Barcelona, Spain
2 shared publications - You-Il (Chris) Park
University of Hawaii at Manoa - School of Accountancy
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 1 April 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 71 (4) , 3185-3215
Do Proprietary Costs Deter Insider Trading?
Insider trading conveys insiders’ private information to outsiders. This private information potentially benefits rival firms, which may reduce the competitive advantage of the insiders’ firms. Using a composite proprietary cost measure, we find proprietary costs are negatively associated with insiders’ purchases, especially when their trades are more likely to be informative to rivals. Consistent with proprietary costs increasing the costs of insider purchases and, hence, the expected benefits required to trade, insiders earn significantly higher abnormal profits when proprietary costs are higher. Exploiting settings with exogenous and event-driven variation in proprietary costs, we find insiders significantly reduce their purchases when noncompete agreement enforceability is high and before new product launches. Moreover, firms with higher proprietary costs are more likely to impose window-based insider trading restrictions and insiders with greater equity holdings reduce their purchases more strongly in the presence of proprietary costs. Finally, we provide evidence of real effects of insider trading on rivals’ investment decisions. We find that investments are associated with insiders’ purchases at rival firms, and these associations are stronger when proprietary costs at rivals are higher. Our findings indicate insiders and firms are aware of potential proprietary costs when insiders trade on private information and respond accordingly. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting. Supplemental Material: The online appendices and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.02469 .
- 1 April 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 71 (4) , 3185-3215
Do Proprietary Costs Deter Insider Trading?
Insider trading conveys insiders’ private information to outsiders. This private information potentially benefits rival firms, which may reduce the competitive advantage of the insiders’ firms. Using a composite proprietary cost measure, we find proprietary costs are negatively associated with insiders’ purchases, especially when their trades are more likely to be informative to rivals. Consistent with proprietary costs increasing the costs of insider purchases and, hence, the expected benefits required to trade, insiders earn significantly higher abnormal profits when proprietary costs are higher. Exploiting settings with exogenous and event-driven variation in proprietary costs, we find insiders significantly reduce their purchases when noncompete agreement enforceability is high and before new product launches. Moreover, firms with higher proprietary costs are more likely to impose window-based insider trading restrictions and insiders with greater equity holdings reduce their purchases more strongly in the presence of proprietary costs. Finally, we provide evidence of real effects of insider trading on rivals’ investment decisions. We find that investments are associated with insiders’ purchases at rival firms, and these associations are stronger when proprietary costs at rivals are higher. Our findings indicate insiders and firms are aware of potential proprietary costs when insiders trade on private information and respond accordingly. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting. Supplemental Material: The online appendices and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.02469 .
- 21 June 2024
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 41 (3) , 1754-1784
Performance measure skewness and the structure of CEO compensation: Theory and evidence
While research has analyzed how the structure of incentive pay relates to the dispersion of the performance measure distribution, as measured by its variance or volatility, we examine how it relates to the asymmetry of the distribution, as measured by its skewness. In contrast to the variance, skewness affects the relative informativeness of high and low performance about the agent's effort, which determines the relative efficiency of providing rewards and punishments for incentive purposes. Therefore, skewness is an important determinant of compensation convexity, which is determined by the relative holdings of stock and options. Consistent with our analytical and numerical results, we find that the skewness of expected earnings is negatively associated with the convexity of CEO compensation. Our results are economically significant, robust to alternative specifications, and do not appear to be driven by reverse causality. In addition, we find that earnings skewness is negatively associated with total CEO compensation and that this association is driven by lower options‐based compensation. These findings are consistent with CEOs preferring positively skewed performance metrics. Overall, we provide theoretical, numerical, and empirical evidence suggesting that skewness is a more important determinant of the convexity and structure of CEO compensation than volatility.
