Yuping Zhao
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Yuping Zhao has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jeffrey Pittman
Memorial University
2 shared publications - Beu Lee
Department of Accounting and Finance, College of Business, Texas A&M University-San Antonio, San Antonio, TX 78224, USA
1 shared publication Chi Wan
University of Massachusetts Boston
1 shared publication- George Gamble
Department of Accountancy and Taxation, C.T. Bauer College of Business, University of Houston, Houston, TX 77004, USA
1 shared publication Jeffrey Pittman
Memorial University of Newfoundland
1 shared publication- Jeffrey Pittman
Memorial University of Newfoundland
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 November 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 71 (11) , 9256-9289
Do Managers Successfully Shop for Auditors Who Allow Them to Opportunistically Report Positive News? Evidence from Accounting Estimates
Prior auditor shopping literature examines managers’ attempts to opportunistically underreport negative news by finding auditors who will allow them to avoid negative audit opinions or underreport goodwill impairments or financial misstatements. We advance this literature by examining management attempts to opportunistically report positive news, as captured by income-increasing changes in accounting estimates. Adapting a previous framework, we find that, ex ante, managers are more (less) likely to dismiss their auditor if it increases (decreases) the expected likelihood of reporting income-increasing changes in accounting estimates (POSCHGs). We also find that, ex post, following auditor dismissals, the frequency and magnitude of POSCHGs increase, and companies reporting POSCHGs are more likely to restate earnings, receive Securities and Exchange Commission comment letters related to estimates, meet or beat earnings targets, and less likely to receive going concern opinions or violate debt covenants. Placebo tests show that none of the above results hold for income-decreasing changes in estimates. Finally, we identify several institutional factors that constrain managers’ ability to shop for lenient auditors, including the quality of the successor auditor and strong corporate governance. Collectively, our findings are consistent with managers successfully shopping for auditors who allow them to opportunistically report positive news following auditor dismissals. This paper was accepted by Ranjani Krishnan, accounting. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.05299 .
- 1 November 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 71 (11) , 9256-9289
Do Managers Successfully Shop for Auditors Who Allow Them to Opportunistically Report Positive News? Evidence from Accounting Estimates
Prior auditor shopping literature examines managers’ attempts to opportunistically underreport negative news by finding auditors who will allow them to avoid negative audit opinions or underreport goodwill impairments or financial misstatements. We advance this literature by examining management attempts to opportunistically report positive news, as captured by income-increasing changes in accounting estimates. Adapting a previous framework, we find that, ex ante, managers are more (less) likely to dismiss their auditor if it increases (decreases) the expected likelihood of reporting income-increasing changes in accounting estimates (POSCHGs). We also find that, ex post, following auditor dismissals, the frequency and magnitude of POSCHGs increase, and companies reporting POSCHGs are more likely to restate earnings, receive Securities and Exchange Commission comment letters related to estimates, meet or beat earnings targets, and less likely to receive going concern opinions or violate debt covenants. Placebo tests show that none of the above results hold for income-decreasing changes in estimates. Finally, we identify several institutional factors that constrain managers’ ability to shop for lenient auditors, including the quality of the successor auditor and strong corporate governance. Collectively, our findings are consistent with managers successfully shopping for auditors who allow them to opportunistically report positive news following auditor dismissals. This paper was accepted by Ranjani Krishnan, accounting. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.05299 .
- Open Access
- 8 November 2024
- Published by MDPI AG in Journal of Risk and Financial Management
- Vol. 17 (11) , 503
The Effects of Regulated Auditor Tenure on Opinion Shopping: Evidence from the Korean Market
We examine the impact of regulated auditor tenure on the shopping for favorable audit reports. We predict that these regulations may affect auditors’ willingness to acquiesce and clients’ incentives to engage in opinion shopping. We draw from the unique Korean setting where both mandatory audit firm retention and mandatory rotation were implemented for all public firms in a staggered manner. Based on hand-collected audit reports, we identify harmful language in explanatory paragraphs. We define favorable audit reports as those with unqualified opinions and without any harmful explanatory language. We find that opinion shopping for favorable audit reports appears to subside after mandatory retention but increases after mandatory rotation, with the positive impact of mandatory retention offset by the negative impact of mandatory rotation. We add to the literature by examining the impact of regulated auditor tenure on opinion shopping and highlighting the potential unintended consequences of these regulatory attempts.
