Gordon Douglas Menzies
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Gordon Douglas Menzies has a total of 43 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Daniel John Zizzo
School of Economics, University of Queensland, St Lucia, Australia
14 shared publications Timo Henckel
School of Economics and Finance University of Oxford Australian National University & CAMA University of Technology Carnegie Mellon University Newcastle University & CAMA University of Technology Sydney Uni- versity of Technology Sydney 2007 Broadway Sydney NSW Australia
5 shared publications- Timo Henckel
Australian National University Canberra Australian Capital Territory Australia
4 shared publications Donald Hay
University of Oxford Oxford UK
3 shared publications- David Vines
University of Oxford
2 shared publications Johannes Muhle-Karbe
Carnegie Mellon University, United States
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 25 June 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
The Efficiency of Moral Character: Modelling Principal–Agent Relations and Caring Agents Within the Fiduciary
This paper reconsiders how intrinsic motives that support trustworthiness should be modelled within economic theory, contributing to a methodologically pluralist business ethics. We re-examine the principal–agent problem, exposing a hidden assumption in the classic Jensen and Meckling (1976) solution. By introducing a lying cost—reflecting the agent’s concern for honesty—we reveal their model as a limiting case and distinguish between opportunistic agents and what we call ‘caring agents’, who have a disposition to tell the truth. When lying costs are sufficiently high, a first-best, fixed-wage contract becomes optimal, offering an alternative to the standard incentive-based approach. We also present a dynamic model in which incentive contracts may erode honesty over time, by signalling distrust and lowering agents’ lying costs—a downward spiral that crowds out trustworthiness. Drawing on recent developments in the philosophy of trust, we show how moral commitments can be formally integrated into economic models. Our results shed light on debates about the proper function of fiduciary relationships as recognized in law, and contribute to the explanation of why salaried contracts remain prevalent in professional roles, where strong financial incentives are also often resisted. Moral character, we argue, is not only normatively significant but also economically efficient.
- 25 June 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
Open AccessThe Efficiency of Moral Character: Modelling Principal–Agent Relations and Caring Agents Within the Fiduciary
This paper reconsiders how intrinsic motives that support trustworthiness should be modelled within economic theory, contributing to a methodologically pluralist business ethics. We re-examine the principal–agent problem, exposing a hidden assumption in the classic Jensen and Meckling (1976) solution. By introducing a lying cost—reflecting the agent’s concern for honesty—we reveal their model as a limiting case and distinguish between opportunistic agents and what we call ‘caring agents’, who have a disposition to tell the truth. When lying costs are sufficiently high, a first-best, fixed-wage contract becomes optimal, offering an alternative to the standard incentive-based approach. We also present a dynamic model in which incentive contracts may erode honesty over time, by signalling distrust and lowering agents’ lying costs—a downward spiral that crowds out trustworthiness. Drawing on recent developments in the philosophy of trust, we show how moral commitments can be formally integrated into economic models. Our results shed light on debates about the proper function of fiduciary relationships as recognized in law, and contribute to the explanation of why salaried contracts remain prevalent in professional roles, where strong financial incentives are also often resisted. Moral character, we argue, is not only normatively significant but also economically efficient.
- Open Access
- 10 April 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Review of Economic Policy
- Vol. 39 (2) , 367-378
Creating a new sovereign debt reconstruction mechanism: why incentives, risk sharing, and CACs will all matter
This paper argues that the Covid recession, and aggressive monetary tightening in the US accompanying the post-Covid recovery, are likely to cause a sovereign debt overhang in emerging market economies—i.e. debt which is unlikely to be fully repaid. A sovereign debt reconstruction mechanism (SDRM) seems necessary to avoid widespread disorderly debt write-downs. We discuss a range of procedures that are available, building upon Anne Krueger’s proposal for an SDRM in 2002 ( Krueger, 2002a, b). At that time Krugman (1988) had already argued that any SDRM should incentivize debtors so that they put in effort to clear their debts (a Krugman contract). Menzies (2004) went further than this to show that these effects should be further sharpened, creating what he called ‘hyper-incentive effects’ (a Menzies contract). The International Monetary Fund has argued that risk-sharing between debtors and creditors will also be important ( IMF, 2020). But we show that risk-sharing will—in general—pull in the opposite direction to incentive effects, and we doubt the extent to which the IMF has recognized this trade-off. Finally, we argue that collective action clauses (CACs) increase the probability of achieving any agreement, whatever it might be. They will help avoid the alternative of disorderly debt write-downs, outcomes which will deliver neither incentive effects nor risk-sharing.
