JPJeffrey Pittman

Jeffrey Pittman

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Jeffrey Pittman has a total of 29 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Individual Auditor Social Responsibility and Audit Quality: Evidence from China

    by Jeffrey Pittman, Baolei Qi, Yi Si, Zi-Tian Wang, Chongwu Xia


  • Network Analysis of Audit Partner Rotation†

    by Jeffrey Pittman, Lin Wang, Donghui Wu

    Focusing on mandatory partner rotations, we examine the importance of within‐firm network connections to the selection of successor partners and the impact of those connections on post‐rotation audit performance. Using data from China, we track partners' history and identify incumbent‐successor connections stemming from jointly conducted prior engagements. Although these connections can enhance incumbent‐successor information transfers and thus post‐rotation audit performance, they may also pose a threat to quality by compromising the successor's independence. Among the pool of replacement candidates, we find that individuals with stronger connections with the incumbent are more likely to be appointed as successors. This finding is more pronounced when the audit engagement is more complex, client‐specific knowledge is not readily available to the succeeding partner, and the engagement is more valuable to the audit firm. We also document that successor‐incumbent connections are associated with equal or better post‐rotation audit quality and fewer client defections. These results suggest that the benefits of network‐based successor selection may outweigh its costs. By enriching our understanding of the partner transition process, this study contributes to the public policy discourse on partner rotation.


  • It's a Small World: The Importance of Social Connections with Auditors to Mutual Fund Managers’ Portfolio Decisions

    by Yangyang Chen, Jun Huang, Ting Li, Jeffrey Pittman

    We find that mutual funds whose managers are socially connected with firm auditors hold more shares of these firms and generate superior portfolio returns. Cross‐sectional results reveal that the relation between social connections and mutual fund stockholdings is more pronounced: when the social connections are stronger, when the auditor is in a better position or has stronger incentives to acquire private information, when the fund manager exercises more power, for small audit firms, for auditors in areas with poor investor protection, and for public firms with greater business opacity or private information. Other results are consistent with fund managers electing to schedule their corporate site visits to coincide with the fieldwork of their connected auditors, as would be expected if fund managers time their visits to meet with these auditors to facilitate information transfer. Additionally, we observe associations between fund trading prior to earnings surprises and audit opinions, and the presence of social connections between fund managers and firm auditors. Finally, we show that mutual funds and firms in which they invest tend to appoint connected auditors and pay them higher fees. Collectively, we document empirical patterns that would arise if socially connected auditors and mutual fund managers share information.


  • Does the Threat of a PCAOB Inspection Mitigate US Institutional Investors' Home Bias?*

    by Yue He, Bing Li, Zhenbin Liu, Jeffrey Pittman

    We exploit the staggered introduction of the PCAOB's international inspection program to examine the role that the stringency of public audit oversight plays in shaping US institutional investors' home bias. Analyzing a sample of foreign firms listed in the United States, we evaluate whether US institutional investors hold larger equity stakes in these firms—a longstanding issue that reflects investor portfolio decisions—if their auditors are exposed to the threat of a PCAOB inspection. In a differences‐in‐differences framework, we find that US‐listed foreign firms enjoy an increase in US institutional investors' equity positions after their auditors become subject to PCAOB inspection access. Cross‐sectional analysis implies that the benefit of the PCAOB inspection threat in mitigating US institutional investors' home bias is concentrated in foreign countries without a strict local audit oversight system; active US institutional investors that are known to value accounting transparency; and firms from countries that grant PCAOB access later (after the onset of its international inspection program in 2005). Our evidence suggests that foreign firms become better known in the capital markets under the PCAOB inspection program, which induces US institutional investors to acquire larger equity stakes in US‐listed foreign firms given the lower information asymmetry that ensues under the PCAOB inspection threat.


  • The Importance of Director External Social Networks to Stock Price Crash Risk*

    by Xiaohua Fang, Jeffrey Pittman, Yuping Zhao

    Prior research documents that information transmitted via director networks affects firms' policies and real economic activities. Given a manager's potential monopoly over firm information, it is important to analyze whether information transmission through director social networks undermines the manager's control. Specifically, we explore whether information flow through director networks influences managers' ability to hoard bad news. We predict and find that the extent of external connections of the board of directors is negatively associated with future stock price crash risk. Additional analysis implies that this evidence is driven by firms with more powerful executives, with weaker auditor monitoring, or subject to strong investor protection, and by directors with greater monitoring incentives or responsibilities and directors with less firm‐specific knowledge. Collectively, our research lends empirical support for the monitoring view under which better‐informed directors narrow the scope for bad news hoarding evident in stock price crash risk. In another series of tests, we fail to find evidence consistent with the information leakage view under which directors pass sensitive firm‐specific information to connections that trade on the information before its public release. Other analysis helps dispel the concern that the endogenous match between directors and companies is spuriously responsible for our core results. Our empirical findings have important implications on how social networks affect the proper functioning of capital markets.


