David Vines
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
David Vines has a total of 21 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Gregor Irwin
Bank of England, UK
3 shared publicationsDaniel Susskind
Department of Political Economy and Policy Institute at King’s College London; Institute for Ethics in AI and Department of Economics at Oxford University
2 shared publications- Gordon Douglas Menzies
University of Technology Sydney (UTS) - School of Finance and Economics
2 shared publications Anne Williamson
*** Partners in Health Mexico
1 shared publication- Christopher Adam
Christopher Adam, University of Oxford and IGC, UK
1 shared publication - Christopher Allsopp
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS Research Division St. Louis P.O. Box 442 63166 MO
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 June 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Review of Economic Policy
- Vol. 40 (2) , 189-219
Global economic order and global economic governance
This issue of the Oxford Review of Economic Policy explores the origins of the US-led liberal multilateral economic order in the post-war world and the threats which that order now faces, drawing on contributions from two different groups of people—academic international relations (IR) scholars and international economists. This introductory essay attempts to weave the various strands of this intellectual collaboration together. First, it provides a narrative history of how economic collaboration emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War. Second, it describes the nature of the global economic governance that emerged and provides a new formal framework for analysing it, making use of the idea of ‘concerted unilateralism’. Third, it explores how contemporary challenges—a broadening of policy requirements, the rise of economic nationalism, and the rise of China as a new hegemon—mean that the global economic order is now in flux. And finally, it concludes with a general observation that runs through the paper: that IR scholars are inclined to analyse international economic regimes, economists to study particular policy proposals, and that these two perspectives can—and should—complement one another.
- 12 June 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Review of Economic Policy
- Vol. 40 (2) , 189-219
Open AccessGlobal economic order and global economic governance
This issue of the Oxford Review of Economic Policy explores the origins of the US-led liberal multilateral economic order in the post-war world and the threats which that order now faces, drawing on contributions from two different groups of people—academic international relations (IR) scholars and international economists. This introductory essay attempts to weave the various strands of this intellectual collaboration together. First, it provides a narrative history of how economic collaboration emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War. Second, it describes the nature of the global economic governance that emerged and provides a new formal framework for analysing it, making use of the idea of ‘concerted unilateralism’. Third, it explores how contemporary challenges—a broadening of policy requirements, the rise of economic nationalism, and the rise of China as a new hegemon—mean that the global economic order is now in flux. And finally, it concludes with a general observation that runs through the paper: that IR scholars are inclined to analyse international economic regimes, economists to study particular policy proposals, and that these two perspectives can—and should—complement one another.
- 19 September 2023
- Published by Wiley in Australian Economic Review
- Vol. 56 (3) , 273-287
Monetary Policy Mistakes and Remedies: An Assessment Following the RBA Review
- 19 September 2023
- Published by Wiley in Australian Economic Review
- Vol. 56 (3) , 273-287
Monetary Policy Mistakes and Remedies: An Assessment Following the RBA Review
- Open Access
- 10 April 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Review of Economic Policy
- Vol. 39 (2) , 367-378
Creating a new sovereign debt reconstruction mechanism: why incentives, risk sharing, and CACs will all matter
This paper argues that the Covid recession, and aggressive monetary tightening in the US accompanying the post-Covid recovery, are likely to cause a sovereign debt overhang in emerging market economies—i.e. debt which is unlikely to be fully repaid. A sovereign debt reconstruction mechanism (SDRM) seems necessary to avoid widespread disorderly debt write-downs. We discuss a range of procedures that are available, building upon Anne Krueger’s proposal for an SDRM in 2002 ( Krueger, 2002a, b). At that time Krugman (1988) had already argued that any SDRM should incentivize debtors so that they put in effort to clear their debts (a Krugman contract). Menzies (2004) went further than this to show that these effects should be further sharpened, creating what he called ‘hyper-incentive effects’ (a Menzies contract). The International Monetary Fund has argued that risk-sharing between debtors and creditors will also be important ( IMF, 2020). But we show that risk-sharing will—in general—pull in the opposite direction to incentive effects, and we doubt the extent to which the IMF has recognized this trade-off. Finally, we argue that collective action clauses (CACs) increase the probability of achieving any agreement, whatever it might be. They will help avoid the alternative of disorderly debt write-downs, outcomes which will deliver neither incentive effects nor risk-sharing.
