John Erik Fossum
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
John Erik Fossum has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Agustín José Menéndez
Universidad de León
2 shared publications - Amy Verdun
Department of Political Science, University of Victoria
1 shared publication - Ben Crum
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
1 shared publication - Christopher Lord
University of Oslo
1 shared publication Erik Oddvar Eriksen
1 shared publication- Erik Oddvar Eriksen
University of Oslo
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 November 2026
- Published by Cogitatio in Politics and Governance
- Vol. 14
The European Union and the Challenge of Rescaling Representation
This article focuses on the challenges associated with scaling up representative democracy from the European Union’s (EU) member states to the EU level. We argue that the notion of scaling up, understood as copying nation-state representational arrangements to the EU level, provides an inaccurate depiction of what is going on and the main challenges facing the EU and its member states. A more apt depiction of what is going on is rescaling democracy. Representative democracy is not only about elections, parties, and parliaments; it operates within and is shaped by a broader ecology of civil society, public sphere and media, democratic community, rule of law, and constitutionalism. The article starts by outlining what is meant by scaling up, along with the ecology of nation-state democracy. Thereafter, the article outlines how representative democracy is configured in the multilevel EU and shows how that makes the EU a case of rescaling democracy.
- 12 November 2026
- Published by Cogitatio in Politics and Governance
- Vol. 14
Open AccessThe European Union and the Challenge of Rescaling Representation
This article focuses on the challenges associated with scaling up representative democracy from the European Union’s (EU) member states to the EU level. We argue that the notion of scaling up, understood as copying nation-state representational arrangements to the EU level, provides an inaccurate depiction of what is going on and the main challenges facing the EU and its member states. A more apt depiction of what is going on is rescaling democracy. Representative democracy is not only about elections, parties, and parliaments; it operates within and is shaped by a broader ecology of civil society, public sphere and media, democratic community, rule of law, and constitutionalism. The article starts by outlining what is meant by scaling up, along with the ecology of nation-state democracy. Thereafter, the article outlines how representative democracy is configured in the multilevel EU and shows how that makes the EU a case of rescaling democracy.
- 10 November 2025
- Published by Wiley in Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy
- Vol. 16 (4)
The European Council—A Shapeshifting Crisis Handler
The question that this article addresses is: What is the role of the European Council (EUCO) in the European Union (EU)'s crisis handling? The EUCO as an organization is a meso‐level phenomenon, so that the analysis of EUCO's role in crisis handling is about a meso‐level organization's handling of crises. The article will show that EUCO is a distinct type of body, namely what is here referred to as a shapeshifting body. All organizations can change aspects of their form or shape (change mandate, change message, change personnel, shift their orientation to other organizations and contexts, and change functions and form), but only some quite distinct organizations qualify as shapeshifters. Criteria for what constitutes such a body are developed and EUCO is assessed against them. The key argument that is presented here is that EUCO's character as a shapeshifting body profoundly affects its crisis handling. An important part of EUCO's rationale was to increase the EU's ability to deal with internal and external challenges and crises. The specifics of that are shown from an analysis of how EUCO grappled with the financial turned Eurozone crisis.
- 10 November 2025
- Published by Wiley in Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy
- Vol. 16 (4)
The European Council—A Shapeshifting Crisis Handler
The question that this article addresses is: What is the role of the European Council (EUCO) in the European Union (EU)'s crisis handling? The EUCO as an organization is a meso‐level phenomenon, so that the analysis of EUCO's role in crisis handling is about a meso‐level organization's handling of crises. The article will show that EUCO is a distinct type of body, namely what is here referred to as a shapeshifting body. All organizations can change aspects of their form or shape (change mandate, change message, change personnel, shift their orientation to other organizations and contexts, and change functions and form), but only some quite distinct organizations qualify as shapeshifters. Criteria for what constitutes such a body are developed and EUCO is assessed against them. The key argument that is presented here is that EUCO's character as a shapeshifting body profoundly affects its crisis handling. An important part of EUCO's rationale was to increase the EU's ability to deal with internal and external challenges and crises. The specifics of that are shown from an analysis of how EUCO grappled with the financial turned Eurozone crisis.
- 18 February 2025
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 374-399
The political future of the EEA
- 18 May 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 35-54
Populism and Segmentation in Contemporary Europe
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 331-352
How Relevant Are Continued Ties with Canada?