- 8 November 2024
- Published by MDPI AG in Journal of Risk and Financial Management
- Vol. 17 (11) , 503
Open AccessThe Effects of Regulated Auditor Tenure on Opinion Shopping: Evidence from the Korean Market
We examine the impact of regulated auditor tenure on the shopping for favorable audit reports. We predict that these regulations may affect auditors’ willingness to acquiesce and clients’ incentives to engage in opinion shopping. We draw from the unique Korean setting where both mandatory audit firm retention and mandatory rotation were implemented for all public firms in a staggered manner. Based on hand-collected audit reports, we identify harmful language in explanatory paragraphs. We define favorable audit reports as those with unqualified opinions and without any harmful explanatory language. We find that opinion shopping for favorable audit reports appears to subside after mandatory retention but increases after mandatory rotation, with the positive impact of mandatory retention offset by the negative impact of mandatory rotation. We add to the literature by examining the impact of regulated auditor tenure on opinion shopping and highlighting the potential unintended consequences of these regulatory attempts.
- 3 October 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 99 (6) , 297-324
Individual Auditor Turnover and Audit Quality—Large Sample Evidence from U.S. Audit Offices
We examine the relationship between audit quality and office-level auditor turnover. Using resumes of over 106,000 Big 4 auditors, we find that audit offices with higher turnover have a greater likelihood of client annual report restatements. This detrimental effect is more pronounced when the departing auditors are more experienced and when the office faces tighter human capital constraints and is primarily attributable to voluntary turnover. Further, such negative effect is borne mostly by complex clients and intangible-intensive clients but is weakened for clients with greater product similarity to the client portfolio of the audit office. Last, the impact of office-level turnover on audit quality persists after controlling for firm-level turnover. Our findings inform the current policy debate on whether and to what extent audit firms should disclose auditor turnover as a potential indicator of audit quality. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M42.
- 3 October 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 99 (6) , 297-324
Individual Auditor Turnover and Audit Quality—Large Sample Evidence from U.S. Audit Offices
We examine the relationship between audit quality and office-level auditor turnover. Using resumes of over 106,000 Big 4 auditors, we find that audit offices with higher turnover have a greater likelihood of client annual report restatements. This detrimental effect is more pronounced when the departing auditors are more experienced and when the office faces tighter human capital constraints and is primarily attributable to voluntary turnover. Further, such negative effect is borne mostly by complex clients and intangible-intensive clients but is weakened for clients with greater product similarity to the client portfolio of the audit office. Last, the impact of office-level turnover on audit quality persists after controlling for firm-level turnover. Our findings inform the current policy debate on whether and to what extent audit firms should disclose auditor turnover as a potential indicator of audit quality. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M42.
- Open Access
- 16 July 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory
- Vol. 43 (3) , 107-137
Corporate Monitoring and Misreporting: The Role of Rules-Based and Principles-Based Accounting Standards
SUMMARY: Prior research provides some evidence that strict corporate monitoring constrains financial misreporting. We examine whether the efficacy of various corporate monitoring mechanisms hinges on the nature of accounting standards—rules-based standards (RBS) versus principles-based standards (PBS)—in place. We generally document that the negative association between the likelihood of misstatements and tough monitoring by audit committees, boards, external auditors, and the SEC is more pronounced under RBS than under PBS. This evidence collectively suggests that most corporate gatekeepers fulfill their monitoring obligations primarily through ensuring better compliance with detailed standards when the applicable standards are more specific and leave less room for discretion. Although some prior studies document higher financial reporting quality under PBS, our results imply that it is important for regulators to also consider the potentially higher monitoring efficacy under RBS when setting accounting standards. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M40; M42.
- 16 July 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory
- Vol. 43 (3) , 107-137
Open AccessCorporate Monitoring and Misreporting: The Role of Rules-Based and Principles-Based Accounting Standards
SUMMARY: Prior research provides some evidence that strict corporate monitoring constrains financial misreporting. We examine whether the efficacy of various corporate monitoring mechanisms hinges on the nature of accounting standards—rules-based standards (RBS) versus principles-based standards (PBS)—in place. We generally document that the negative association between the likelihood of misstatements and tough monitoring by audit committees, boards, external auditors, and the SEC is more pronounced under RBS than under PBS. This evidence collectively suggests that most corporate gatekeepers fulfill their monitoring obligations primarily through ensuring better compliance with detailed standards when the applicable standards are more specific and leave less room for discretion. Although some prior studies document higher financial reporting quality under PBS, our results imply that it is important for regulators to also consider the potentially higher monitoring efficacy under RBS when setting accounting standards. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M40; M42.
- Open Access
- 23 October 2023
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 98 (7) , 405-433
Third-Party Source Switches: Objective Valuation or Fair Value Opinion Shopping?