- 10 April 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Review of Economic Policy
- Vol. 39 (2) , 367-378
Open AccessCreating a new sovereign debt reconstruction mechanism: why incentives, risk sharing, and CACs will all matter
This paper argues that the Covid recession, and aggressive monetary tightening in the US accompanying the post-Covid recovery, are likely to cause a sovereign debt overhang in emerging market economies—i.e. debt which is unlikely to be fully repaid. A sovereign debt reconstruction mechanism (SDRM) seems necessary to avoid widespread disorderly debt write-downs. We discuss a range of procedures that are available, building upon Anne Krueger’s proposal for an SDRM in 2002 ( Krueger, 2002a, b). At that time Krugman (1988) had already argued that any SDRM should incentivize debtors so that they put in effort to clear their debts (a Krugman contract). Menzies (2004) went further than this to show that these effects should be further sharpened, creating what he called ‘hyper-incentive effects’ (a Menzies contract). The International Monetary Fund has argued that risk-sharing between debtors and creditors will also be important ( IMF, 2020). But we show that risk-sharing will—in general—pull in the opposite direction to incentive effects, and we doubt the extent to which the IMF has recognized this trade-off. Finally, we argue that collective action clauses (CACs) increase the probability of achieving any agreement, whatever it might be. They will help avoid the alternative of disorderly debt write-downs, outcomes which will deliver neither incentive effects nor risk-sharing.
- Open Access
- 10 April 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Review of Economic Policy
- Vol. 39 (2) , 245-266
Longer-term structural transitions and short-term macroeconomic adjustment: quantitative implications for the global financial system
This paper provides quantitative modelling of the effect of three longer-term global transitions: the global demographic transition involving a marked reduction in population growth; a long-term slowdown in productivity growth which may continue, or may conceivably be reversed; and the disruption in the global economy due to increasing climate shocks and the implementation of climate policies that will be needed to reach net-zero emissions by 2050. We study the global investment needs to which these transitions will lead. We demonstrate that these investment needs will be both asymmetric across countries and over time. This asymmetry will lead to potentially large changes in trade flows and significant financial capital flows across national borders, and also to substantial real exchange changes and interest rate movements. The resulting large movements in international capital flows will have significant implications for the global financial system, which we demonstrate at the country and regional level.
- 10 April 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Review of Economic Policy
- Vol. 39 (2) , 245-266
Open AccessLonger-term structural transitions and short-term macroeconomic adjustment: quantitative implications for the global financial system
This paper provides quantitative modelling of the effect of three longer-term global transitions: the global demographic transition involving a marked reduction in population growth; a long-term slowdown in productivity growth which may continue, or may conceivably be reversed; and the disruption in the global economy due to increasing climate shocks and the implementation of climate policies that will be needed to reach net-zero emissions by 2050. We study the global investment needs to which these transitions will lead. We demonstrate that these investment needs will be both asymmetric across countries and over time. This asymmetry will lead to potentially large changes in trade flows and significant financial capital flows across national borders, and also to substantial real exchange changes and interest rate movements. The resulting large movements in international capital flows will have significant implications for the global financial system, which we demonstrate at the country and regional level.
- 29 August 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Review of Economic Policy
- Vol. 36 (Supplement) , S14-S37
A workable strategy for COVID-19 testing: stratified periodic testing rather than universal random testing
This paper argues for the regular testing of people in groups that are more likely to be exposed to SARS-CoV-2, to reduce the spread of COVID-19 and resume economic activity. We call this ‘stratified periodic testing’. It is ‘stratified’ as it is based on at-risk groups, and ‘periodic’ as everyone in the group is tested at regular intervals. We argue that this is a better use of scarce testing resources than ‘universal random testing’, as has been recently discussed globally. We find that, under reasonable assumptions and allowing for false negative results 30 per cent of the time, 17 per cent of a subgroup would need to be tested each day to lower the effective reproduction number R from 2.5 to 0.75, under stratified periodic testing. Using the same assumptions the universal random testing rate would need to be 27 per cent (as opposed to 7 per cent as argued by Romer (2020b)). We obtain this rate of testing using a corrected method for calculating the impact of an infectious person on others, and allowing for asymptomatic cases. We also find that the effect of one day’s delay between testing positive and self-isolating is similar to having a test that is 30 per cent less accurate.
