Daron Acemoglu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Daron Acemoglu has a total of 115 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Asuman Ozdaglar
EECS LIDS Massachusetts Institute of Technology
13 shared publications - Munther A. Dahleh
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
6 shared publications - James A. Robinson
Harvard University
5 shared publications - Emilio Frazzoli
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
4 shared publications - Giacomo Como
Department of Mathematical Sciences, Politecnico di Torino, Turin, Italy
4 shared publications - Ketan Savla
Department of Economics Massachusetts Institute of Technology Massachusetts Institute of Technology
4 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 21 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature
- Vol. 656 (8129) , 795
Why we must stop talking about artificial general intelligence — and instead build ‘pro-worker’ AI
- 21 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature
- Vol. 656 (8129) , 795
Why we must stop talking about artificial general intelligence — and instead build ‘pro-worker’ AI
- Top Cited Papers
- 30 January 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 141 (2) , 1521-1579
Automation and Rent Dissipation: Implications for Wages, Inequality, and Productivity
This article studies the effects of automation in a task-based economy in which some jobs pay workers rents—wages above workers' outside options. We show that automation targets high-rent tasks, dissipating rents, amplifying wage losses, and reducing within-group wage dispersion in exposed groups. This form of rent dissipation is inefficient and offsets the productivity gains from automation. Using U.S. data from 1980 to 2016, we find evidence of sizable rent dissipation and reduced within-group wage dispersion due to automation. Automation accounts for 52% of the increase in between-group inequality since 1980, with rent dissipation explaining one-fifth of this total. Our estimates imply that inefficient rent dissipation has offset 60%–90% of the productivity gains from automation over this period.
- 30 January 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 141 (2) , 1521-1579
Top Cited PapersAutomation and Rent Dissipation: Implications for Wages, Inequality, and Productivity
This article studies the effects of automation in a task-based economy in which some jobs pay workers rents—wages above workers' outside options. We show that automation targets high-rent tasks, dissipating rents, amplifying wage losses, and reducing within-group wage dispersion in exposed groups. This form of rent dissipation is inefficient and offsets the productivity gains from automation. Using U.S. data from 1980 to 2016, we find evidence of sizable rent dissipation and reduced within-group wage dispersion due to automation. Automation accounts for 52% of the increase in between-group inequality since 1980, with rent dissipation explaining one-fifth of this total. Our estimates imply that inefficient rent dissipation has offset 60%–90% of the productivity gains from automation over this period.
- Open Access
- 15 December 2025
- Published by Tsinghua University Press in Research in Government and Economics
- Vol. 1 (1) , 47-75
How Can Administrative Agencies Operate Effectively? Institutional Trust, Independence, and Mission-Driven Incentives
From the perspective of government and economics, the paper examines the role of modern administrative agencies in market economies and the pressures they confront. It conceptualizes these agencies, such as central banks and environmental regulators, as a “fourth pillar” of the state, parallel to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Together, they constitute the contemporary “administrative state.” Its effectiveness rests on broad institutional trust. Yet this trust is increasingly undermined by populist movements and political interference, which weaken the professionalism and independence of administrative agencies. To address these risks, the paper develops an analytical framework that emphasizes two pillars: mission-driven incentives and institutional independence. At the local level, it analyzes incentive failures and governance fragmentation within federal systems. The paper then turns to emerging technologies, particularly artificial intelligence, and argues that regulatory frameworks must be reconfigured. The key is to balance deregulation with targeted oversight. Such a balance is essential for rebuilding state capacity and enabling governments to navigate the uncertainties of the current era.
- 15 December 2025
- Published by Tsinghua University Press in Research in Government and Economics
- Vol. 1 (1) , 47-75
Open AccessHow Can Administrative Agencies Operate Effectively? Institutional Trust, Independence, and Mission-Driven Incentives
From the perspective of government and economics, the paper examines the role of modern administrative agencies in market economies and the pressures they confront. It conceptualizes these agencies, such as central banks and environmental regulators, as a “fourth pillar” of the state, parallel to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Together, they constitute the contemporary “administrative state.” Its effectiveness rests on broad institutional trust. Yet this trust is increasingly undermined by populist movements and political interference, which weaken the professionalism and independence of administrative agencies. To address these risks, the paper develops an analytical framework that emphasizes two pillars: mission-driven incentives and institutional independence. At the local level, it analyzes incentive failures and governance fragmentation within federal systems. The paper then turns to emerging technologies, particularly artificial intelligence, and argues that regulatory frameworks must be reconfigured. The key is to balance deregulation with targeted oversight. Such a balance is essential for rebuilding state capacity and enabling governments to navigate the uncertainties of the current era.