  • Debt Covenant Restriction, Financial Misreporting, and Auditor Monitoring*

    by Jeffrey Pittman, Yuping Zhao

    Theory suggests that financial report‐based debt covenants engender incentives for the manager to relax covenant constraints through accounting choices in order to avoid costly covenant violations. Prior studies directly testing this hypothesis in the context of financial misreporting fail to find consistent evidence. Using a more refined measure of debt covenant restriction, we find that debt covenant restriction is positively associated with the probability of financial statement misstatements. This positive association is driven by performance covenants rather than capital covenants and is more consistent with the manager striving to avoid a “false‐positive” violation than to delay the violation. Our results also imply that managers resort to both income‐increasing and non–income‐increasing misreporting to relieve covenant constraints and rely more on the latter when faced with greater earnings management constraints. Additionally, the auditor charges higher audit fees to firms with more binding covenants even outside the violation state, and audit fees increase with constraints relative to both performance and capital covenants, reflecting greater financial reporting risk and bankruptcy risk, respectively. Within capital covenants, we find some evidence of even higher audit fees for tighter intangible‐inclusive versus intangible‐exclusive capital covenants. Lastly, our evidence suggests that the positive association between covenant constraints and misreporting is attenuated when the auditor has more experience with debt covenants, has greater bargaining power over the client, or faces greater litigation risk.


  • How Aggressive Tax Planning Facilitates the Diversion of Corporate Resources: Evidence from Path Analysis

    by Andrew M. Bauer, Junxiong Fang, Jeffrey Pittman, Yinqi Zhang, Yuping Zhao

    In measuring tunneling with intercorporate loans disclosed by Chinese listed companies, we analyze the underlying channels through which aggressive tax planning facilitates the diversion of corporate resources by firm insiders. Using path analysis, we document that the path from tax aggressiveness to related loans is mediated by both the additional cash flows from tax savings and the increased financial opacity from tax planning, and that additional cash flows plays a much more important role than opacity in helping controlling shareholders to divert corporate resources under the guise of tax aggressiveness. Beyond the two mediated paths, we also detect a residual, direct path from tax aggressiveness to related loans. After an exogenous shock from the government crackdown on diversionary related loans, we find the direct path is fully mediated by the two indirect paths, suggesting that tunneling via related loans only occurs at firms where insiders can mask tunneling under the cover of opacity or can justify related loans on grounds of abnormal cash flows from tax savings. Our evidence supports the notion that greater outside scrutiny increases the hurdle for, but does not entirely eradicate, diversion facilitated by tax aggressiveness. Collectively, our research lends some support to recent theory on the importance of taxes to corporate governance by demonstrating how the agency costs of tax planning allow certain shareholders to benefit from firm activities at the expense of others.


  • Top Cited Papers

    Political Uncertainty and Cost Stickiness: Evidence from National Elections around the World

    by Woo‐Jong Lee, Jeffrey Pittman, Walid Saffar

    By analyzing a large panel of elections in 55 countries, we show that political uncertainty surrounding elections can affect asymmetric cost responses to activity changes (i.e., cost stickiness). In comparison to non‐election years, we find that the asymmetry in cost behaviors is stronger during election years in regressions that control for other firm‐level and country‐level determinants. In another series of tests, we report strong, robust evidence supporting the predictions that the importance of political uncertainty to cost stickiness is concentrated in countries with sound political and legal institutions. Collectively, the results imply that managers retain slack resources when political uncertainty is high but to be resolved soon.


  • Cross‐Country Evidence on the Importance of Auditor Choice to Corporate Debt Maturity

    by Sadok El Ghoul, Omrane Guedhami, Jeffrey A. Pittman, Sorin Rizeanu

    We examine the importance of Big Four audits in reducing agency costs evident in corporate debt maturity worldwide. Analyzing a large sample of public firms from 42 countries reveals that the fraction of long‐term debt in firms' capital structures rises with the presence of a Big Four auditor, suggesting that higher‐quality audits substitute for short‐term debt for monitoring purposes. In additional analyses, we find that the role that auditor choice plays in debt maturity is concentrated in firms from countries with strong legal institutions governing property rights and creditor rights. Collectively, our research implies that Big Four audits matter to corporate debt maturity, although the impact is isolated in firms operating in countries with more protective legal regimes.