- 10 April 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Review of Economic Policy
- Vol. 39 (2) , 367-378
Open AccessCreating a new sovereign debt reconstruction mechanism: why incentives, risk sharing, and CACs will all matter
This paper argues that the Covid recession, and aggressive monetary tightening in the US accompanying the post-Covid recovery, are likely to cause a sovereign debt overhang in emerging market economies—i.e. debt which is unlikely to be fully repaid. A sovereign debt reconstruction mechanism (SDRM) seems necessary to avoid widespread disorderly debt write-downs. We discuss a range of procedures that are available, building upon Anne Krueger’s proposal for an SDRM in 2002 ( Krueger, 2002a, b). At that time Krugman (1988) had already argued that any SDRM should incentivize debtors so that they put in effort to clear their debts (a Krugman contract). Menzies (2004) went further than this to show that these effects should be further sharpened, creating what he called ‘hyper-incentive effects’ (a Menzies contract). The International Monetary Fund has argued that risk-sharing between debtors and creditors will also be important ( IMF, 2020). But we show that risk-sharing will—in general—pull in the opposite direction to incentive effects, and we doubt the extent to which the IMF has recognized this trade-off. Finally, we argue that collective action clauses (CACs) increase the probability of achieving any agreement, whatever it might be. They will help avoid the alternative of disorderly debt write-downs, outcomes which will deliver neither incentive effects nor risk-sharing.
- Open Access
- 1 February 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 25 (1) , 26-67
Belief adjustment: a double hurdle model and experimental evidence
We present an experiment where subjects sequentially receive signals about the true state of the world and need to form beliefs about which one is true, with payoffs related to reported beliefs. We attempt to control for risk aversion using the Offerman et al. (Rev Econ Stud 76(4):1461–1489, 2009) technique. Against the baseline of Bayesian updating, we test for belief adjustment underreaction and overreaction and model the decision making process of the agent as a double hurdle model where agents with inferential expectations first decide whether to adjust their beliefs and then, if so, decide by how much. We also test the effects of increased inattention and complexity on belief updating. We find evidence for periods of belief inertia interspersed with belief adjustment. This is due to a combination of random belief adjustment; state-dependent belief adjustment, with many subjects requiring considerable evidence to change their beliefs; and quasi-Bayesian belief adjustment, with aggregate insufficient belief adjustment when a belief change does occur. Inattention, like complexity, makes subjects less likely to adjust their stated beliefs, while inattention additionally discourages full adjustment.
- 1 February 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 25 (1) , 26-67
Open AccessBelief adjustment: a double hurdle model and experimental evidence
We present an experiment where subjects sequentially receive signals about the true state of the world and need to form beliefs about which one is true, with payoffs related to reported beliefs. We attempt to control for risk aversion using the Offerman et al. (Rev Econ Stud 76(4):1461–1489, 2009) technique. Against the baseline of Bayesian updating, we test for belief adjustment underreaction and overreaction and model the decision making process of the agent as a double hurdle model where agents with inferential expectations first decide whether to adjust their beliefs and then, if so, decide by how much. We also test the effects of increased inattention and complexity on belief updating. We find evidence for periods of belief inertia interspersed with belief adjustment. This is due to a combination of random belief adjustment; state-dependent belief adjustment, with many subjects requiring considerable evidence to change their beliefs; and quasi-Bayesian belief adjustment, with aggregate insufficient belief adjustment when a belief change does occur. Inattention, like complexity, makes subjects less likely to adjust their stated beliefs, while inattention additionally discourages full adjustment.