- 21 June 2024
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 41 (3) , 1754-1784
Performance measure skewness and the structure of CEO compensation: Theory and evidence
While research has analyzed how the structure of incentive pay relates to the dispersion of the performance measure distribution, as measured by its variance or volatility, we examine how it relates to the asymmetry of the distribution, as measured by its skewness. In contrast to the variance, skewness affects the relative informativeness of high and low performance about the agent's effort, which determines the relative efficiency of providing rewards and punishments for incentive purposes. Therefore, skewness is an important determinant of compensation convexity, which is determined by the relative holdings of stock and options. Consistent with our analytical and numerical results, we find that the skewness of expected earnings is negatively associated with the convexity of CEO compensation. Our results are economically significant, robust to alternative specifications, and do not appear to be driven by reverse causality. In addition, we find that earnings skewness is negatively associated with total CEO compensation and that this association is driven by lower options‐based compensation. These findings are consistent with CEOs preferring positively skewed performance metrics. Overall, we provide theoretical, numerical, and empirical evidence suggesting that skewness is a more important determinant of the convexity and structure of CEO compensation than volatility.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Do Proprietary Costs Deter Insider Trading?
Insider trading conveys insiders’ private information to outsiders. This private information potentially benefits rival firms, which may reduce the competitive advantage of the insiders’ firms. Using a composite proprietary cost measure, we find proprietary costs are negatively associated with insiders’ purchases, especially when their trades are more likely to be informative to rivals. Consistent with proprietary costs increasing the costs of insider purchases and, hence, the expected benefits required to trade, insiders earn significantly higher abnormal profits when proprietary costs are higher. Exploiting settings with exogenous and event-driven variation in proprietary costs, we find insiders significantly reduce their purchases when noncompete agreement enforceability is high and before new product launches. Moreover, firms with higher proprietary costs are more likely to impose window-based insider trading restrictions and insiders with greater equity holdings reduce their purchases more strongly in the presence of proprietary costs. Finally, we provide evidence of real effects of insider trading on rivals’ investment decisions. We find that investments are associated with insiders’ purchases at rival firms, and these associations are stronger when proprietary costs at rivals are higher. Our findings indicate insiders and firms are aware of potential proprietary costs when insiders trade on private information, and respond accordingly.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessDo Proprietary Costs Deter Insider Trading?
Insider trading conveys insiders’ private information to outsiders. This private information potentially benefits rival firms, which may reduce the competitive advantage of the insiders’ firms. Using a composite proprietary cost measure, we find proprietary costs are negatively associated with insiders’ purchases, especially when their trades are more likely to be informative to rivals. Consistent with proprietary costs increasing the costs of insider purchases and, hence, the expected benefits required to trade, insiders earn significantly higher abnormal profits when proprietary costs are higher. Exploiting settings with exogenous and event-driven variation in proprietary costs, we find insiders significantly reduce their purchases when noncompete agreement enforceability is high and before new product launches. Moreover, firms with higher proprietary costs are more likely to impose window-based insider trading restrictions and insiders with greater equity holdings reduce their purchases more strongly in the presence of proprietary costs. Finally, we provide evidence of real effects of insider trading on rivals’ investment decisions. We find that investments are associated with insiders’ purchases at rival firms, and these associations are stronger when proprietary costs at rivals are higher. Our findings indicate insiders and firms are aware of potential proprietary costs when insiders trade on private information, and respond accordingly.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Competitive Pressure and Tax Avoidance
We wish to thank Laurent Frésard for the use of his tariff-cut data. We appreciate the helpful comments and suggestions of Michal Matejka, Igor Cunha and workshop participants at Arizona State University and the 2014 UNC-TESCM Conference.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCompetitive Pressure and Tax Avoidance
We wish to thank Laurent Frésard for the use of his tariff-cut data. We appreciate the helpful comments and suggestions of Michal Matejka, Igor Cunha and workshop participants at Arizona State University and the 2014 UNC-TESCM Conference.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Analysts' Monitoring Incentives across the Macro-Economic Cycle
