David Martimort
David Martimort has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Elisabetta Iossa
University of Rome Tor Vergata; IEFE Bocconi University
4 shared publications - Jakub Kastl
Department of Economics Stanford University NBER 579 Serra Mall Stanford California 94305‐6072 U.S.A.
2 shared publications - Salvatore Piccolo
University of Bergamo and Econic Partners, LLC, Bergamo, Italy
2 shared publications Bruno Biais
Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), 21 Allée de Brienne, 31000 Toulouse, France; bruno.biais@univ‐tlse1.fr
1 shared publicationDavid Barde
1 shared publication- David Bardey
U Los Andes and TSE, Bogotá, Colombia
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 11 October 2018
- Published by CAIRN.INFO in Revue d'économie politique
- Vol. 128 (4) , 493-533
Contract Theory in the Spotlight: Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, 2016 Nobel Prize Winners
Un coup de projecteur sur la Théorie des Contrats : Oliver Hart et Bengt Holmström, Prix Nobel d’Économie 2016 Oliver Hart et Bengt Holmström ont reçu le Prix de la Banque de Suède en sciences économiques en mémoire d’Alfred Nobel pour leurs contributions à la Théorie des Contrats. Leurs travaux établissent une Théorie de la Firme et des organisations fondée sur deux piliers. (1) Les parties contractantes exercent des efforts ou accomplissent des investissements qui accroissent la valeur de leur relation, mais ces actions sont parfois cachées, ne peuvent être directement observées, et ne peuvent donc pas être spécifiées dans des contrats mise en œuvre par des cours de justice. (2) Les contrats et les structures de propriétés sont des réponses (imparfaites) à ces frictions informationnelles. Les contributions de ces auteurs ont ainsi conjointement ouvert la voie à un renouvellement complet de la Théorie de la Firme et de la Théorie des Organisations.
- 11 October 2018
- Published by CAIRN.INFO in Revue d'économie politique
- Vol. 128 (4) , 493-533
Contract Theory in the Spotlight: Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, 2016 Nobel Prize Winners
Un coup de projecteur sur la Théorie des Contrats : Oliver Hart et Bengt Holmström, Prix Nobel d’Économie 2016 Oliver Hart et Bengt Holmström ont reçu le Prix de la Banque de Suède en sciences économiques en mémoire d’Alfred Nobel pour leurs contributions à la Théorie des Contrats. Leurs travaux établissent une Théorie de la Firme et des organisations fondée sur deux piliers. (1) Les parties contractantes exercent des efforts ou accomplissent des investissements qui accroissent la valeur de leur relation, mais ces actions sont parfois cachées, ne peuvent être directement observées, et ne peuvent donc pas être spécifiées dans des contrats mise en œuvre par des cours de justice. (2) Les contrats et les structures de propriétés sont des réponses (imparfaites) à ces frictions informationnelles. Les contributions de ces auteurs ont ainsi conjointement ouvert la voie à un renouvellement complet de la Théorie de la Firme et de la Théorie des Organisations.
- Open Access
Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation when Sellers Provide Expert Advice
We consider a market in which sellers can exert an information-gathering effort to advise buyers about which of two goods best fits their needs. Sellers may steer buyers towards the higher margin good. We show that for sellers to collect and reveal information, profits on both goods must be sufficiently close to each other, i.e., lie within an implementability cone, which competition or regulation may ensure. Instruments to do so vary with the context. Controlling market power while improving the quality of advice is more difficult when sellers have private information on the profitability of the goods.
Open AccessDrugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation when Sellers Provide Expert Advice
We consider a market in which sellers can exert an information-gathering effort to advise buyers about which of two goods best fits their needs. Sellers may steer buyers towards the higher margin good. We show that for sellers to collect and reveal information, profits on both goods must be sufficiently close to each other, i.e., lie within an implementability cone, which competition or regulation may ensure. Instruments to do so vary with the context. Controlling market power while improving the quality of advice is more difficult when sellers have private information on the profitability of the goods.