- 9 December 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Environmental Education Research
- Vol. 26 (2) , 253-274
Developing sustainability learning in business school curricula – productive boundary objects and participatory processes
Sustainability learning is holistic and complex as it draws on diverse disciplines and can be interpreted differently within individual pedagogies. Embedding sustainability across and within business schools relies on developing suitable boundary objects. These may include representations such as models, frameworks or classificatory schemes that are malleable enough to be adapted for use within the disparate disciplines and pedagogies, yet durable enough to be recognisable and to maintain consistency across them. Boundary objects thus allow the sharing of ways of knowing or practice across various social boundaries. This paper outlines how participatory curriculum development processes can enable sustainability to be embedded in a business school curriculum. Distinct phases of the process were marked by different ways of knowing, as disciplinary-specific academics developed and embedded sustainability into and across curricula. Boundary objects were both outcomes and productive facilitators of this process. They acted as catalysts and attracted ongoing processes of dialogue, debate and meaning-making between these academics. The institutional context provided enabling conditions to legitimize outcomes from the participatory process. The process may be replicable in other business schools by the use of boundary objects.
- 9 December 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Environmental Education Research
- Vol. 26 (2) , 253-274
Developing sustainability learning in business school curricula – productive boundary objects and participatory processes
Sustainability learning is holistic and complex as it draws on diverse disciplines and can be interpreted differently within individual pedagogies. Embedding sustainability across and within business schools relies on developing suitable boundary objects. These may include representations such as models, frameworks or classificatory schemes that are malleable enough to be adapted for use within the disparate disciplines and pedagogies, yet durable enough to be recognisable and to maintain consistency across them. Boundary objects thus allow the sharing of ways of knowing or practice across various social boundaries. This paper outlines how participatory curriculum development processes can enable sustainability to be embedded in a business school curriculum. Distinct phases of the process were marked by different ways of knowing, as disciplinary-specific academics developed and embedded sustainability into and across curricula. Boundary objects were both outcomes and productive facilitators of this process. They acted as catalysts and attracted ongoing processes of dialogue, debate and meaning-making between these academics. The institutional context provided enabling conditions to legitimize outcomes from the participatory process. The process may be replicable in other business schools by the use of boundary objects.
- 6 September 2019
- Published by Wiley in Economic Record
- Vol. 95 (311) , 497-509
Restoring Trust in Finance: From Principal–Agent to Principled Agent
Banking solves the principal–agent problem with incentive contracts which assume a Homo Economicus representative agent. However, professions can solve the principal–agent problem by assuming a ‘Reasonable Person’ representative agent, from tort law, who reliably tells the truth about hidden action. We describe a non‐virtuous circle in finance, which is a negative feedback loop between motivation crowding out arising from incentive contracts, and the subsequent need to offer incentive contacts because agents change from the Reasonable Person to Homo Economicus. We prescribe less reliance on incentive contracts in the practice of finance, and on Homo Economicus in the theory of finance.
- 6 September 2019
- Published by Wiley in Economic Record
- Vol. 95 (311) , 497-509
Restoring Trust in Finance: From Principal–Agent to Principled Agent
Banking solves the principal–agent problem with incentive contracts which assume a Homo Economicus representative agent. However, professions can solve the principal–agent problem by assuming a ‘Reasonable Person’ representative agent, from tort law, who reliably tells the truth about hidden action. We describe a non‐virtuous circle in finance, which is a negative feedback loop between motivation crowding out arising from incentive contracts, and the subsequent need to offer incentive contacts because agents change from the Reasonable Person to Homo Economicus. We prescribe less reliance on incentive contracts in the practice of finance, and on Homo Economicus in the theory of finance.