- 29 August 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Review of Economic Policy
- Vol. 36 (Supplement) , S14-S37
A workable strategy for COVID-19 testing: stratified periodic testing rather than universal random testing
This paper argues for the regular testing of people in groups that are more likely to be exposed to SARS-CoV-2, to reduce the spread of COVID-19 and resume economic activity. We call this ‘stratified periodic testing’. It is ‘stratified’ as it is based on at-risk groups, and ‘periodic’ as everyone in the group is tested at regular intervals. We argue that this is a better use of scarce testing resources than ‘universal random testing’, as has been recently discussed globally. We find that, under reasonable assumptions and allowing for false negative results 30 per cent of the time, 17 per cent of a subgroup would need to be tested each day to lower the effective reproduction number R from 2.5 to 0.75, under stratified periodic testing. Using the same assumptions the universal random testing rate would need to be 27 per cent (as opposed to 7 per cent as argued by Romer (2020b)). We obtain this rate of testing using a corrected method for calculating the impact of an infectious person on others, and allowing for asymptomatic cases. We also find that the effect of one day’s delay between testing positive and self-isolating is similar to having a test that is 30 per cent less accurate.
- Open Access
- 29 August 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Review of Economic Policy
- Vol. 36 (Supplement) , S297-S337
Global macroeconomic cooperation in response to the COVID-19 pandemic: a roadmap for the G20 and the IMF
The COVID-19 crisis has caused the greatest collapse in global economic activity since 1720. Some advanced countries have mounted a massive fiscal response, both to pay for disease-fighting action and to preserve the incomes of firms and workers until the economic recovery is under way. But there are many emerging market economies which have been prevented from doing what is needed by their high existing levels of public debt and—especially—by the external financial constraints which they face. We argue in the present paper that there is a need for international cooperation to allow such countries to undertake the kind of massive fiscal response that all countries now need, and that many advanced countries have been able to carry out. We show what such cooperation would involve. We use a global macroeconomic model to explore how extraordinarily beneficial such cooperation would be. Simulations of the model suggest that GDP in the countries in which extra fiscal support takes place would be around two and a half per cent higher in the first year, and that GDP in other countries in the world be more than one per cent higher. So far, such cooperation has been notably lacking, in striking contrast with what happened in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008. The necessary cooperation needs to be led by the Group of Twenty (G20), just as happened in 2008–9, since the G20 brings together the leaders of the world’s largest economies. This cooperation must also necessarily involve a promise of international financial support from the International Monetary Fund, otherwise international financial markets might take fright at the large budget deficits and current account deficits which will emerge, creating fiscal crises and currency crises and so causing such expansionary policies which we advocate to be brought to an end.
- 29 August 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Review of Economic Policy
- Vol. 36 (Supplement) , S297-S337
Open AccessGlobal macroeconomic cooperation in response to the COVID-19 pandemic: a roadmap for the G20 and the IMF
The COVID-19 crisis has caused the greatest collapse in global economic activity since 1720. Some advanced countries have mounted a massive fiscal response, both to pay for disease-fighting action and to preserve the incomes of firms and workers until the economic recovery is under way. But there are many emerging market economies which have been prevented from doing what is needed by their high existing levels of public debt and—especially—by the external financial constraints which they face. We argue in the present paper that there is a need for international cooperation to allow such countries to undertake the kind of massive fiscal response that all countries now need, and that many advanced countries have been able to carry out. We show what such cooperation would involve. We use a global macroeconomic model to explore how extraordinarily beneficial such cooperation would be. Simulations of the model suggest that GDP in the countries in which extra fiscal support takes place would be around two and a half per cent higher in the first year, and that GDP in other countries in the world be more than one per cent higher. So far, such cooperation has been notably lacking, in striking contrast with what happened in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008. The necessary cooperation needs to be led by the Group of Twenty (G20), just as happened in 2008–9, since the G20 brings together the leaders of the world’s largest economies. This cooperation must also necessarily involve a promise of international financial support from the International Monetary Fund, otherwise international financial markets might take fright at the large budget deficits and current account deficits which will emerge, creating fiscal crises and currency crises and so causing such expansionary policies which we advocate to be brought to an end.
