GMGordon Douglas Menzies

Gordon Douglas Menzies

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Gordon Douglas Menzies has a total of 43 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    The Efficiency of Moral Character: Modelling Principal–Agent Relations and Caring Agents Within the Fiduciary

    by Gordon Menzies, Isa Hafalir, Thomas Simpson

    This paper reconsiders how intrinsic motives that support trustworthiness should be modelled within economic theory, contributing to a methodologically pluralist business ethics. We re-examine the principal–agent problem, exposing a hidden assumption in the classic Jensen and Meckling (1976) solution. By introducing a lying cost—reflecting the agent’s concern for honesty—we reveal their model as a limiting case and distinguish between opportunistic agents and what we call ‘caring agents’, who have a disposition to tell the truth. When lying costs are sufficiently high, a first-best, fixed-wage contract becomes optimal, offering an alternative to the standard incentive-based approach. We also present a dynamic model in which incentive contracts may erode honesty over time, by signalling distrust and lowering agents’ lying costs—a downward spiral that crowds out trustworthiness. Drawing on recent developments in the philosophy of trust, we show how moral commitments can be formally integrated into economic models. Our results shed light on debates about the proper function of fiduciary relationships as recognized in law, and contribute to the explanation of why salaried contracts remain prevalent in professional roles, where strong financial incentives are also often resisted. Moral character, we argue, is not only normatively significant but also economically efficient.

  • Open Access

    Creating a new sovereign debt reconstruction mechanism: why incentives, risk sharing, and CACs will all matter

    by Gordon Menzies, David Vines

    This paper argues that the Covid recession, and aggressive monetary tightening in the US accompanying the post-Covid recovery, are likely to cause a sovereign debt overhang in emerging market economies—i.e. debt which is unlikely to be fully repaid. A sovereign debt reconstruction mechanism (SDRM) seems necessary to avoid widespread disorderly debt write-downs. We discuss a range of procedures that are available, building upon Anne Krueger’s proposal for an SDRM in 2002 ( Krueger, 2002a, b). At that time Krugman (1988) had already argued that any SDRM should incentivize debtors so that they put in effort to clear their debts (a Krugman contract). Menzies (2004) went further than this to show that these effects should be further sharpened, creating what he called ‘hyper-incentive effects’ (a Menzies contract). The International Monetary Fund has argued that risk-sharing between debtors and creditors will also be important ( IMF, 2020). But we show that risk-sharing will—in general—pull in the opposite direction to incentive effects, and we doubt the extent to which the IMF has recognized this trade-off. Finally, we argue that collective action clauses (CACs) increase the probability of achieving any agreement, whatever it might be. They will help avoid the alternative of disorderly debt write-downs, outcomes which will deliver neither incentive effects nor risk-sharing.

  • Open Access

    Belief adjustment: a double hurdle model and experimental evidence

    by Timo Henckel, Gordon D. Menzies, Peter G. Moffatt, Daniel J. Zizzo

    We present an experiment where subjects sequentially receive signals about the true state of the world and need to form beliefs about which one is true, with payoffs related to reported beliefs. We attempt to control for risk aversion using the Offerman et al. (Rev Econ Stud 76(4):1461–1489, 2009) technique. Against the baseline of Bayesian updating, we test for belief adjustment underreaction and overreaction and model the decision making process of the agent as a double hurdle model where agents with inferential expectations first decide whether to adjust their beliefs and then, if so, decide by how much. We also test the effects of increased inattention and complexity on belief updating. We find evidence for periods of belief inertia interspersed with belief adjustment. This is due to a combination of random belief adjustment; state-dependent belief adjustment, with many subjects requiring considerable evidence to change their beliefs; and quasi-Bayesian belief adjustment, with aggregate insufficient belief adjustment when a belief change does occur. Inattention, like complexity, makes subjects less likely to adjust their stated beliefs, while inattention additionally discourages full adjustment.