- 1 June 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Macroeconomics
- Vol. 60, 294-308
Three dimensions of central bank credibility and inferential expectations: The Euro zone
- 1 June 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Macroeconomics
- Vol. 60, 294-308
Three dimensions of central bank credibility and inferential expectations: The Euro zone
- 22 November 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 175, 32-35
Switching cost models as hypothesis tests
- 22 November 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 175, 32-35
Switching cost models as hypothesis tests
- Open Access
Switching Cost Models as Hypothesis Tests
We relate models based on costs of switching beliefs (e.g. due to inattention) to hypothesis tests. Specifically, for an inference problem with a penalty for mistakes and for switching the inferred value, a band of inaction is optimal. We show this band is equivalent to a confidence interval, and therefore to a two-sided hypothesis test.
Open AccessSwitching Cost Models as Hypothesis Tests
We relate models based on costs of switching beliefs (e.g. due to inattention) to hypothesis tests. Specifically, for an inference problem with a penalty for mistakes and for switching the inferred value, a band of inaction is optimal. We show this band is equivalent to a confidence interval, and therefore to a two-sided hypothesis test.
- Open Access
- 7 August 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Australian Prudential Regulation before and after the Global Financial Crisis
This paper reviews the nature of Australian bank prudential regulation before and after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). It provides a detailed conceptual framework for understanding the functions of banks and deposit-takers, the theory of what can go wrong with the operation of these institutions, and the logic of prudential regulation. It traces developments in Australian prudential regulation from the introduction of the formal capital-based framework in the 1980s to the implementation of the Basel III regime after the GFC. The paper concludes that i) the introduction of the Financial Claims Scheme was a clear and welcome change compared with pre-GFC arrangements; ii) the introduction of the Basel III liquidity regime constituted a more fundamental modification, best characterised as a significant refinement to the riskbased calculation of capital than as a fundamental change to regulatory philosophy; iii) the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) had been practising macroprudential regulation well before the GFC even though Australia’s adoption of Basel III’s macroprudential apparatus appears on the surface to constitute a genuine innovation in prudential regulation; and iv) the importance of financial stability as a policy objective and the nature of macroprudential regulation raise questions about the wisdom of having split monetary policy and prudential regulation functions in 1998, and a revisit of this question and a reassessment of institutional structures are called for.
- 7 August 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessAustralian Prudential Regulation before and after the Global Financial Crisis
This paper reviews the nature of Australian bank prudential regulation before and after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). It provides a detailed conceptual framework for understanding the functions of banks and deposit-takers, the theory of what can go wrong with the operation of these institutions, and the logic of prudential regulation. It traces developments in Australian prudential regulation from the introduction of the formal capital-based framework in the 1980s to the implementation of the Basel III regime after the GFC. The paper concludes that i) the introduction of the Financial Claims Scheme was a clear and welcome change compared with pre-GFC arrangements; ii) the introduction of the Basel III liquidity regime constituted a more fundamental modification, best characterised as a significant refinement to the riskbased calculation of capital than as a fundamental change to regulatory philosophy; iii) the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) had been practising macroprudential regulation well before the GFC even though Australia’s adoption of Basel III’s macroprudential apparatus appears on the surface to constitute a genuine innovation in prudential regulation; and iv) the importance of financial stability as a policy objective and the nature of macroprudential regulation raise questions about the wisdom of having split monetary policy and prudential regulation functions in 1998, and a revisit of this question and a reassessment of institutional structures are called for.
- 1 July 2016
- Published by Elsevier in China Economic Review
- Vol. 39, 15-30
Rural-led exchange rate appreciation in China
- 1 July 2016
- Published by Elsevier in China Economic Review
- Vol. 39, 15-30
Rural-led exchange rate appreciation in China