- 15 September 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 14 (3) , 669-718
A MECHANISM DESIGN APPROACH TO CLIMATE-CHANGE AGREEMENTS
- 15 September 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 14 (3) , 669-718
A MECHANISM DESIGN APPROACH TO CLIMATE-CHANGE AGREEMENTS
- 1 May 2015
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 91, 75-96
Pessimistic information gathering
- 1 May 2015
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 91, 75-96
Pessimistic information gathering
- Top Cited Papers
- 22 January 2015
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 17 (1) , 4-48
The Simple Microeconomics of Public‐Private Partnerships
We build on the existing literature in public‐private partnerships (PPP) to analyze the main incentive issues in PPPs and the shape of optimal contracts in those contexts. We present a basic model of procurement in a multitask environment in which a risk‐averse firm chooses noncontractible efforts in cost reduction and quality improvement. We first consider the effect on incentives and risk transfer of bundling building and management stages into a single contract, allowing for different assumptions on feasible contracts and information available to the government. Then we extend the model in novel directions. We study the relationship between the operator and its financiers and the impact of private finance. We discuss the trade‐off between incentive and flexibility in PPP agreements and the dynamics of PPPs, including cost overruns. We also consider how institutions, and specifically the risk of regulatory opportunism, affect contract design and incentives. The conclusion summarizes policy implications on the desirability of PPPs.
- 22 January 2015
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 17 (1) , 4-48
Top Cited PapersThe Simple Microeconomics of Public‐Private Partnerships
We build on the existing literature in public‐private partnerships (PPP) to analyze the main incentive issues in PPPs and the shape of optimal contracts in those contexts. We present a basic model of procurement in a multitask environment in which a risk‐averse firm chooses noncontractible efforts in cost reduction and quality improvement. We first consider the effect on incentives and risk transfer of bundling building and management stages into a single contract, allowing for different assumptions on feasible contracts and information available to the government. Then we extend the model in novel directions. We study the relationship between the operator and its financiers and the impact of private finance. We discuss the trade‐off between incentive and flexibility in PPP agreements and the dynamics of PPPs, including cost overruns. We also consider how institutions, and specifically the risk of regulatory opportunism, affect contract design and incentives. The conclusion summarizes policy implications on the desirability of PPPs.
- 25 March 2013
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 61 (1) , 84-107
Delegation, Ownership Concentration and R&D Spending: Evidence From Italy
We use data from the Italian manufacturing industry to document a positive correlation between delegation and R&D. This result is robust to controlling for the determinants of R&D such as human capital, capital intensity and sectoral or regional effects. We further investigate the determinants of delegation and find that ownership concentration is significantly related to delegation. Among large firms with a dispersed ownership structure, larger ownership concentration implies less delegation, whereas the opposite emerges with more concentrated ownership. Differences between the Northern and Southern regions in terms of firms' propensity to delegate decisions and engage in R&D also emerge.
- 25 March 2013
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 61 (1) , 84-107
Delegation, Ownership Concentration and R&D Spending: Evidence From Italy
We use data from the Italian manufacturing industry to document a positive correlation between delegation and R&D. This result is robust to controlling for the determinants of R&D such as human capital, capital intensity and sectoral or regional effects. We further investigate the determinants of delegation and find that ownership concentration is significantly related to delegation. Among large firms with a dispersed ownership structure, larger ownership concentration implies less delegation, whereas the opposite emerges with more concentrated ownership. Differences between the Northern and Southern regions in terms of firms' propensity to delegate decisions and engage in R&D also emerge.
- 1 January 2013
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 81 (1) , 393-406
Corrigendum to "Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment"
- 1 January 2013
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 81 (1) , 393-406
Corrigendum to "Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment"
- 1 December 2012
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 43 (4) , 650-676
Optimal domestic regulation under asymmetric information and international trade: a simple general equilibrium approach
- 1 December 2012
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 43 (4) , 650-676
Optimal domestic regulation under asymmetric information and international trade: a simple general equilibrium approach
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 September 2012
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 43 (3) , 442-474
Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public‐‐private partnerships
We study the agency costs of delegated public service provision, focusing on the link between organizational forms and uncertainty at project implementation. We consider a dynamic multitask moral hazard environment where the mapping between effort and performance is ex ante uncertain but new information may arise during operations. Our analysis highlights the costs and benefits that bundling planning and implementation—as under public‐‐private partnerships—can bring in terms of project design and operational costs under various scenarios, possibly allowing for asymmetric information, moral hazard and renegotiation. It also shows that relying on private finance enhances the benefits of bundling only if lenders have enough expertise to assess project risks.
- 1 September 2012
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 43 (3) , 442-474
Top Cited PapersRisk allocation and the costs and benefits of public‐‐private partnerships
We study the agency costs of delegated public service provision, focusing on the link between organizational forms and uncertainty at project implementation. We consider a dynamic multitask moral hazard environment where the mapping between effort and performance is ex ante uncertain but new information may arise during operations. Our analysis highlights the costs and benefits that bundling planning and implementation—as under public‐‐private partnerships—can bring in terms of project design and operational costs under various scenarios, possibly allowing for asymmetric information, moral hazard and renegotiation. It also shows that relying on private finance enhances the benefits of bundling only if lenders have enough expertise to assess project risks.