Craig R. M. McKenzie
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Craig R. M. McKenzie has a total of 25 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Michael J. Liersch
Merrill Lynch New York City NY USA
6 shared publicationsShlomi Sher
Department of Psychological Science, Pomona College, Claremont, CA, 91711, USA
4 shared publications- Shlomi Sher
Department of Psychology, University of California, San Diego, USA
4 shared publications - John Timothy Wixted
University of California, San Diego
3 shared publications - Jonathan D. Nelson
School of Psychology, University of Surrey, Guildford, UK
3 shared publications Laurie A. Mikkelsen
Department of Psychology, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093-0109, USA
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 25 October 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 45, e240
Incomplete preferences and rational framing effects
The normative principle of description invariance presupposes that rational preferences must be complete. The completeness axiom is normatively dubious, however, and its rejection opens the door to rational framing effects. In this commentary, we suggest that Bermúdez's insightful challenge to the standard normative view of framing can be clarified and extended by situating it within a broader critique of completeness.
- 25 October 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 45, e240
Incomplete preferences and rational framing effects
The normative principle of description invariance presupposes that rational preferences must be complete. The completeness axiom is normatively dubious, however, and its rejection opens the door to rational framing effects. In this commentary, we suggest that Bermúdez's insightful challenge to the standard normative view of framing can be clarified and extended by situating it within a broader critique of completeness.
- 2 November 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
- Vol. 28 (2) , 695-702
Default sensitivity in attempts at social influence
While past research has demonstrated the power of defaults to nudge decision makers toward desired outcomes, few studies have examined whether people under
- 2 November 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
- Vol. 28 (2) , 695-702
Default sensitivity in attempts at social influence
While past research has demonstrated the power of defaults to nudge decision makers toward desired outcomes, few studies have examined whether people under
- 31 December 2018
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Review of Behavioral Economics
- Vol. 5 (3-4) , 337-360
Constructed Preferences, Rationality, and Choice Architecture
Preferences must be constructed at least some of the time. This, by itself, is not problematic for rationality. At issue is whether the construction is done in a reasonable manner. The common view is that preference construction violates coherence principles that are basic requirements of rational choice. However, traditional coherence principles are static and implicitly assume that the choice context provides no relevant information. In lab experiments, decision makers often evaluate or choose between options that are unfamiliar or even fictitious, and they may look to the context for choice-relevant cues that help them update their beliefs and construct their preferences. We review evidence that a number of apparent “biases” in decision making stem from adaptive sensitivity to subtle contextual cues. These context effects are dynamically coherent, in that preference-updating is coordinated with reasonable context-dependent belief-updating. This perspective on preference construction not only provides a different view of the psychology and rationality of decision making, it also suggests a different approach to choice architecture. Whereas the traditional nudge approach tries to engineer specific decision outcomes, often by rerouting apparent biases so that they point in desirable directions, the present approach seeks to facilitate processes in order to help people make rational decisions.
- 31 December 2018
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Review of Behavioral Economics
- Vol. 5 (3-4) , 337-360
Constructed Preferences, Rationality, and Choice Architecture
Preferences must be constructed at least some of the time. This, by itself, is not problematic for rationality. At issue is whether the construction is done in a reasonable manner. The common view is that preference construction violates coherence principles that are basic requirements of rational choice. However, traditional coherence principles are static and implicitly assume that the choice context provides no relevant information. In lab experiments, decision makers often evaluate or choose between options that are unfamiliar or even fictitious, and they may look to the context for choice-relevant cues that help them update their beliefs and construct their preferences. We review evidence that a number of apparent “biases” in decision making stem from adaptive sensitivity to subtle contextual cues. These context effects are dynamically coherent, in that preference-updating is coordinated with reasonable context-dependent belief-updating. This perspective on preference construction not only provides a different view of the psychology and rationality of decision making, it also suggests a different approach to choice architecture. Whereas the traditional nudge approach tries to engineer specific decision outcomes, often by rerouting apparent biases so that they point in desirable directions, the present approach seeks to facilitate processes in order to help people make rational decisions.
- 29 March 2015
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
- Vol. 29 (1) , 25-36
Are Longshots Only for Losers? A New Look at the Last Race Effect
There is evidence that betting on longshots increases in the last race of a day of horse racing. Previous accounts have assumed that the phenomenon is driven by bettors who have lost money and are trying to recoup their losses. To test this assumption of “reference dependence,” three laboratory experiments simulated a day at the races: In each of several rounds, participants chose either (i) a gamble with a small probability of a large gain and a large probability of a small loss (the “longshot”) or (ii) a gamble with a moderate chance of a small gain or a small loss (the “favorite”). The first two experiments employed a game played for points, while a third experiment included monetary incentives and stimuli drawn from a real day of racing. These experiments provide a clear demonstration of the last race effect in a laboratory setting. However, the results indicate that the effect is largely referenceindependent: Participants were more likely to choose the longshot in the last round regardless of whether, and how much, they had won or lost in previous rounds. Winning or losing, bettors prefer to “go out with a bang” at the end of a series of gambles. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
- 29 March 2015
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
- Vol. 29 (1) , 25-36
Are Longshots Only for Losers? A New Look at the Last Race Effect
There is evidence that betting on longshots increases in the last race of a day of horse racing. Previous accounts have assumed that the phenomenon is driven by bettors who have lost money and are trying to recoup their losses. To test this assumption of “reference dependence,” three laboratory experiments simulated a day at the races: In each of several rounds, participants chose either (i) a gamble with a small probability of a large gain and a large probability of a small loss (the “longshot”) or (ii) a gamble with a moderate chance of a small gain or a small loss (the “favorite”). The first two experiments employed a game played for points, while a third experiment included monetary incentives and stimuli drawn from a real day of racing. These experiments provide a clear demonstration of the last race effect in a laboratory setting. However, the results indicate that the effect is largely referenceindependent: Participants were more likely to choose the longshot in the last round regardless of whether, and how much, they had won or lost in previous rounds. Winning or losing, bettors prefer to “go out with a bang” at the end of a series of gambles. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
- 1 January 2014
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA)
A Rational Analysis of Constructed Preference
- 1 January 2014
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA)
A Rational Analysis of Constructed Preference
- 1 January 2013
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA)
Are Longshots Only for Losers? A New Look at the Last Race Effect
- 1 January 2013
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA)
Are Longshots Only for Losers? A New Look at the Last Race Effect