Fair value estimates from external third-party sources are generally considered more reliable than internal estimates based on managerial inputs. However, even externally sourced estimates are subject to managerial opportunism, because firms can switch from one external source to another. In the context of life insurance companies that mostly rely on external sources, we posit that such source switches could be driven by managerial incentive either to faithfully report fair values (objective valuation) or to inflate estimates to avoid OTTI (opinion shopping). Our results support both motives. In instances in which the two incentives yield conflicting predictions for source switching, we find the opinion-shopping motive dominates. We also find that switches that increase fair value estimates are associated with a reduced OTTI likelihood and magnitude, especially for high-impairment-risk securities. On balance, our evidence suggests that opportunism with respect to source switching can compromise the reliability of externally sourced fair value estimates. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G22; M41.
- 23 October 2023
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 98 (7) , 405-433
Open AccessThird-Party Source Switches: Objective Valuation or Fair Value Opinion Shopping?
Fair value estimates from external third-party sources are generally considered more reliable than internal estimates based on managerial inputs. However, even externally sourced estimates are subject to managerial opportunism, because firms can switch from one external source to another. In the context of life insurance companies that mostly rely on external sources, we posit that such source switches could be driven by managerial incentive either to faithfully report fair values (objective valuation) or to inflate estimates to avoid OTTI (opinion shopping). Our results support both motives. In instances in which the two incentives yield conflicting predictions for source switching, we find the opinion-shopping motive dominates. We also find that switches that increase fair value estimates are associated with a reduced OTTI likelihood and magnitude, especially for high-impairment-risk securities. On balance, our evidence suggests that opportunism with respect to source switching can compromise the reliability of externally sourced fair value estimates. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G22; M41.
- 19 February 2021
- Published by American Accounting Association in AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory
- Vol. 40 (3) , 127-153
Auditor Responses to and Prevention of Non-Income-Increasing Misreporting: Evidence from Audit Fees and Restatements
SUMMARY: We document that non-income-increasing (NII) misreporting is important to investors and then investigate whether auditors respond to and prevent different types of NII misstatements. We categorize NII misstatements into those whose correction adversely (i.e., unfavorably) affect financial reports and those whose correction positively (i.e., favorably) affect financial reports. We find that audit fees are positively associated with unfavorable NII misstatements, but not with favorable NII misstatements. We examine whether auditors prevent quarterly misstatements from resulting in annual report misstatements and find that auditors are less likely to prevent both favorable and unfavorable NII quarterly report misstatements from resulting in annual report misstatements, with the audit efficacy being lower for favorable NII misstatements. In sum, our research indicates that auditors do attempt to constrain NII misreporting with greater effort expended on unfavorable NII misstatements. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources. JEL Classifications: M49.
- 19 February 2021
- Published by American Accounting Association in AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory
- Vol. 40 (3) , 127-153
Auditor Responses to and Prevention of Non-Income-Increasing Misreporting: Evidence from Audit Fees and Restatements
SUMMARY: We document that non-income-increasing (NII) misreporting is important to investors and then investigate whether auditors respond to and prevent different types of NII misstatements. We categorize NII misstatements into those whose correction adversely (i.e., unfavorably) affect financial reports and those whose correction positively (i.e., favorably) affect financial reports. We find that audit fees are positively associated with unfavorable NII misstatements, but not with favorable NII misstatements. We examine whether auditors prevent quarterly misstatements from resulting in annual report misstatements and find that auditors are less likely to prevent both favorable and unfavorable NII quarterly report misstatements from resulting in annual report misstatements, with the audit efficacy being lower for favorable NII misstatements. In sum, our research indicates that auditors do attempt to constrain NII misreporting with greater effort expended on unfavorable NII misstatements. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources. JEL Classifications: M49.
- 13 September 2020
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 38 (2) , 903-941
The Importance of Director External Social Networks to Stock Price Crash Risk*
Prior research documents that information transmitted via director networks affects firms' policies and real economic activities. Given a manager's potential monopoly over firm information, it is important to analyze whether information transmission through director social networks undermines the manager's control. Specifically, we explore whether information flow through director networks influences managers' ability to hoard bad news. We predict and find that the extent of external connections of the board of directors is negatively associated with future stock price crash risk. Additional analysis implies that this evidence is driven by firms with more powerful executives, with weaker auditor monitoring, or subject to strong investor protection, and by directors with greater monitoring incentives or responsibilities and directors with less firm‐specific knowledge. Collectively, our research lends empirical support for the monitoring view under which better‐informed directors narrow the scope for bad news hoarding evident in stock price crash risk. In another series of tests, we fail to find evidence consistent with the information leakage view under which directors pass sensitive firm‐specific information to connections that trade on the information before its public release. Other analysis helps dispel the concern that the endogenous match between directors and companies is spuriously responsible for our core results. Our empirical findings have important implications on how social networks affect the proper functioning of capital markets.