- Open Access
- 8 May 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1176-1179
Wikipedia Contributions in the Wake of ChatGPT
- 8 May 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1176-1179
Open AccessWikipedia Contributions in the Wake of ChatGPT
- Open Access
- 13 September 2024
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
CAPITAL AND WAGES
Does capital accumulation increase labor demand and wages? Neoclassical production functions, where capital and labor are q‐complements, ensure that the answer is yes, so long as labor markets are competitive. This result critically depends on the assumption that capital accumulation does not change the technologies being developed and used. I adapt the theory of endogenous technological change to investigate this question when technology also responds to capital accumulation. I show that there are strong parallels between the relationship between capital and wages and existing results on the conditions under which equilibrium factor demands are upward‐sloping (e.g., Acemoglu, Econometrica 75(5) (2007), 1371–410). Extending this framework, I provide intuitive conditions and simple examples where a greater capital stock leads to lower wages, because it triggers more automation. I then offer an endogenous growth model with a menu of technologies where equilibrium involves choices over both the extent of automation and the rate of growth of labor‐augmenting productivity. In this framework, capital accumulation and technological change in the long run are associated with wage growth, but an increase in the saving rate increases the extent of automation, and initially reduces the wage rate and can subsequently depress its long‐run growth rate.
- 13 September 2024
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
Open AccessCAPITAL AND WAGES
Does capital accumulation increase labor demand and wages? Neoclassical production functions, where capital and labor are q‐complements, ensure that the answer is yes, so long as labor markets are competitive. This result critically depends on the assumption that capital accumulation does not change the technologies being developed and used. I adapt the theory of endogenous technological change to investigate this question when technology also responds to capital accumulation. I show that there are strong parallels between the relationship between capital and wages and existing results on the conditions under which equilibrium factor demands are upward‐sloping (e.g., Acemoglu, Econometrica 75(5) (2007), 1371–410). Extending this framework, I provide intuitive conditions and simple examples where a greater capital stock leads to lower wages, because it triggers more automation. I then offer an endogenous growth model with a menu of technologies where equilibrium involves choices over both the extent of automation and the rate of growth of labor‐augmenting productivity. In this framework, capital accumulation and technological change in the long run are associated with wage growth, but an increase in the saving rate increases the extent of automation, and initially reduces the wage rate and can subsequently depress its long‐run growth rate.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 6 August 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Economic Policy
- Vol. 40 (121) , 13-58
The simple macroeconomics of AI
SUMMARY: This paper evaluates claims about the large macroeconomic implications of new advances in Artificial intelligence (AI). It starts from a task-based model of AI’s effects, working through automation and task complementarities. So long as AI’s microeconomic effects are driven by cost savings/productivity improvements at the task level, its macroeconomic consequences will be given by a version of Hulten’s theorem: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and aggregate productivity gains can be estimated by what fraction of tasks are impacted and average task-level cost savings. Using existing estimates on exposure to AI and productivity improvements at the task level, these macroeconomic effects appear non-trivial but modest – no more than a 0.66% increase in total factor productivity (TFP) over 10 years. The paper then argues that even these estimates could be exaggerated, because early evidence is from easy-to-learn tasks, whereas some of the future effects will come from hard-to-learn tasks, where there are many context-dependent factors affecting decision-making and no objective outcome measures from which to learn successful performance. Consequently, predicted TFP gains over the next 10 years are even more modest and are predicted to be less than 0.53%. I also explore AI’s wage and inequality effects. I show theoretically that even when AI improves the productivity of low-skill workers in certain tasks (without creating new tasks for them), this may increase rather than reduce inequality. Empirically, I find that AI advances are unlikely to increase inequality as much as previous automation technologies because their impact is more equally distributed across demographic groups, but there is also no evidence that AI will reduce labour income inequality. Instead, AI is predicted to widen the gap between capital and labour income. Finally, some of the new tasks created by AI may have negative social value (such as the design of algorithms for online manipulation), and I discuss how to incorporate the macroeconomic effects of new tasks that may have negative social value.
- 6 August 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Economic Policy
- Vol. 40 (121) , 13-58
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessThe simple macroeconomics of AI
SUMMARY: This paper evaluates claims about the large macroeconomic implications of new advances in Artificial intelligence (AI). It starts from a task-based model of AI’s effects, working through automation and task complementarities. So long as AI’s microeconomic effects are driven by cost savings/productivity improvements at the task level, its macroeconomic consequences will be given by a version of Hulten’s theorem: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and aggregate productivity gains can be estimated by what fraction of tasks are impacted and average task-level cost savings. Using existing estimates on exposure to AI and productivity improvements at the task level, these macroeconomic effects appear non-trivial but modest – no more than a 0.66% increase in total factor productivity (TFP) over 10 years. The paper then argues that even these estimates could be exaggerated, because early evidence is from easy-to-learn tasks, whereas some of the future effects will come from hard-to-learn tasks, where there are many context-dependent factors affecting decision-making and no objective outcome measures from which to learn successful performance. Consequently, predicted TFP gains over the next 10 years are even more modest and are predicted to be less than 0.53%. I also explore AI’s wage and inequality effects. I show theoretically that even when AI improves the productivity of low-skill workers in certain tasks (without creating new tasks for them), this may increase rather than reduce inequality. Empirically, I find that AI advances are unlikely to increase inequality as much as previous automation technologies because their impact is more equally distributed across demographic groups, but there is also no evidence that AI will reduce labour income inequality. Instead, AI is predicted to widen the gap between capital and labour income. Finally, some of the new tasks created by AI may have negative social value (such as the design of algorithms for online manipulation), and I discuss how to incorporate the macroeconomic effects of new tasks that may have negative social value.