We examine the dynamic relation between earnings management and external monitoring by financial analysts in response to changes in macroeconomic conditions. We predict and find that analysts' incentives to monitor firms' earnings management activities vary counter-cyclically. Specifically, we find that analysts are more effective at constraining accruals earnings management during periods of economic contraction. This effect is significantly diminished when firms are more likely to issue equity. Further, we find that only affiliated analysts display differences in monitoring intensity across macroeconomic conditions. Overall, we find the efficacy of analysts as external monitors varies counter-cyclically with economic conditions.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessAnalysts' Monitoring Incentives across the Macro-Economic Cycle
We examine the dynamic relation between earnings management and external monitoring by financial analysts in response to changes in macroeconomic conditions. We predict and find that analysts' incentives to monitor firms' earnings management activities vary counter-cyclically. Specifically, we find that analysts are more effective at constraining accruals earnings management during periods of economic contraction. This effect is significantly diminished when firms are more likely to issue equity. Further, we find that only affiliated analysts display differences in monitoring intensity across macroeconomic conditions. Overall, we find the efficacy of analysts as external monitors varies counter-cyclically with economic conditions.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Management Forecasts and Litigation Risk *
We examine the influence of the ex ante risk of class action securities litigation on firms' decisions to issue management earnings forecasts as well as the characteristics of those forecasts. We find that litigation risk is positively associated with the likelihood of issuing a forecast for both good-and bad-news firms. While the association is marginally stronger for firms with bad earnings news, our results suggest that litigation risk is unlikely to explain the observed preponderance of bad-news forecasts. We examine the effect of litigation risk on the amount of the total earnings news released in the forecast, on forecast horizon, and on forecast precision. These results indicate that higher litigation risk is associated with a higher proportion of news being released when firms have bad news. Finally, higher litigation risk is associated with forecasts being released earlier and being more precise.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessManagement Forecasts and Litigation Risk *
We examine the influence of the ex ante risk of class action securities litigation on firms' decisions to issue management earnings forecasts as well as the characteristics of those forecasts. We find that litigation risk is positively associated with the likelihood of issuing a forecast for both good-and bad-news firms. While the association is marginally stronger for firms with bad earnings news, our results suggest that litigation risk is unlikely to explain the observed preponderance of bad-news forecasts. We examine the effect of litigation risk on the amount of the total earnings news released in the forecast, on forecast horizon, and on forecast precision. These results indicate that higher litigation risk is associated with a higher proportion of news being released when firms have bad news. Finally, higher litigation risk is associated with forecasts being released earlier and being more precise.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
How the Stock Market responds to the Tone in Analyst Reports ⊗
Using a large sample of analyst reports (~215,000), we examine whether two textual attributes, tone and uncertainty, provide incremental information to investors beyond quantitative summary measures. We find that tone (uncertainty) is positively (negatively) associated with short-term abnormal returns around the report's release date conditional on forecast and recommendation revisions. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that analysts provide additional information in the text of their reports that is not captured in the summary quantitative measures. The results also suggest that investors place significantly more weight on tone information when the report contains "bad" news, although the evidence is mixed w.r.t. uncertainty. We also examine the effects of consistency between textual and quantitative report attributes. We find that investors place more weight on report tone when tone and forecast (recommendation) revisions provide consistent signals, but not vice-versa. ⊗ We appreciate the comments and suggestions of seminar participants at INSEAD.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessHow the Stock Market responds to the Tone in Analyst Reports ⊗
Using a large sample of analyst reports (~215,000), we examine whether two textual attributes, tone and uncertainty, provide incremental information to investors beyond quantitative summary measures. We find that tone (uncertainty) is positively (negatively) associated with short-term abnormal returns around the report's release date conditional on forecast and recommendation revisions. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that analysts provide additional information in the text of their reports that is not captured in the summary quantitative measures. The results also suggest that investors place significantly more weight on tone information when the report contains "bad" news, although the evidence is mixed w.r.t. uncertainty. We also examine the effects of consistency between textual and quantitative report attributes. We find that investors place more weight on report tone when tone and forecast (recommendation) revisions provide consistent signals, but not vice-versa. ⊗ We appreciate the comments and suggestions of seminar participants at INSEAD.
