Promises and partner-switch
Open Access
- 1 June 2023
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of the Economic Science Association
- Vol. 9 (1) , 77-89
Abstract
Building on a partner-switching mechanism, we experimentally test two theories that posit different reasons why promises breed trust and cooperation. The expectation-based explanation (EBE) operates via belief-dependent guilt aversion, while the commitment-based explanation (CBE) suggests that promises offer commitment power via a (belief-independent) preference to keep one’s word. Previous research performed a similar test, which we argue should be interpreted as concerning informal agreements rather than (unilateral) promises.Keywords
Funding Information
- Università degli Studi di Roma La Sapienza
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