- Open Access
- 27 September 2023
- Published by Cogitatio in Politics and Governance
- Vol. 11 (3) , 231-240
Multiheaded Federations: The EU and Canada Compared
The purpose of this article is to assess the merits of comparing the EU and Canada from a federal perspective. The point of departure is that both are federal-type entities that represent deviations from the standard or mainstream American model of federalism. That has given rise to alternative conceptions, multilevel governance for the EU, and a multinational federation for Canada. The article discusses the limitations of each such notion and instead argues for the merits of seeing both as different versions of multiheaded federation which is a useful analytical device for analyzing contestation over federalism within federal-type entities. This notion directs our attention to those with power and in the position to shape the political system’s federal-constitutional nature and design, which normally happens in the realm of constitutional politics. It is the fundamental struggle over sovereignty within a federal-type structure that gives rise to the notion of a multiheaded federation—there are multiple heads because there is no willingness to accept a hierarchical arrangement. The notion of a multiheaded federation is particularly suitable for capturing (de)federalisation processes and dynamics.
- 27 September 2023
- Published by Cogitatio in Politics and Governance
- Vol. 11 (3) , 231-240
Open AccessMultiheaded Federations: The EU and Canada Compared
The purpose of this article is to assess the merits of comparing the EU and Canada from a federal perspective. The point of departure is that both are federal-type entities that represent deviations from the standard or mainstream American model of federalism. That has given rise to alternative conceptions, multilevel governance for the EU, and a multinational federation for Canada. The article discusses the limitations of each such notion and instead argues for the merits of seeing both as different versions of multiheaded federation which is a useful analytical device for analyzing contestation over federalism within federal-type entities. This notion directs our attention to those with power and in the position to shape the political system’s federal-constitutional nature and design, which normally happens in the realm of constitutional politics. It is the fundamental struggle over sovereignty within a federal-type structure that gives rise to the notion of a multiheaded federation—there are multiple heads because there is no willingness to accept a hierarchical arrangement. The notion of a multiheaded federation is particularly suitable for capturing (de)federalisation processes and dynamics.
- Open Access
- 15 March 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Ethnicities
- Vol. 24 (1) , 3-30
Governing diversity in the multilevel European public space
The issue of working out a viable relationship between accepting and/or living with diversity on the one hand and fostering integration on the other has occupied public debates, political agendas, and social sciences for decades. Our point of departure is that the contemporary European context provides distinct challenges. We need to understand how postmigrant integration is shaped and conditioned by the European public space understood as a geographical space; a composite of legally and institutionally constituted entities; covering nations, regions, and cities mainly within but also beyond the EU; and a site of interaction, and public expression of contestation and cooperation. In so doing, we have to contend with the fact that such important perspectives for handling diversity as multiculturalism, interculturalism, transnationalism and cosmopolitanism occupy distinct roles within the European public space whose governance is multi-levelled yet not reducible to a single tiered system. The European public space is more encompassing than the EU even while that level of governance has some important regulative functions upon member states and to some extent even on non-EU states such as Norway and the UK, especially in what we refer to as the outer circle. While the national level is the most powerful normatively and by most other measures on the inclusion of difference (our inner circle), municipalities also contribute to the constitution of this space. We explore the logics of our four ‘isms’ and of the tiers of governance and their interaction with each other, both the isms in tensions and syntheses with each other and differentially in relation to the levels of governance. This is an exercise that has not been done before. Our purpose is to suggest a new normativity that might feasibly achieve a broader degree of support and success than any of the isms have achieved alone.
- 15 March 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Ethnicities
- Vol. 24 (1) , 3-30
Open AccessGoverning diversity in the multilevel European public space
The issue of working out a viable relationship between accepting and/or living with diversity on the one hand and fostering integration on the other has occupied public debates, political agendas, and social sciences for decades. Our point of departure is that the contemporary European context provides distinct challenges. We need to understand how postmigrant integration is shaped and conditioned by the European public space understood as a geographical space; a composite of legally and institutionally constituted entities; covering nations, regions, and cities mainly within but also beyond the EU; and a site of interaction, and public expression of contestation and cooperation. In so doing, we have to contend with the fact that such important perspectives for handling diversity as multiculturalism, interculturalism, transnationalism and cosmopolitanism occupy distinct roles within the European public space whose governance is multi-levelled yet not reducible to a single tiered system. The European public space is more encompassing than the EU even while that level of governance has some important regulative functions upon member states and to some extent even on non-EU states such as Norway and the UK, especially in what we refer to as the outer circle. While the national level is the most powerful normatively and by most other measures on the inclusion of difference (our inner circle), municipalities also contribute to the constitution of this space. We explore the logics of our four ‘isms’ and of the tiers of governance and their interaction with each other, both the isms in tensions and syntheses with each other and differentially in relation to the levels of governance. This is an exercise that has not been done before. Our purpose is to suggest a new normativity that might feasibly achieve a broader degree of support and success than any of the isms have achieved alone.
