James A. Robinson
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
James A. Robinson has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Daron Acemoglu
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
5 shared publications Daron Acemoglu
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics , E52–380, 50 Memorial Drive, Cambridge, MA02142
1 shared publication- Francisco A. Gallego
Instituto de Economía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile
1 shared publication - Jean-Marie Baland
CRED, University of Namur, Belgium
1 shared publication - Jeffrey B. Nugent
Department of Economics. University of Southern California, University Park Campus. Los Angeles, CA 90089-0253
1 shared publication - Jonathan H. Conning
City University of New York
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 2 August 2014
- Published by Annual Reviews in Annual Review of Economics
- Vol. 6 (1) , 875-912
Institutions, Human Capital, and Development*
In this article, we revisit the relationship among institutions, human capital, and development. We argue that empirical models that treat institutions and human capital as exogenous are misspecified, both because of the usual omitted variable bias problems and because of differential measurement error in these variables, and that this misspecification is at the root of the very large returns of human capital, about four to five times greater than that implied by micro (Mincerian) estimates, found in the previous literature. Using cross-country and cross-regional regressions, we show that when we focus on historically determined differences in human capital and control for the effect of institutions, the impact of institutions on long-run development is robust, whereas the estimates of the effect of human capital are much diminished and become consistent with micro estimates. Using historical and cross-country regression evidence, we also show that there is no support for the view that differences in the human capital endowments of early European colonists have been a major factor in the subsequent institutional development of former colonies.
- 2 August 2014
- Published by Annual Reviews in Annual Review of Economics
- Vol. 6 (1) , 875-912
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessInstitutions, Human Capital, and Development*
In this article, we revisit the relationship among institutions, human capital, and development. We argue that empirical models that treat institutions and human capital as exogenous are misspecified, both because of the usual omitted variable bias problems and because of differential measurement error in these variables, and that this misspecification is at the root of the very large returns of human capital, about four to five times greater than that implied by micro (Mincerian) estimates, found in the previous literature. Using cross-country and cross-regional regressions, we show that when we focus on historically determined differences in human capital and control for the effect of institutions, the impact of institutions on long-run development is robust, whereas the estimates of the effect of human capital are much diminished and become consistent with micro estimates. Using historical and cross-country regression evidence, we also show that there is no support for the view that differences in the human capital endowments of early European colonists have been a major factor in the subsequent institutional development of former colonies.
- Top Cited Papers
- 10 April 2013
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 115 (2) , 260-291
The Political Economy of Clientelism*
In this paper, we argue that the political‐commitment problem provides an explanation for why much income redistribution takes an inefficient form, particularly employment in the public sector. A job is a credible way of redistributing when it provides rents (such as in situations with moral hazard), and employment is optimal ex post. Moreover, a job is selective and reversible, and thus ties the continuation utility of a voter to the political success of a particular politician. We show that the need to make offers of employment incentive‐compatible leads to inefficiencies in the supply of public goods. We also show that such inefficient redistribution becomes relatively attractive in situations with high inequality and low productivity. Inefficiency is increased when the stakes from politics are high, when inequality is high, and when money matters less than ideology in politics.
- 10 April 2013
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 115 (2) , 260-291
Top Cited PapersThe Political Economy of Clientelism*
In this paper, we argue that the political‐commitment problem provides an explanation for why much income redistribution takes an inefficient form, particularly employment in the public sector. A job is a credible way of redistributing when it provides rents (such as in situations with moral hazard), and employment is optimal ex post. Moreover, a job is selective and reversible, and thus ties the continuation utility of a voter to the political success of a particular politician. We show that the need to make offers of employment incentive‐compatible leads to inefficiencies in the supply of public goods. We also show that such inefficient redistribution becomes relatively attractive in situations with high inequality and low productivity. Inefficiency is increased when the stakes from politics are high, when inequality is high, and when money matters less than ideology in politics.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 1 February 2013
- Published by American Economic Association in Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Vol. 27 (2) , 173-192
Economics versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy Advice
The standard approach to policy making and advice in economics implicitly or explicitly ignores politics and political economy and maintains that if possible, any market failure should be rapidly removed. This essay explains why this conclusion may be incorrect; because it ignores politics, this approach is oblivious to the impact of the removal of market failures on future political equilibria and economic efficiency, which can be deleterious. We first outline a simple framework for the study of the impact of current economic policies on future political equilibria—and indirectly on future economic outcomes. We then illustrate the mechanisms through which such impacts might operate using a series of examples. The main message is that sound economic policy should be based on a careful analysis of political economy and should factor in its influence on future political equilibria.
- 1 February 2013
- Published by American Economic Association in Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Vol. 27 (2) , 173-192
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessEconomics versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy Advice
The standard approach to policy making and advice in economics implicitly or explicitly ignores politics and political economy and maintains that if possible, any market failure should be rapidly removed. This essay explains why this conclusion may be incorrect; because it ignores politics, this approach is oblivious to the impact of the removal of market failures on future political equilibria and economic efficiency, which can be deleterious. We first outline a simple framework for the study of the impact of current economic policies on future political equilibria—and indirectly on future economic outcomes. We then illustrate the mechanisms through which such impacts might operate using a series of examples. The main message is that sound economic policy should be based on a careful analysis of political economy and should factor in its influence on future political equilibria.
- 9 October 2012
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Institutional Economics
- Vol. 9 (1) , 27-29
Measuring institutions in the Trobriand Islands: a comment on Voigt's paper
I use the historical institutions of the Trobriand Islands to discuss problems and non-problems with measuring institutions and estimating their causal effects on economic outcomes.