  • Developing sustainability learning in business school curricula – productive boundary objects and participatory processes

    by Melissa Edwards, Paul Brown, Suzanne Benn, Christopher Bajada, Robert Perey, Deborah Cotton, Walter Jarvis, Gordon Menzies, Ian McGregor, Katrina Waite

    Sustainability learning is holistic and complex as it draws on diverse disciplines and can be interpreted differently within individual pedagogies. Embedding sustainability across and within business schools relies on developing suitable boundary objects. These may include representations such as models, frameworks or classificatory schemes that are malleable enough to be adapted for use within the disparate disciplines and pedagogies, yet durable enough to be recognisable and to maintain consistency across them. Boundary objects thus allow the sharing of ways of knowing or practice across various social boundaries. This paper outlines how participatory curriculum development processes can enable sustainability to be embedded in a business school curriculum. Distinct phases of the process were marked by different ways of knowing, as disciplinary-specific academics developed and embedded sustainability into and across curricula. Boundary objects were both outcomes and productive facilitators of this process. They acted as catalysts and attracted ongoing processes of dialogue, debate and meaning-making between these academics. The institutional context provided enabling conditions to legitimize outcomes from the participatory process. The process may be replicable in other business schools by the use of boundary objects.


  • Restoring Trust in Finance: From Principal–Agent to Principled Agent

    by Gordon Menzies, Donald Hay, Thomas Simpson, David Vines

    Banking solves the principal–agent problem with incentive contracts which assume a Homo Economicus representative agent. However, professions can solve the principal–agent problem by assuming a ‘Reasonable Person’ representative agent, from tort law, who reliably tells the truth about hidden action. We describe a non‐virtuous circle in finance, which is a negative feedback loop between motivation crowding out arising from incentive contracts, and the subsequent need to offer incentive contacts because agents change from the Reasonable Person to Homo Economicus. We prescribe less reliance on incentive contracts in the practice of finance, and on Homo Economicus in the theory of finance.


  • Switching cost models as hypothesis tests

    by Samuel N. Cohen, Timo Henckel, Gordon D. Menzies, Johannes Muhle-Karbe, Daniel J. Zizzo


  • Open Access

    Switching Cost Models as Hypothesis Tests

    by Samuel N. Cohen, Timo Henckel, Gordon D. Menzies, Johannes Muhle-Karbe, Daniel J. Zizzo

    We relate models based on costs of switching beliefs (e.g. due to inattention) to hypothesis tests. Specifically, for an inference problem with a penalty for mistakes and for switching the inferred value, a band of inaction is optimal. We show this band is equivalent to a confidence interval, and therefore to a two-sided hypothesis test.

  • Open Access

    Australian Prudential Regulation before and after the Global Financial Crisis

    by Peter Docherty, Ron Bird, Timo Henckel, Gordon Douglas Menzies

    This paper reviews the nature of Australian bank prudential regulation before and after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). It provides a detailed conceptual framework for understanding the functions of banks and deposit-takers, the theory of what can go wrong with the operation of these institutions, and the logic of prudential regulation. It traces developments in Australian prudential regulation from the introduction of the formal capital-based framework in the 1980s to the implementation of the Basel III regime after the GFC. The paper concludes that i) the introduction of the Financial Claims Scheme was a clear and welcome change compared with pre-GFC arrangements; ii) the introduction of the Basel III liquidity regime constituted a more fundamental modification, best characterised as a significant refinement to the riskbased calculation of capital than as a fundamental change to regulatory philosophy; iii) the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) had been practising macroprudential regulation well before the GFC even though Australia’s adoption of Basel III’s macroprudential apparatus appears on the surface to constitute a genuine innovation in prudential regulation; and iv) the importance of financial stability as a policy objective and the nature of macroprudential regulation raise questions about the wisdom of having split monetary policy and prudential regulation functions in 1998, and a revisit of this question and a reassessment of institutional structures are called for.


  • Rural-led exchange rate appreciation in China

    by Gordon Menzies, Sylvia Xiaolin Xiao, Peter Dixon, Xiujian Peng, Maureen Rimmer