- Open Access
- 1 November 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in National Institute Economic Review
- Vol. 250 (1) , R22-R29
Developing Trade
Executive Summary: The UK faces no easy options in determining how to develop its approach to international trade post-Brexit. If it finally decides to leave the European Customs Union and Single Market, it faces the possibility either of simply crashing out of the EU without a deal; trying to form market-access agreements and Free Trade Areas (FTAs) with the EU and other countries; or unilaterally reducing tariffs and liberalising trade with all countries. Each course raises significant practical difficulties, and entails major disadvantages compared with staying in the Customs Union and Single Market.The economic costs of a ‘no-deal’ approach stand to be very large, including inevitable tariffs, obstruction of UK access to EU markets, physical disruption at borders, a damping of investment and the much-discussed problem of the Irish border. Assuming ‘no-deal’ does not happen, negotiating FTAs with other countries would be possible only after a lengthy transition period, as in the Withdrawal Agreement voted down in Parliament, and would depend on the shape of the ultimate post-Brexit trading relationship between the EU and the UK. The process would be difficult, costly, and protracted; would likely be concluded on disadvantageous terms; would be even harder to apply to trade in services; and would yield extremely small gains given the volume of UK non-EU trade that is already covered by FTAs. Finally, unilateral liberalisation, while ameliorating some of the drawbacks of the first two options, faces the same problems of loss of access to European markets and disruption to trade; and would entail severe economic pain with only very gradual gains.The UK needs to conduct a much more profound and considered debate on these issues before deciding to set aside the large benefits of membership of the Customs Union and Single Market for the significant difficulties and tenuous gains offered by the alternatives. Public debate on the economic effects of trade policy has so far lacked the detailed but necessary analysis of these questions. It seems essential to establish a national policy review institution, modelled on the Australian Productivity Commission, in order to stimulate such a debate.
- 1 November 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in National Institute Economic Review
- Vol. 250 (1) , R22-R29
Open AccessDeveloping Trade
Executive Summary: The UK faces no easy options in determining how to develop its approach to international trade post-Brexit. If it finally decides to leave the European Customs Union and Single Market, it faces the possibility either of simply crashing out of the EU without a deal; trying to form market-access agreements and Free Trade Areas (FTAs) with the EU and other countries; or unilaterally reducing tariffs and liberalising trade with all countries. Each course raises significant practical difficulties, and entails major disadvantages compared with staying in the Customs Union and Single Market.The economic costs of a ‘no-deal’ approach stand to be very large, including inevitable tariffs, obstruction of UK access to EU markets, physical disruption at borders, a damping of investment and the much-discussed problem of the Irish border. Assuming ‘no-deal’ does not happen, negotiating FTAs with other countries would be possible only after a lengthy transition period, as in the Withdrawal Agreement voted down in Parliament, and would depend on the shape of the ultimate post-Brexit trading relationship between the EU and the UK. The process would be difficult, costly, and protracted; would likely be concluded on disadvantageous terms; would be even harder to apply to trade in services; and would yield extremely small gains given the volume of UK non-EU trade that is already covered by FTAs. Finally, unilateral liberalisation, while ameliorating some of the drawbacks of the first two options, faces the same problems of loss of access to European markets and disruption to trade; and would entail severe economic pain with only very gradual gains.The UK needs to conduct a much more profound and considered debate on these issues before deciding to set aside the large benefits of membership of the Customs Union and Single Market for the significant difficulties and tenuous gains offered by the alternatives. Public debate on the economic effects of trade policy has so far lacked the detailed but necessary analysis of these questions. It seems essential to establish a national policy review institution, modelled on the Australian Productivity Commission, in order to stimulate such a debate.
- 3 July 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Economic and Political Studies
- Vol. 6 (3) , 338-348
The BRI and RCEP: ensuring cooperation in the liberalisation of trade in Asia
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) offers the prospect of trade integration between Asia and Europe. But it is subject to a number of risks, some of them are similar to those associated with the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). East Asian trade liberalisation in the 1990s involved collaborative autonomy – a cooperative process of outward-looking unilateral liberalisation on a ‘most favoured nation’ (MFN) basis – rather than the creation of a regional free trade area. By contrast, the TPP has sought to create a free trade area, which would have led to trade diversion and have had other unsatisfactory features. The combination of BRI with the Regional Cooperation Economic Partnership (RCEP) might offer the possibility of outward-looking liberalisation, one which is neither dominated by China nor subject to the trade diversion of the TPP. This combination would bring strength and legitimacy to the BRI.
