Hiroshi Kitamura
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Hiroshi Kitamura has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Misato Sato
Osaka Univ, Osaka Sch Int Publ Policy, 1-3 Machikaneyama, Toyonaka, Osaka 5600043, Japan
4 shared publications - Noriaki Matsushima
Osaka School of International Public Policy, University of Osaka, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, Japan
2 shared publications - Akira Miyaoka
Kansai University
1 shared publication - Akira Miyaoka
Osaka University
1 shared publication Jun Oshiro
Department of Law and Economics, Okinawa University, 555 Kokuba, Naha, Okinawa 902-0075, Japan
1 shared publication- Koki Arai
Japan Fair Trade Commission
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 30 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 64 (2) , 219-242
How Does Downstream Firms’ Efficiency Affect Exclusive Supply Agreements?
We develop a bilateral monopoly model with a downstream entrant to examine anticompetitive exclusive supply contracts that prevent the upstream supplier from selling inputs to the downstream entrant. When the entrant is more efficient and needs a lesser amount of the input that is produced by the supplier than does the incumbent, the input demand may not increase significantly following the entry. Therefore, the socially efficient entry does not increase the supplier’s profits significantly, which allows the downstream incumbent to deter socially efficient entry through an exclusive supply contract. This result holds even in the simplest framework, which is composed of a single seller, buyer, and entrant.
- 30 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 64 (2) , 219-242
Open AccessHow Does Downstream Firms’ Efficiency Affect Exclusive Supply Agreements?
We develop a bilateral monopoly model with a downstream entrant to examine anticompetitive exclusive supply contracts that prevent the upstream supplier from selling inputs to the downstream entrant. When the entrant is more efficient and needs a lesser amount of the input that is produced by the supplier than does the incumbent, the input demand may not increase significantly following the entry. Therefore, the socially efficient entry does not increase the supplier’s profits significantly, which allows the downstream incumbent to deter socially efficient entry through an exclusive supply contract. This result holds even in the simplest framework, which is composed of a single seller, buyer, and entrant.
- 1 February 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 151, 1-3
Exclusive contracts and bargaining power
- 1 February 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 151, 1-3
Exclusive contracts and bargaining power
- 9 April 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics
- Vol. 119 (1) , 17-45
Relationship-specific investment as a barrier to entry
- 9 April 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics
- Vol. 119 (1) , 17-45
Relationship-specific investment as a barrier to entry
- 20 November 2013
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Asian Journal of Law and Economics
- Vol. 5 (1-2) , 1-15
Market-Share Contracts with Vertical Externalities
We construct a model of market-share contracts with vertical externalities. When a dominant supplier offers a linear wholesale price to a retailer, vertical externalities, well-recognized as double-marginalization problems, arise in the vertical relation. The dominant supplier facing vertical externalities charges a wholesale price that is excessively high for both the vertical relation and social welfare. Under market-share contracts, the retailer can commit to increase the sales of goods produced by the dominant supplier for a lower wholesale price. We point out that this induces the vertical relation to engage in market-share contracts even in the absence of exclusionary effects in the upstream market. We also show that such contracts mitigate vertical externalities and improve social welfare.
- 20 November 2013
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Asian Journal of Law and Economics
- Vol. 5 (1-2) , 1-15
Market-Share Contracts with Vertical Externalities
We construct a model of market-share contracts with vertical externalities. When a dominant supplier offers a linear wholesale price to a retailer, vertical externalities, well-recognized as double-marginalization problems, arise in the vertical relation. The dominant supplier facing vertical externalities charges a wholesale price that is excessively high for both the vertical relation and social welfare. Under market-share contracts, the retailer can commit to increase the sales of goods produced by the dominant supplier for a lower wholesale price. We point out that this induces the vertical relation to engage in market-share contracts even in the absence of exclusionary effects in the upstream market. We also show that such contracts mitigate vertical externalities and improve social welfare.
- 30 September 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of the Japanese and International Economies
- Vol. 29, 98-116
Free entry, market diffusion, and social inefficiency with endogenously growing demand
- 30 September 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of the Japanese and International Economies
- Vol. 29, 98-116
Free entry, market diffusion, and social inefficiency with endogenously growing demand
- 19 February 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics
- Vol. 112 (1) , 47-60
Exclusive contracts when the incumbent can establish a direct retailer
- 19 February 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics
- Vol. 112 (1) , 47-60
Exclusive contracts when the incumbent can establish a direct retailer