Marjorie K. Shelley
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Marjorie K. Shelley has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Thomas C. Omer
Department of Accounting, Texas A&M University, 4353 TAMU, College Station, TX 77843, United States
3 shared publications - Ning Du
DePaul University
2 shared publications - David V. Budescu
Fordham University
1 shared publication T. J. Atwood
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 2 January 2014
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Behavioral Finance
- Vol. 15 (1) , 70-77
Exploring Ambiguity and Familiarity Effects in The “Earnings Game” Between Managers and Investors
Prior evidence suggests that managers and investors play an earnings game in which managers bias their earnings forecasts downward as the earnings announcement date approaches. Knowing managers’ incentives to provide biased guidance, investors still revise their expectations downward helping to create “positive earnings surprises.” Using a 2 (ambiguity) × 2 (familiarity) between subject randomized experimental design where MBA students playing the roles of manager and investor answer a series of questions related to earnings guidance, we investigate whether earnings environment ambiguity and manager-investor familiarity influence behavior during the “earnings game.” In general, results from this study suggest that ambiguity contributes to managers’ propensity to mislead and investors’ propensity to follow, and a false sense of familiarity may amplify investors’ reliance on managers’ guidance.
- 2 January 2014
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Behavioral Finance
- Vol. 15 (1) , 70-77
Exploring Ambiguity and Familiarity Effects in The “Earnings Game” Between Managers and Investors
Prior evidence suggests that managers and investors play an earnings game in which managers bias their earnings forecasts downward as the earnings announcement date approaches. Knowing managers’ incentives to provide biased guidance, investors still revise their expectations downward helping to create “positive earnings surprises.” Using a 2 (ambiguity) × 2 (familiarity) between subject randomized experimental design where MBA students playing the roles of manager and investor answer a series of questions related to earnings guidance, we investigate whether earnings environment ambiguity and manager-investor familiarity influence behavior during the “earnings game.” In general, results from this study suggest that ambiguity contributes to managers’ propensity to mislead and investors’ propensity to follow, and a false sense of familiarity may amplify investors’ reliance on managers’ guidance.
- 31 May 2011
- Published by Elsevier in Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
- Vol. 115 (1) , 143
Erratum to “The appeal of vague financial forecasts” [Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 114 (2011) 179–189]
- 31 May 2011
- Published by Elsevier in Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
- Vol. 115 (1) , 143
Erratum to “The appeal of vague financial forecasts” [Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 114 (2011) 179–189]
- 1 January 1998
- Published by JSTOR in Journal of Accounting Research
- Vol. 36 (2) , 365
Capital Restructuring and Accounting Compliance Costs: The Case of Publicly Traded Partnerships
- 1 January 1998
- Published by JSTOR in Journal of Accounting Research
- Vol. 36 (2) , 365
Capital Restructuring and Accounting Compliance Costs: The Case of Publicly Traded Partnerships
- 30 April 1996
- Published by Elsevier in Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
- Vol. 66 (1) , 42-58
Intertemporal Framing Issues in Management Compensation
- 30 April 1996
- Published by Elsevier in Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
- Vol. 66 (1) , 42-58
Intertemporal Framing Issues in Management Compensation