How Does Downstream Firms’ Efficiency Affect Exclusive Supply Agreements?
Open Access
- 30 November 2023
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 64 (2) , 219-242
Abstract
We develop a bilateral monopoly model with a downstream entrant to examine anticompetitive exclusive supply contracts that prevent the upstream supplier from selling inputs to the downstream entrant. When the entrant is more efficient and needs a lesser amount of the input that is produced by the supplier than does the incumbent, the input demand may not increase significantly following the entry. Therefore, the socially efficient entry does not increase the supplier’s profits significantly, which allows the downstream incumbent to deter socially efficient entry through an exclusive supply contract. This result holds even in the simplest framework, which is composed of a single seller, buyer, and entrant.Keywords
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Funding Information
- Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JP22243022, JP24730220, JP15H03349, JP15K17060, JP18K01593, JP19H01483, JP21K01452, JP24530248, JP15H03349, JP15H05728, JP17H00984, JP18H00847, JP18K01593, JP19H01483, JP20H05631, JP21K01452, JP18K01593, JP20K13485, JP22H00846)
- Osaka University (Joint Usage/Research Center, Joint Usage/Research Center, Joint Usage/Research Center)
- Osaka University
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