- 3 July 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Economic and Political Studies
- Vol. 6 (3) , 338-348
The BRI and RCEP: ensuring cooperation in the liberalisation of trade in Asia
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) offers the prospect of trade integration between Asia and Europe. But it is subject to a number of risks, some of them are similar to those associated with the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). East Asian trade liberalisation in the 1990s involved collaborative autonomy – a cooperative process of outward-looking unilateral liberalisation on a ‘most favoured nation’ (MFN) basis – rather than the creation of a regional free trade area. By contrast, the TPP has sought to create a free trade area, which would have led to trade diversion and have had other unsatisfactory features. The combination of BRI with the Regional Cooperation Economic Partnership (RCEP) might offer the possibility of outward-looking liberalisation, one which is neither dominated by China nor subject to the trade diversion of the TPP. This combination would bring strength and legitimacy to the BRI.
- 1 March 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Financial Regulation
- Vol. 2 (1) , 114-129
Fiscal Governance: How Can the Eurozone Get What It Needs?
Within the Eurozone’s macroeconomic policy framework, fiscal policy was assigned the task of managing the level of fiscal deficits, and ensuring that the level of public debt was not too high. Within this framework, monetary policy was to stabilize the macroeconomy, wage and price setting was to ensure that countries remained sufficiently competitive in relation to each other, and financial liberalization was undertaken to enable integration of the peripheral European economies with their northern neighbours, thereby generating an increase in well-being. But, even before the onset of the global financial crisis, the competitive position of the GIIPS countries had become unsustainable, and financial liberalization had been grossly mismanaged. The onset of the global financial crisis has meant that interest rates have reached the zero bound so that monetary policy is no longer able to stabilize the Eurozone economy effectively. In these circumstances, fiscal policy needs to both help stabilize the economy, in a way not allowed by the Stability and Growth Pact, and also needs to play a part in ensuring the resolution of imbalances within Europe. For this to be possible, some of the sovereign debt of countries will need to be written down.
- 1 March 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Financial Regulation
- Vol. 2 (1) , 114-129
Fiscal Governance: How Can the Eurozone Get What It Needs?
Within the Eurozone’s macroeconomic policy framework, fiscal policy was assigned the task of managing the level of fiscal deficits, and ensuring that the level of public debt was not too high. Within this framework, monetary policy was to stabilize the macroeconomy, wage and price setting was to ensure that countries remained sufficiently competitive in relation to each other, and financial liberalization was undertaken to enable integration of the peripheral European economies with their northern neighbours, thereby generating an increase in well-being. But, even before the onset of the global financial crisis, the competitive position of the GIIPS countries had become unsustainable, and financial liberalization had been grossly mismanaged. The onset of the global financial crisis has meant that interest rates have reached the zero bound so that monetary policy is no longer able to stabilize the Eurozone economy effectively. In these circumstances, fiscal policy needs to both help stabilize the economy, in a way not allowed by the Stability and Growth Pact, and also needs to play a part in ensuring the resolution of imbalances within Europe. For this to be possible, some of the sovereign debt of countries will need to be written down.
- 27 October 2015
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Integration
- Vol. 37 (7) , 861-874
Impossible Macroeconomic Trinity: The Challenge to Economic Governance in the Eurozone
Europe now faces a new impossible macroeconomic trinity: it is no longer possible to combine monetary union, German political requirements and coherent economic analysis. Economic analysis shows that there must be more inflation in Germany, a significant fiscal expansion in Germany, a significant easing of austerity in the GIIPS countries and a write-down of much of the debt of southern European sovereigns. These changes will be resisted by Germany. But they are necessary if the monetary union is to survive.
- 27 October 2015
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Integration
- Vol. 37 (7) , 861-874
Impossible Macroeconomic Trinity: The Challenge to Economic Governance in the Eurozone
Europe now faces a new impossible macroeconomic trinity: it is no longer possible to combine monetary union, German political requirements and coherent economic analysis. Economic analysis shows that there must be more inflation in Germany, a significant fiscal expansion in Germany, a significant easing of austerity in the GIIPS countries and a write-down of much of the debt of southern European sovereigns. These changes will be resisted by Germany. But they are necessary if the monetary union is to survive.