David J. Cooper
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
David J. Cooper has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- John H. Kagel
Ohio State University, Columbus, USA
2 shared publications - John H. Kagel
Department of Economics, 410 Arps Hall, Ohio State University, Columbus, USA
1 shared publication - Jordi Brandts
Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 January 2010
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA)
Why Are Two Heads Better than One?
- 1 January 2010
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA)
Why Are Two Heads Better than One?
- 31 December 2009
- Published by Elsevier in Research in Economics
- Vol. 63 (4) , 216-224
Equilibrium selection in signaling games with teams: Forward induction or faster adaptive learning?
- 31 December 2009
- Published by Elsevier in Research in Economics
- Vol. 63 (4) , 216-224
Equilibrium selection in signaling games with teams: Forward induction or faster adaptive learning?
- 13 March 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 33 (1) , 1-10
An introduction to the symposium on behavioral game theory
- 13 March 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 33 (1) , 1-10
An introduction to the symposium on behavioral game theory
- 16 January 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 34 (3) , 415-439
Learning and transfer in signaling games
- 16 January 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 34 (3) , 415-439
Learning and transfer in signaling games
- 1 December 2006
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 9 (4) , 407-423
Observability and overcoming coordination failure in organizations: An experimental study
Motivated by problems of coordination failure in organizations, we examine how overcoming coordination failure and maintaining coordination depend on the ability of individuals to observe others’ choices. Subjects’ payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels in a weak-link game. Treatments vary along two dimensions. First, subjects either start with low financial incentives for coordination, which typically leads to coordination failure, and then are switched to higher incentives or start with high incentives, which usually yield effective coordination, and are switched to low incentives. Second, as the key treatment variable, subjects either observe the effort levels chosen by all individuals in their experimental group (full feedback) or observe only the minimum effort (limited feedback). We find three primary results: (1) When starting from coordination failure the use of full feedback improves subjects’ ability to overcome coordination failure, (2) When starting with good coordination the use of full feedback has no effect on subjects’ ability to avoid slipping into coordination failure, and (3) History-dependence, defined as dependence of current effort levels on past incentives, is strengthened by the use of full feedback.
- 1 December 2006
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 9 (4) , 407-423
Observability and overcoming coordination failure in organizations: An experimental study
Motivated by problems of coordination failure in organizations, we examine how overcoming coordination failure and maintaining coordination depend on the ability of individuals to observe others’ choices. Subjects’ payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels in a weak-link game. Treatments vary along two dimensions. First, subjects either start with low financial incentives for coordination, which typically leads to coordination failure, and then are switched to higher incentives or start with high incentives, which usually yield effective coordination, and are switched to low incentives. Second, as the key treatment variable, subjects either observe the effort levels chosen by all individuals in their experimental group (full feedback) or observe only the minimum effort (limited feedback). We find three primary results: (1) When starting from coordination failure the use of full feedback improves subjects’ ability to overcome coordination failure, (2) When starting with good coordination the use of full feedback has no effect on subjects’ ability to avoid slipping into coordination failure, and (3) History-dependence, defined as dependence of current effort levels on past incentives, is strengthened by the use of full feedback.
- 18 March 2006
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 6 (2)
Are Experienced Managers Experts at Overcoming Coordination Failure?
This paper studies experiments set in a corporate environment where a manager attempts to overcome a history of coordination failure by employees using either financial incentives or communication. I compare the choices of subject managers drawn from a standard undergraduate population with subject managers drawn from the executive MBA (EMBA) program at Case's Weatherhead School of Management. The EMBA subjects are a group of experienced, successful managers; all of the EMBA subjects have at least ten years of work experience, including at least five years in a supervisory role, and have average annual earnings in excess of $120,000. The EMBA subject managers are able to overcome a history of coordination failure significantly faster than the undergraduate subject managers. This superior performance is driven neither by differences in the financial incentives offered to the employees nor by use of an inherently different communications strategy. Instead, EMBA subject managers are significantly more likely to use the same "good" communication strategy as is identified for undergraduate subject managers through systematic coding of manager’s messages to employees.
- 18 March 2006
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 6 (2)
Are Experienced Managers Experts at Overcoming Coordination Failure?
This paper studies experiments set in a corporate environment where a manager attempts to overcome a history of coordination failure by employees using either financial incentives or communication. I compare the choices of subject managers drawn from a standard undergraduate population with subject managers drawn from the executive MBA (EMBA) program at Case's Weatherhead School of Management. The EMBA subjects are a group of experienced, successful managers; all of the EMBA subjects have at least ten years of work experience, including at least five years in a supervisory role, and have average annual earnings in excess of $120,000. The EMBA subject managers are able to overcome a history of coordination failure significantly faster than the undergraduate subject managers. This superior performance is driven neither by differences in the financial incentives offered to the employees nor by use of an inherently different communications strategy. Instead, EMBA subject managers are significantly more likely to use the same "good" communication strategy as is identified for undergraduate subject managers through systematic coding of manager’s messages to employees.