- 9 October 2012
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Institutional Economics
- Vol. 9 (1) , 27-29
Measuring institutions in the Trobriand Islands: a comment on Voigt's paper
I use the historical institutions of the Trobriand Islands to discuss problems and non-problems with measuring institutions and estimating their causal effects on economic outcomes.
- 1 July 2012
- Published by Wiley in New Perspectives Quarterly
- Vol. 29 (3) , 52-54
Who Will Rule the World?
- 1 July 2012
- Published by Wiley in New Perspectives Quarterly
- Vol. 29 (3) , 52-54
Who Will Rule the World?
- 27 March 2012
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The Economists’ Voice
- Vol. 9 (3)
Is This Time Different? Capture and Anti-Capture of US Politics
Acemoglu and Robinson, drawing on their recent book, describe how political movements have kept U.S. political institutions inclusive despite threats of political capture.
- 27 March 2012
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The Economists’ Voice
- Vol. 9 (3)
Is This Time Different? Capture and Anti-Capture of US Politics
Acemoglu and Robinson, drawing on their recent book, describe how political movements have kept U.S. political institutions inclusive despite threats of political capture.
- 16 March 2012
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 56 (3) , 601-619
The Political Value of Land: Political Reform and Land Prices in Chile
- 16 March 2012
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 56 (3) , 601-619
The Political Value of Land: Political Reform and Land Prices in Chile
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 June 2010
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Economic History of Developing Regions
- Vol. 25 (1) , 21-50
WHY IS AFRICA POOR?
In this paper we take for granted that the poverty of Sub-Saharan Africa is to a large part explained by its political and economic institutions. As citizens Africans do not have the incentives to save and invest, as politicians they do not have the incentive to provide public goods. We focus on the issue of how Africa developed such institutions. Historically, no society had the types of institutions required for modern economic growth, though a few had elements of them for quite long periods. Growth arose when institutional transitions took place. We argue that the historical dynamics of institutions in Africa have been different. Processes of state formation seem to have been delayed relative to Eurasia, and state institutions appear to have been intensely absolutist and patrimonial. These initial institutions interacted in a perverse way with a series of shocks that hit Africa, in particular the slave trade in the early modern period, and colonialism in the 19th and 20th centuries. Africa countries emerged at independence with a complex path dependent set of institutions that were probably even worse than those which they had at the time of colonization. It was these that precipitated authoritarianism, sustained economic decline and reinforced the poverty we see in Africa today.
- 1 June 2010
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Economic History of Developing Regions
- Vol. 25 (1) , 21-50
Top Cited PapersWHY IS AFRICA POOR?
In this paper we take for granted that the poverty of Sub-Saharan Africa is to a large part explained by its political and economic institutions. As citizens Africans do not have the incentives to save and invest, as politicians they do not have the incentive to provide public goods. We focus on the issue of how Africa developed such institutions. Historically, no society had the types of institutions required for modern economic growth, though a few had elements of them for quite long periods. Growth arose when institutional transitions took place. We argue that the historical dynamics of institutions in Africa have been different. Processes of state formation seem to have been delayed relative to Eurasia, and state institutions appear to have been intensely absolutist and patrimonial. These initial institutions interacted in a perverse way with a series of shocks that hit Africa, in particular the slave trade in the early modern period, and colonialism in the 19th and 20th centuries. Africa countries emerged at independence with a complex path dependent set of institutions that were probably even worse than those which they had at the time of colonization. It was these that precipitated authoritarianism, sustained economic decline and reinforced the poverty we see in Africa today.
- 1 May 2010
- Published by Wiley in Review of Development Economics
- Vol. 14 (2) , 282-301
Interlinking and Collusion
- 1 May 2010
- Published by Wiley in Review of Development Economics
- Vol. 14 (2) , 282-301
Interlinking and Collusion
- Open Access
- 1 March 2010
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Revista de Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History
- Vol. 28 (1) , 45-82
Are factor endowments fate?
In recent theories of comparative development, the role of institutional differences has been crucial. Yet, what explains comparative institutional evolution? We investigate this issue by studying the coffee exporting economies of Latin America. Although homogeneous in many ways, they experienced radically different paths of economic (and political) development, which is conventionally traced to the differential organization of the coffee industry. We show that the different forms that the coffee economy took in the 19thcentury was critically determined by the legal environment determining access to land, and that different laws resulted from differences in the nature of political competition and the backgrounds of political elites. Our analysis suggests that explanations of institutional differences that stress economic fundamentals can only be part of the story. At least in the economies that we study, while geography, factor endowments and technology are clearly important, their implications for the institutional structure and thus development are conditional on the form that political competition takes in society. For interesting variations in economic outcomes, endowments are not fate.
- 1 March 2010
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Revista de Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History
- Vol. 28 (1) , 45-82
Open AccessAre factor endowments fate?
In recent theories of comparative development, the role of institutional differences has been crucial. Yet, what explains comparative institutional evolution? We investigate this issue by studying the coffee exporting economies of Latin America. Although homogeneous in many ways, they experienced radically different paths of economic (and political) development, which is conventionally traced to the differential organization of the coffee industry. We show that the different forms that the coffee economy took in the 19thcentury was critically determined by the legal environment determining access to land, and that different laws resulted from differences in the nature of political competition and the backgrounds of political elites. Our analysis suggests that explanations of institutional differences that stress economic fundamentals can only be part of the story. At least in the economies that we study, while geography, factor endowments and technology are clearly important, their implications for the institutional structure and thus development are conditional on the form that political competition takes in society. For interesting variations in economic outcomes, endowments are not fate.