- 13 September 2020
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 38 (2) , 903-941
The Importance of Director External Social Networks to Stock Price Crash Risk*
Prior research documents that information transmitted via director networks affects firms' policies and real economic activities. Given a manager's potential monopoly over firm information, it is important to analyze whether information transmission through director social networks undermines the manager's control. Specifically, we explore whether information flow through director networks influences managers' ability to hoard bad news. We predict and find that the extent of external connections of the board of directors is negatively associated with future stock price crash risk. Additional analysis implies that this evidence is driven by firms with more powerful executives, with weaker auditor monitoring, or subject to strong investor protection, and by directors with greater monitoring incentives or responsibilities and directors with less firm‐specific knowledge. Collectively, our research lends empirical support for the monitoring view under which better‐informed directors narrow the scope for bad news hoarding evident in stock price crash risk. In another series of tests, we fail to find evidence consistent with the information leakage view under which directors pass sensitive firm‐specific information to connections that trade on the information before its public release. Other analysis helps dispel the concern that the endogenous match between directors and companies is spuriously responsible for our core results. Our empirical findings have important implications on how social networks affect the proper functioning of capital markets.
- 20 July 2020
- Published by Morressier GmbH
The Importance of Social Capital to Individual Auditors.
We examine the role that individual auditors’ social networks play in their careers. We focus on educational networks in China, as measured by th |
- 20 July 2020
- Published by Morressier GmbH
The Importance of Social Capital to Individual Auditors.
We examine the role that individual auditors’ social networks play in their careers. We focus on educational networks in China, as measured by th |
- 22 November 2019
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 37 (4) , 2145-2185
Debt Covenant Restriction, Financial Misreporting, and Auditor Monitoring*
Theory suggests that financial report‐based debt covenants engender incentives for the manager to relax covenant constraints through accounting choices in order to avoid costly covenant violations. Prior studies directly testing this hypothesis in the context of financial misreporting fail to find consistent evidence. Using a more refined measure of debt covenant restriction, we find that debt covenant restriction is positively associated with the probability of financial statement misstatements. This positive association is driven by performance covenants rather than capital covenants and is more consistent with the manager striving to avoid a “false‐positive” violation than to delay the violation. Our results also imply that managers resort to both income‐increasing and non–income‐increasing misreporting to relieve covenant constraints and rely more on the latter when faced with greater earnings management constraints. Additionally, the auditor charges higher audit fees to firms with more binding covenants even outside the violation state, and audit fees increase with constraints relative to both performance and capital covenants, reflecting greater financial reporting risk and bankruptcy risk, respectively. Within capital covenants, we find some evidence of even higher audit fees for tighter intangible‐inclusive versus intangible‐exclusive capital covenants. Lastly, our evidence suggests that the positive association between covenant constraints and misreporting is attenuated when the auditor has more experience with debt covenants, has greater bargaining power over the client, or faces greater litigation risk.
- 22 November 2019
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 37 (4) , 2145-2185
Debt Covenant Restriction, Financial Misreporting, and Auditor Monitoring*
Theory suggests that financial report‐based debt covenants engender incentives for the manager to relax covenant constraints through accounting choices in order to avoid costly covenant violations. Prior studies directly testing this hypothesis in the context of financial misreporting fail to find consistent evidence. Using a more refined measure of debt covenant restriction, we find that debt covenant restriction is positively associated with the probability of financial statement misstatements. This positive association is driven by performance covenants rather than capital covenants and is more consistent with the manager striving to avoid a “false‐positive” violation than to delay the violation. Our results also imply that managers resort to both income‐increasing and non–income‐increasing misreporting to relieve covenant constraints and rely more on the latter when faced with greater earnings management constraints. Additionally, the auditor charges higher audit fees to firms with more binding covenants even outside the violation state, and audit fees increase with constraints relative to both performance and capital covenants, reflecting greater financial reporting risk and bankruptcy risk, respectively. Within capital covenants, we find some evidence of even higher audit fees for tighter intangible‐inclusive versus intangible‐exclusive capital covenants. Lastly, our evidence suggests that the positive association between covenant constraints and misreporting is attenuated when the auditor has more experience with debt covenants, has greater bargaining power over the client, or faces greater litigation risk.