Michael Keen
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Michael Keen has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jenny E. Ligthart
Tilburg University
4 shared publications - Jon Strand
The World Bank
2 shared publications Mario Mansour
Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC 20431, USA
2 shared publications- Alexander Klemm
International Monetary Fund, Washington, USA
1 shared publication - Benjamin Jones
New College, Oxford, UK
1 shared publication - Christos Kotsogiannis
Tax Administration Research Centre (TARC), University of Exeter , Exeter
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 June 2016
- Published by University of Chicago Press in National Tax Journal
- Vol. 69 (2) , 461-469
TAX SYSTEMS. By JOEL SLEMROD and CHRISTIAN GILLITZER.
- 1 June 2016
- Published by University of Chicago Press in National Tax Journal
- Vol. 69 (2) , 461-469
TAX SYSTEMS. By JOEL SLEMROD and CHRISTIAN GILLITZER.
- 30 January 2015
- Published by MIT Press
- p. 229-252
Taxation, Bank Leverage, and Financial Crises
That most corporate tax systems favor debt over equity finance is now widely recognized as, potentially, amplifying risks to financial stability. This paper makes a first attempt to explore, empirically, the link between this tax bias and the probability of financial crisis. It finds that greater tax bias is associated with significantly higher aggregate bank leverage, and that this in turn is associated with a significantly greater chance of crisis. The implication is that tax bias makes crises more likely, especially when bank leverage ratios are already high, and, conversely, that the welfare gains from policies to alleviate it can be substantial-far greater than previous studies, which have ignored financial stability considerations, suggest.
- 30 January 2015
- Published by MIT Press
- p. 229-252
Taxation, Bank Leverage, and Financial Crises
That most corporate tax systems favor debt over equity finance is now widely recognized as, potentially, amplifying risks to financial stability. This paper makes a first attempt to explore, empirically, the link between this tax bias and the probability of financial crisis. It finds that greater tax bias is associated with significantly higher aggregate bank leverage, and that this in turn is associated with a significantly greater chance of crisis. The implication is that tax bias makes crises more likely, especially when bank leverage ratios are already high, and, conversely, that the welfare gains from policies to alleviate it can be substantial-far greater than previous studies, which have ignored financial stability considerations, suggest.
- 13 May 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 21 (4) , 536-559
Thresholds, informality, and partitions of compliance
- 13 May 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 21 (4) , 536-559
Thresholds, informality, and partitions of compliance
- Open Access
- 5 May 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 20 (1) , 29-70
Fiscal implications of climate change
- 5 May 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 20 (1) , 29-70
Open AccessFiscal implications of climate change
- 27 January 2011
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in CESifo Economic Studies
- Vol. 57 (1) , 1-24
Rethinking the Taxation of the Financial Sector
The economic crisis that erupted in 2008 has prompted many countries to rethink, and several already to reform, the taxation of financial institutions. The underlying analytical issues, however, have received almost no attention in the public finance literature. This article explores the possible purposes and broad design of distinctive tax measures for financial institutions, focusing especially on the potential role of corrective taxation, and its merits relative to traditional forms of regulation, in addressing the challenges posed by the potential failure of systemically important institutions. (JEL codes: G38, H21 and H23)
- 27 January 2011
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in CESifo Economic Studies
- Vol. 57 (1) , 1-24
Rethinking the Taxation of the Financial Sector
The economic crisis that erupted in 2008 has prompted many countries to rethink, and several already to reform, the taxation of financial institutions. The underlying analytical issues, however, have received almost no attention in the public finance literature. This article explores the possible purposes and broad design of distinctive tax measures for financial institutions, focusing especially on the potential role of corrective taxation, and its merits relative to traditional forms of regulation, in addressing the challenges posed by the potential failure of systemically important institutions. (JEL codes: G38, H21 and H23)
- 2 August 2010
- Published by Wiley in Development Policy Review
- Vol. 28 (5) , 573-596
Revenue Mobilisation in Sub‐Saharan Africa: Challenges from Globalisation II – Corporate Taxation
- 2 August 2010
- Published by Wiley in Development Policy Review
- Vol. 28 (5) , 573-596
Revenue Mobilisation in Sub‐Saharan Africa: Challenges from Globalisation II – Corporate Taxation
- 2 August 2010
- Published by Wiley in Development Policy Review
- Vol. 28 (5) , 553-571
Revenue Mobilisation in Sub‐Saharan Africa: Challenges from Globalisation I – Trade Reform
This is the first of two articles evaluating the nature and extent of, and possible responses to, two of the central challenges that globalisation poses for revenue mobilisation in sub‐Saharan Africa: trade liberalisation, and corporate tax competition. Both articles use a new dataset with the features needed to address these issues meaningfully: a disentangling of tariff from commodity tax revenue, and a distinction between resource‐related and other revenues. This first article describes that dataset, and provides a broad picture of revenue developments in the region between 1980 and 2005. Countries’ experiences have varied, but the overall picture is of non‐resource revenues having been essentially stagnant. Within this, however, and with exceptions, reductions in trade tax revenue have been largely offset by increased revenue from domestic sources.
