Martin Dufwenberg
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Martin Dufwenberg has a total of 22 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Amrish Patel
School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK
2 shared publications - Giovanni Di Bartolomeo
Sapienza Univ Rome, Dept Econ & Law, Rome, Italy
2 shared publications - Jose Apesteguia
ICREA-Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE
2 shared publications - Matt Van Essen
Department of Economics, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, USA
2 shared publications - Uri Gneezy
University of California San Diego
2 shared publications - Alec Smith
Department of Economics, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA, United States
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 June 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of the Economic Science Association
- Vol. 9 (1) , 77-89
Promises and partner-switch
Building on a partner-switching mechanism, we experimentally test two theories that posit different reasons why promises breed trust and cooperation. The expectation-based explanation (EBE) operates via belief-dependent guilt aversion, while the commitment-based explanation (CBE) suggests that promises offer commitment power via a (belief-independent) preference to keep one’s word. Previous research performed a similar test, which we argue should be interpreted as concerning informal agreements rather than (unilateral) promises.
- 1 June 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of the Economic Science Association
- Vol. 9 (1) , 77-89
Open AccessPromises and partner-switch
Building on a partner-switching mechanism, we experimentally test two theories that posit different reasons why promises breed trust and cooperation. The expectation-based explanation (EBE) operates via belief-dependent guilt aversion, while the commitment-based explanation (CBE) suggests that promises offer commitment power via a (belief-independent) preference to keep one’s word. Previous research performed a similar test, which we argue should be interpreted as concerning informal agreements rather than (unilateral) promises.
- 31 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 139, 15-25
Honesty in the city
- 31 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 139, 15-25
Honesty in the city
- Open Access
- 9 October 2021
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 24 (1) , 5-29
Tax evasion with a conscience
- 9 October 2021
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 24 (1) , 5-29
Open AccessTax evasion with a conscience
- Open Access
- 16 December 2019
- Published by CAIRN.INFO in Revue économique
- Vol. 70 (6) , 919-926
Sealed Envelope Submissions Foster Research Integrity
Parce que les revues préfèrent des résultats clairs, les chercheurs peuvent être tentés de s’engager dans des pratiques non éthiques, allant de la collecte de données supplémentaires pour atteindre un seuil de significativité jusqu’à la création de fausses données. Pour redresser les incitations des chercheurs, nous proposons un mécanisme par lequel les soumissions sont proposées sous enveloppe scellée. Les évaluations des éditeurs et des rapporteurs ne sont fondées que sur l’intérêt de la question de recherche et la méthode empirique proposée. Nous soutenons que les chercheurs honnêtes ne seront pas lésés par ce mécanisme, mais seront plutôt aidés par une meilleure protection. JEL Codes: A19, B49
- 16 December 2019
- Published by CAIRN.INFO in Revue économique
- Vol. 70 (6) , 919-926
Open AccessSealed Envelope Submissions Foster Research Integrity
Parce que les revues préfèrent des résultats clairs, les chercheurs peuvent être tentés de s’engager dans des pratiques non éthiques, allant de la collecte de données supplémentaires pour atteindre un seuil de significativité jusqu’à la création de fausses données. Pour redresser les incitations des chercheurs, nous proposons un mécanisme par lequel les soumissions sont proposées sous enveloppe scellée. Les évaluations des éditeurs et des rapporteurs ne sont fondées que sur l’intérêt de la question de recherche et la méthode empirique proposée. Nous soutenons que les chercheurs honnêtes ne seront pas lésés par ce mécanisme, mais seront plutôt aidés par une meilleure protection. JEL Codes: A19, B49
- 1 November 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 167, 181-184
Introduction to special issue on psychological game theory
- 1 November 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 167, 181-184
Introduction to special issue on psychological game theory
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 113, 137-146
Promises, expectations & causation
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 113, 137-146
Promises, expectations & causation
- 1 November 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 112, 125-138
King of the Hill: Giving backward induction its best shot
- 1 November 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 112, 125-138
King of the Hill: Giving backward induction its best shot
- 1 September 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 111, 85-99
Agreements with reciprocity: Co-financing and MOUs
- 1 September 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 111, 85-99
Agreements with reciprocity: Co-financing and MOUs
- 29 September 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 555-572
Information Disclosure in Auctions
This chapter reports experimental results on the importance of information disclosure policy in first-price sealed-bid auctions. Interaction takes place in ten periods according to a random matching protocol, and the level of information feedback bidders receive after each period is controlled. When bidders are informed about the losing bids in previous periods, prices are higher than the theoretical prediction. However, when this information is not revealed the bidding becomes more competitive, and the bids come close to the theoretical prediction. The chapter suggests that a signaling phenomenon may be important for explaining these results.
- 29 September 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 555-572
Information Disclosure in Auctions
This chapter reports experimental results on the importance of information disclosure policy in first-price sealed-bid auctions. Interaction takes place in ten periods according to a random matching protocol, and the level of information feedback bidders receive after each period is controlled. When bidders are informed about the losing bids in previous periods, prices are higher than the theoretical prediction. However, when this information is not revealed the bidding becomes more competitive, and the bids come close to the theoretical prediction. The chapter suggests that a signaling phenomenon may be important for explaining these results.
- 8 February 2011
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 51 (1) , 896-908
HOLD‐UP: WITH A VENGEANCE
When contracts are incomplete or unenforceable, inefficient levels of investment may occur because of hold‐up. If individuals care for negative reciprocity, these problems may be reduced, as revenge becomes a credible threat. However, negative reciprocity has this effect only when the investor holds the rights of control of the investment proceeds. We explore this issue analytically, deriving predictions for hold‐up games which differ as regards assignment of rights of control. We also test and support these predictions in an experiment. (JEL C72, C92, D23, L14)
- 8 February 2011
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 51 (1) , 896-908
HOLD‐UP: WITH A VENGEANCE
When contracts are incomplete or unenforceable, inefficient levels of investment may occur because of hold‐up. If individuals care for negative reciprocity, these problems may be reduced, as revenge becomes a credible threat. However, negative reciprocity has this effect only when the investor holds the rights of control of the investment proceeds. We explore this issue analytically, deriving predictions for hold‐up games which differ as regards assignment of rights of control. We also test and support these predictions in an experiment. (JEL C72, C92, D23, L14)