- Open Access
- 7 February 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Social & Legal Studies
- Vol. 32 (6) , 930-952
In What Sense Does Right-Wing Populism Pose a Democratic Challenge for the European Union?
What kind of challenge is right-wing populism for the European Union (EU)? The EU has been frequently criticized by populists and non-populists alike for being a remote technocracy that suffers from serious democratic defects. Democratization relies on popular (and system insider) feedback, to spell out where the shortcomings are, and how these can be rectified. Does populism play this role—is it capable of playing this role—in the EU today? I discuss that under three headings: (1) Is populism a democratizing challenge for the EU? (2) Is populism a democratic challenge for the EU? (3) Is populism an existential threat to the EU? The article finds that populists dismiss the prospects for EU democracy and espouse conceptions of people, community, and values that are out of synch with the EU. Today's populists appear less concerned with abolishing the EU and more bent on altering it to serve their ends.
- 7 February 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Social & Legal Studies
- Vol. 32 (6) , 930-952
Open AccessIn What Sense Does Right-Wing Populism Pose a Democratic Challenge for the European Union?
What kind of challenge is right-wing populism for the European Union (EU)? The EU has been frequently criticized by populists and non-populists alike for being a remote technocracy that suffers from serious democratic defects. Democratization relies on popular (and system insider) feedback, to spell out where the shortcomings are, and how these can be rectified. Does populism play this role—is it capable of playing this role—in the EU today? I discuss that under three headings: (1) Is populism a democratizing challenge for the EU? (2) Is populism a democratic challenge for the EU? (3) Is populism an existential threat to the EU? The article finds that populists dismiss the prospects for EU democracy and espouse conceptions of people, community, and values that are out of synch with the EU. Today's populists appear less concerned with abolishing the EU and more bent on altering it to serve their ends.
- Open Access
- 11 November 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 31-52
The Context of Fake News, Disinformation, and Manipulation
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss how, and the extent to which, we may consider fake news, disinformation, and manipulation as bellwethers for the health of democracy. The chapter argues that there are two quite different readings of the democratic implications of the fake news, disinformation, and manipulation challenge: on the one hand, as the rise of a certain type of political actor that claims that established politicians and their conduct of politics have lost touch with ordinary people and their concerns, and in addition, actively seeks to undermine confidence in science and scientists. Thus, the factual and evidence-based foundation of democratic politics is challenged by the rise of a particular species of populist politician and populist parties marked by a distinct style, and relatively unencumbered by conventional party politics. If these phenomena can be identified with and confined to a specific set of actors, parties, and their supporters, then the political challenge is how best to contain or isolate them. The other reading approaches the democratic challenge from a more structural angle and searches for the roots of anti-political sentiment and the trust gap in the circumstances surrounding policymaking and politics. The two readings suggest different causal dynamics in terms of how fake news, disinformation, and manipulation affect democracy. If structural changes are important sources of fake news, disinformation, and manipulation, then the rise of populism is hardly the only source of fake news and disinformation. If so, the irony in focusing on the most blatant manifestations of fake news as espoused by populist politicians is that it may detract attention from those factors that helped create such traits in the first place.
- 11 November 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 31-52
Open AccessThe Context of Fake News, Disinformation, and Manipulation
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss how, and the extent to which, we may consider fake news, disinformation, and manipulation as bellwethers for the health of democracy. The chapter argues that there are two quite different readings of the democratic implications of the fake news, disinformation, and manipulation challenge: on the one hand, as the rise of a certain type of political actor that claims that established politicians and their conduct of politics have lost touch with ordinary people and their concerns, and in addition, actively seeks to undermine confidence in science and scientists. Thus, the factual and evidence-based foundation of democratic politics is challenged by the rise of a particular species of populist politician and populist parties marked by a distinct style, and relatively unencumbered by conventional party politics. If these phenomena can be identified with and confined to a specific set of actors, parties, and their supporters, then the political challenge is how best to contain or isolate them. The other reading approaches the democratic challenge from a more structural angle and searches for the roots of anti-political sentiment and the trust gap in the circumstances surrounding policymaking and politics. The two readings suggest different causal dynamics in terms of how fake news, disinformation, and manipulation affect democracy. If structural changes are important sources of fake news, disinformation, and manipulation, then the rise of populism is hardly the only source of fake news and disinformation. If so, the irony in focusing on the most blatant manifestations of fake news as espoused by populist politicians is that it may detract attention from those factors that helped create such traits in the first place.
- Open Access
- 25 September 2022
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
- Vol. 61 (6) , 1639-1655
The EU and Third Countries: Consequences for Democracy and the Political Order
- 25 September 2022
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
- Vol. 61 (6) , 1639-1655
Open AccessThe EU and Third Countries: Consequences for Democracy and the Political Order