Daisuke Hirata
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Daisuke Hirata has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Toshihiro Matsumura
Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan
2 shared publications - M. Utku Unver
Department of Economics, Boston College, Boston, Massachusetts, USA
1 shared publication - Morimitsu Kurino
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung
1 shared publication - Onur Kesten
Carnegie Mellon University
1 shared publication - Susumu Cato
The University of Tokyo
1 shared publication - Tadashi Hashimoto
Toulouse School of Economics (IDEI); tadashi.hashimoto@tse‐fr.eu
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 March 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 68, 5-13
A model of a two-stage all-pay auction
- 1 March 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 68, 5-13
A model of a two-stage all-pay auction
- Open Access
- 1 January 2014
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 9 (1) , 253-277
Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns lotteries over objects. We show that it is the only mechanism satisfying non-wastefulness and ordinal fairness and the only mechanism satisfying sd-efficiency, sd-envy-freeness, and weak invariance or weak truncation robustness (where \u201csd\u201d stands for first-order stochastic dominance)
- 1 January 2014
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 9 (1) , 253-277
Open AccessTwo axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns lotteries over objects. We show that it is the only mechanism satisfying non-wastefulness and ordinal fairness and the only mechanism satisfying sd-efficiency, sd-envy-freeness, and weak invariance or weak truncation robustness (where \u201csd\u201d stands for first-order stochastic dominance)
- 12 May 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics
- Vol. 104 (3) , 199-217
Price leadership in a homogeneous product market
- 12 May 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics
- Vol. 104 (3) , 199-217
Price leadership in a homogeneous product market
- 1 November 2010
- Published by Elsevier in Operations Research Letters
- Vol. 38 (6) , 533-535
On the uniqueness of Bertrand equilibrium
- 1 November 2010
- Published by Elsevier in Operations Research Letters
- Vol. 38 (6) , 533-535
On the uniqueness of Bertrand equilibrium
- 10 September 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 34 (4) , 611-630
Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations
- 10 September 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 34 (4) , 611-630
Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations
- 16 March 2009
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 9 (1)
Asymmetric Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopoly and Mergers
This paper investigates mixed strategy equilibria in a capacity-constrained price competition among three firms. It is shown that the equilibria in an asymmetric oligopoly are substantially different from those in a duopoly and symmetric oligopoly. In an asymmetric triopoly, it is possible that (i) a continuum of equilibria exists and that (ii) the lowest price of the smallest firm is higher than that of the others and the smallest firm earns more than the max-min profit in undominated strategies. In particular, the second finding sheds light on a new pricing incentive in Bertrand competitions. As an application, the equilibrium characterizations give rise to a new class of merger paradoxes.
- 16 March 2009
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 9 (1)
Asymmetric Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopoly and Mergers
This paper investigates mixed strategy equilibria in a capacity-constrained price competition among three firms. It is shown that the equilibria in an asymmetric oligopoly are substantially different from those in a duopoly and symmetric oligopoly. In an asymmetric triopoly, it is possible that (i) a continuum of equilibria exists and that (ii) the lowest price of the smallest firm is higher than that of the others and the smallest firm earns more than the max-min profit in undominated strategies. In particular, the second finding sheds light on a new pricing incentive in Bertrand competitions. As an application, the equilibrium characterizations give rise to a new class of merger paradoxes.