- Open Access
- 5 July 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Open Economics
- Vol. 3 (Supplement) , i906-i929
A task-based approach to inequality
This article reviews recent work on how automation and task displacement have contributed to labour share declines and inequality in the US labour market. We summarize the basic building blocks of a task-based framework in which a set of tasks is allocated between capital, skilled labour and unskilled labour. Automation, which corresponds to the use of new technologies expanding the set of tasks that can be performed by capital, always reduces the labour share in value added and may depress overall wages and employment. The negative effects of automation on labour share and its potentially adverse consequences for labour demand can be counterbalanced by the creation of new labour-intensive tasks, which can reinstate labour into the production process. We also show that when automation displaces unskilled labour from the tasks in which they used to specialize (which has been its modal impact so far), it increases the demand for skills and inequality. New tasks may or may not limit the increase in the demand for skills depending on whether they are mostly targeted at skilled workers. We then provide a range of evidence supporting the basic predictions and implications of this framework. Most importantly, the decline in the share of labour in national income and the increase in the demand for skills appear to be related to an acceleration in the pace of automation and a deceleration in technological changes complementing humans during the last 30 years. We end with a discussion of the potential bias towards automation in the development and adoption of digital technologies, and how this will affect the nature of work in the face of recent advances in artificial intelligence.
- 5 July 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Open Economics
- Vol. 3 (Supplement) , i906-i929
Open AccessA task-based approach to inequality
This article reviews recent work on how automation and task displacement have contributed to labour share declines and inequality in the US labour market. We summarize the basic building blocks of a task-based framework in which a set of tasks is allocated between capital, skilled labour and unskilled labour. Automation, which corresponds to the use of new technologies expanding the set of tasks that can be performed by capital, always reduces the labour share in value added and may depress overall wages and employment. The negative effects of automation on labour share and its potentially adverse consequences for labour demand can be counterbalanced by the creation of new labour-intensive tasks, which can reinstate labour into the production process. We also show that when automation displaces unskilled labour from the tasks in which they used to specialize (which has been its modal impact so far), it increases the demand for skills and inequality. New tasks may or may not limit the increase in the demand for skills depending on whether they are mostly targeted at skilled workers. We then provide a range of evidence supporting the basic predictions and implications of this framework. Most importantly, the decline in the share of labour in national income and the increase in the demand for skills appear to be related to an acceleration in the pace of automation and a deceleration in technological changes complementing humans during the last 30 years. We end with a discussion of the potential bias towards automation in the development and adoption of digital technologies, and how this will affect the nature of work in the face of recent advances in artificial intelligence.
- Open Access
- 24 June 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 23 (1) , 119-158
The Making of Social Democracy: the Economic and Electoral Consequences of Norway’s 1936 Folk School Reform
Upon assuming power for the first time in 1935, the Norwegian Labour Party delivered on its promise for a major schooling reform. The reform raised minimum instruction time in less-developed rural areas and boosted the resources available to rural schools, reducing class size, and raising teacher salaries. We show that cohorts more intensively affected by the reform increased their education and experienced higher labor income. Our main result is that the schooling reform also boosted support for the Norwegian Labour Party in subsequent elections. This additional support persisted for several decades and was pivotal in maintaining support for the social democratic coalition in Norway. These results are not driven by the direct impact of education and are not explained by higher turnout, or greater attention or resources from the Labour Party targeted toward the municipalities most affected by the reform. Rather, our evidence suggests that cohorts that benefited from the schooling reform, and their parents, rewarded the party for delivering a major reform that was beneficial to them.
