Jenny E. Ligthart
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Jenny E. Ligthart has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Michael Keen
International Monetary Fund
4 shared publications Ben J. Heijdra
University of Groningen
1 shared publication- Ben J. Heijdra
Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
1 shared publication Hendrik Vrijburg
Erasmus University Rotterdam
1 shared publication- Jan P. A. M. Jacobs
University of Groningen Groningen The Netherlands
1 shared publication Rosa M. Martin Suárez
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 14 December 2010
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 5-32
The Productivity of Public Capital: A Meta-analysis
- 14 December 2010
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 5-32
The Productivity of Public Capital: A Meta-analysis
- 24 June 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 17 (3) , 271-294
Consumption tax competition among governments: Evidence from the United States
- 24 June 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 17 (3) , 271-294
Consumption tax competition among governments: Evidence from the United States
- 9 January 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 16 (1) , 82-104
Labor tax reform, unemployment, and search
- 9 January 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 16 (1) , 82-104
Labor tax reform, unemployment, and search
- 1 September 2007
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 109 (3) , 487-504
Revenue Sharing and Information Exchange under Non‐discriminatory Taxation*
The international exchange of tax information, and its merits compared to withholding taxation, has emerged as a central topic in international tax policy. We characterize and compare the outcomes that emerge, in a two‐country world, with and without information exchange, under the assumption that countries are unable to tax residents and non‐residents differentially. The analysis focuses on the role of asymmetries in country size (capturing a key feature of tax havens) and on the impact and potential desirability of schemes to share the revenue raised by withholding (as under the new EU savings tax arrangements) or (more innovatively) as a consequence of information exchange. We show that, irrespective of any difference in country size, it is in the interests of both countries, in terms of tax revenue, that all revenue collected from non‐residents be transferred to the residence country—which would entail taking the EU practice even further from the norm, but is currently the standard in relation to information exchange. A withholding scheme with revenue fully reallocated in this way gives both countries more revenue than does information sharing, whatever the allocation under the latter.
- 1 September 2007
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 109 (3) , 487-504
Revenue Sharing and Information Exchange under Non‐discriminatory Taxation*
The international exchange of tax information, and its merits compared to withholding taxation, has emerged as a central topic in international tax policy. We characterize and compare the outcomes that emerge, in a two‐country world, with and without information exchange, under the assumption that countries are unable to tax residents and non‐residents differentially. The analysis focuses on the role of asymmetries in country size (capturing a key feature of tax havens) and on the impact and potential desirability of schemes to share the revenue raised by withholding (as under the new EU savings tax arrangements) or (more innovatively) as a consequence of information exchange. We show that, irrespective of any difference in country size, it is in the interests of both countries, in terms of tax revenue, that all revenue collected from non‐residents be transferred to the residence country—which would entail taking the EU practice even further from the norm, but is currently the standard in relation to information exchange. A withholding scheme with revenue fully reallocated in this way gives both countries more revenue than does information sharing, whatever the allocation under the latter.
- 1 January 2007
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 31 (1) , 325-359
Fiscal policy, monopolistic competition, and finite lives
- 1 January 2007
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 31 (1) , 325-359
Fiscal policy, monopolistic competition, and finite lives
- 1 May 2006
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 13 (2-3) , 163-180
Incentives and Information Exchange in International Taxation
- 1 May 2006
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 13 (2-3) , 163-180
Incentives and Information Exchange in International Taxation
- 1 January 2006
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 13 (1) , 81-110
Information Sharing and International Taxation: A Primer
- 1 January 2006
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 13 (1) , 81-110
Information Sharing and International Taxation: A Primer
- 1 May 2005
- Published by Wiley in Review of International Economics
- Vol. 13 (2) , 385-390
Coordinating Tariff Reduction and Domestic Tax Reform under Imperfect Competition*
- 1 May 2005
- Published by Wiley in Review of International Economics
- Vol. 13 (2) , 385-390
Coordinating Tariff Reduction and Domestic Tax Reform under Imperfect Competition*