- 2 August 2010
- Published by Wiley in Development Policy Review
- Vol. 28 (5) , 553-571
Revenue Mobilisation in Sub‐Saharan Africa: Challenges from Globalisation I – Trade Reform
This is the first of two articles evaluating the nature and extent of, and possible responses to, two of the central challenges that globalisation poses for revenue mobilisation in sub‐Saharan Africa: trade liberalisation, and corporate tax competition. Both articles use a new dataset with the features needed to address these issues meaningfully: a disentangling of tariff from commodity tax revenue, and a distinction between resource‐related and other revenues. This first article describes that dataset, and provides a broad picture of revenue developments in the region between 1980 and 2005. Countries’ experiences have varied, but the overall picture is of non‐resource revenues having been essentially stagnant. Within this, however, and with exceptions, reductions in trade tax revenue have been largely offset by increased revenue from domestic sources.
- 2 November 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 15 (6) , 712-751
The “flat tax(es)”: principles and experience
- 2 November 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 15 (6) , 712-751
The “flat tax(es)”: principles and experience
- 1 September 2007
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 109 (3) , 487-504
Revenue Sharing and Information Exchange under Non‐discriminatory Taxation*
The international exchange of tax information, and its merits compared to withholding taxation, has emerged as a central topic in international tax policy. We characterize and compare the outcomes that emerge, in a two‐country world, with and without information exchange, under the assumption that countries are unable to tax residents and non‐residents differentially. The analysis focuses on the role of asymmetries in country size (capturing a key feature of tax havens) and on the impact and potential desirability of schemes to share the revenue raised by withholding (as under the new EU savings tax arrangements) or (more innovatively) as a consequence of information exchange. We show that, irrespective of any difference in country size, it is in the interests of both countries, in terms of tax revenue, that all revenue collected from non‐residents be transferred to the residence country—which would entail taking the EU practice even further from the norm, but is currently the standard in relation to information exchange. A withholding scheme with revenue fully reallocated in this way gives both countries more revenue than does information sharing, whatever the allocation under the latter.
- 1 September 2007
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 109 (3) , 487-504
Revenue Sharing and Information Exchange under Non‐discriminatory Taxation*
The international exchange of tax information, and its merits compared to withholding taxation, has emerged as a central topic in international tax policy. We characterize and compare the outcomes that emerge, in a two‐country world, with and without information exchange, under the assumption that countries are unable to tax residents and non‐residents differentially. The analysis focuses on the role of asymmetries in country size (capturing a key feature of tax havens) and on the impact and potential desirability of schemes to share the revenue raised by withholding (as under the new EU savings tax arrangements) or (more innovatively) as a consequence of information exchange. We show that, irrespective of any difference in country size, it is in the interests of both countries, in terms of tax revenue, that all revenue collected from non‐residents be transferred to the residence country—which would entail taking the EU practice even further from the norm, but is currently the standard in relation to information exchange. A withholding scheme with revenue fully reallocated in this way gives both countries more revenue than does information sharing, whatever the allocation under the latter.