- Open Access
- 3 July 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Insider Trading, Future Earnings, and Post-Earnings Announcement Drift
This paper examines the association between insider trading prior to quarterly earnings announcements and the magnitude of the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD). We conjecture and find that insider trades reflect insiders’ private information about the persistence of earnings news. Thus, insider trades can help investors better understand and incorporate the time-series properties of quarterly earnings into stock prices in a timely and unbiased manner, thereby mitigating PEAD. As predicted, PEAD is significantly lower when earnings announcements are preceded by insider trading. The reduction in PEAD is driven by contradictory insider trades (i.e., net buys before large negative earnings news or net sells before large positive earnings news) and is more pronounced in the presence of more sophisticated market participants. Consistent with investors extracting and trading on insiders’ private information, pre-announcement insider trading is associated with smaller market reactions to future earnings news in each of the four subsequent quarters. Overall, our findings indicate insider trading contributes to stock price efficiency by conveying insiders’ private information about future earnings and especially the persistence of earnings news.
- 3 July 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessInsider Trading, Future Earnings, and Post-Earnings Announcement Drift
This paper examines the association between insider trading prior to quarterly earnings announcements and the magnitude of the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD). We conjecture and find that insider trades reflect insiders’ private information about the persistence of earnings news. Thus, insider trades can help investors better understand and incorporate the time-series properties of quarterly earnings into stock prices in a timely and unbiased manner, thereby mitigating PEAD. As predicted, PEAD is significantly lower when earnings announcements are preceded by insider trading. The reduction in PEAD is driven by contradictory insider trades (i.e., net buys before large negative earnings news or net sells before large positive earnings news) and is more pronounced in the presence of more sophisticated market participants. Consistent with investors extracting and trading on insiders’ private information, pre-announcement insider trading is associated with smaller market reactions to future earnings news in each of the four subsequent quarters. Overall, our findings indicate insider trading contributes to stock price efficiency by conveying insiders’ private information about future earnings and especially the persistence of earnings news.
- Open Access
- 23 August 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Role of Employees as Information Intermediaries: Evidence from Their Professional Connections
This paper investigates whether employees in conjunction with their professional networks function as information intermediaries. Collectively, employees have access to value-relevant information that can be distributed through both their direct professional contacts and the contacts of their contacts. We find that firms with more highly connected employees have more efficient prices with respect to earnings-related information. More highly connected firms have lower abnormal returns and trading volume reactions by retail investors around earnings announcements. These results hold for both executive and non-executive employees. In addition, stock prices incorporate earnings-related information on a more-timely basis over the quarterly earnings cycle when employees are more connected. Finally, we find that retail order imbalances predict the cross-section of future stock returns for firms with highly connected employees. Overall, our findings suggest that employees and their professional connections play an important role as information intermediaries, thereby increasing the information efficiency of stock prices.
- 23 August 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Role of Employees as Information Intermediaries: Evidence from Their Professional Connections
This paper investigates whether employees in conjunction with their professional networks function as information intermediaries. Collectively, employees have access to value-relevant information that can be distributed through both their direct professional contacts and the contacts of their contacts. We find that firms with more highly connected employees have more efficient prices with respect to earnings-related information. More highly connected firms have lower abnormal returns and trading volume reactions by retail investors around earnings announcements. These results hold for both executive and non-executive employees. In addition, stock prices incorporate earnings-related information on a more-timely basis over the quarterly earnings cycle when employees are more connected. Finally, we find that retail order imbalances predict the cross-section of future stock returns for firms with highly connected employees. Overall, our findings suggest that employees and their professional connections play an important role as information intermediaries, thereby increasing the information efficiency of stock prices.
- Open Access
- 28 February 2022
- Published by Wiley in Accounting & Finance
- Vol. 63 (2) , 1885-1918
The association between quarter length, forecast errors, and firms’ voluntary disclosures
- 28 February 2022
- Published by Wiley in Accounting & Finance
- Vol. 63 (2) , 1885-1918
Open AccessThe association between quarter length, forecast errors, and firms’ voluntary disclosures