- 24 June 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 23 (1) , 119-158
Open AccessThe Making of Social Democracy: the Economic and Electoral Consequences of Norway’s 1936 Folk School Reform
Upon assuming power for the first time in 1935, the Norwegian Labour Party delivered on its promise for a major schooling reform. The reform raised minimum instruction time in less-developed rural areas and boosted the resources available to rural schools, reducing class size, and raising teacher salaries. We show that cohorts more intensively affected by the reform increased their education and experienced higher labor income. Our main result is that the schooling reform also boosted support for the Norwegian Labour Party in subsequent elections. This additional support persisted for several decades and was pivotal in maintaining support for the social democratic coalition in Norway. These results are not driven by the direct impact of education and are not explained by higher turnout, or greater attention or resources from the Labour Party targeted toward the municipalities most affected by the reform. Rather, our evidence suggests that cohorts that benefited from the schooling reform, and their parents, rewarded the party for delivering a major reform that was beneficial to them.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 31 May 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in PNAS Nexus
- Vol. 3 (6) , pgae191
The impact of generative artificial intelligence on socioeconomic inequalities and policy making
Generative artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to both exacerbate and ameliorate existing socioeconomic inequalities. In this article, we provide a state-of-the-art interdisciplinary overview of the potential impacts of generative AI on (mis)information and three information-intensive domains: work, education, and healthcare. Our goal is to highlight how generative AI could worsen existing inequalities while illuminating how AI may help mitigate pervasive social problems. In the information domain, generative AI can democratize content creation and access but may dramatically expand the production and proliferation of misinformation. In the workplace, it can boost productivity and create new jobs, but the benefits will likely be distributed unevenly. In education, it offers personalized learning, but may widen the digital divide. In healthcare, it might improve diagnostics and accessibility, but could deepen pre-existing inequalities. In each section, we cover a specific topic, evaluate existing research, identify critical gaps, and recommend research directions, including explicit trade-offs that complicate the derivation of a priori hypotheses. We conclude with a section highlighting the role of policymaking to maximize generative AI's potential to reduce inequalities while mitigating its harmful effects. We discuss strengths and weaknesses of existing policy frameworks in the European Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom, observing that each fails to fully confront the socioeconomic challenges we have identified. We propose several concrete policies that could promote shared prosperity through the advancement of generative AI. This article emphasizes the need for interdisciplinary collaborations to understand and address the complex challenges of generative AI.
- 31 May 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in PNAS Nexus
- Vol. 3 (6) , pgae191
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessThe impact of generative artificial intelligence on socioeconomic inequalities and policy making
Generative artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to both exacerbate and ameliorate existing socioeconomic inequalities. In this article, we provide a state-of-the-art interdisciplinary overview of the potential impacts of generative AI on (mis)information and three information-intensive domains: work, education, and healthcare. Our goal is to highlight how generative AI could worsen existing inequalities while illuminating how AI may help mitigate pervasive social problems. In the information domain, generative AI can democratize content creation and access but may dramatically expand the production and proliferation of misinformation. In the workplace, it can boost productivity and create new jobs, but the benefits will likely be distributed unevenly. In education, it offers personalized learning, but may widen the digital divide. In healthcare, it might improve diagnostics and accessibility, but could deepen pre-existing inequalities. In each section, we cover a specific topic, evaluate existing research, identify critical gaps, and recommend research directions, including explicit trade-offs that complicate the derivation of a priori hypotheses. We conclude with a section highlighting the role of policymaking to maximize generative AI's potential to reduce inequalities while mitigating its harmful effects. We discuss strengths and weaknesses of existing policy frameworks in the European Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom, observing that each fails to fully confront the socioeconomic challenges we have identified. We propose several concrete policies that could promote shared prosperity through the advancement of generative AI. This article emphasizes the need for interdisciplinary collaborations to understand and address the complex challenges of generative AI.
- Top Cited Papers
- 16 May 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Review of Economic Studies
- Vol. 92 (2) , 621-655
(Successful) Democracies Breed Their Own Support
Using large-scale survey data covering more than 110 countries and exploiting within-country variation across cohorts and surveys, we show that individuals with longer exposure to democracy display stronger support for democratic institutions, and that this effect is almost entirely driven by exposure to democracies with successful performance in terms of economic growth, control of corruption, peace and political stability, and public goods provision. Across a variety of specifications, estimation methods, and samples, the results are robust, and the timing and nature of the effects are consistent with our interpretation. We also present suggestive evidence that democratic institutions that receive support from their citizens perform better in the face of negative shocks.
- 16 May 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Review of Economic Studies
- Vol. 92 (2) , 621-655
Top Cited Papers(Successful) Democracies Breed Their Own Support
Using large-scale survey data covering more than 110 countries and exploiting within-country variation across cohorts and surveys, we show that individuals with longer exposure to democracy display stronger support for democratic institutions, and that this effect is almost entirely driven by exposure to democracies with successful performance in terms of economic growth, control of corruption, peace and political stability, and public goods provision. Across a variety of specifications, estimation methods, and samples, the results are robust, and the timing and nature of the effects are consistent with our interpretation. We also present suggestive evidence that democratic institutions that receive support from their citizens perform better in the face of negative shocks.