Dan Levin
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Dan Levin has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Yaron Azrieli
Institute for Mathematical and Statistical Innovation Dept. of Economics Ohio State University azrieli
3 shared publications James Peck
Department of Economics, The Ohio State University, 1945 N High Street, Arps Hall 410, Columbus, OH 43210
2 shared publications- James Peck
Department of Economics, Ohio State University ( )
2 shared publications - Lixin Ye
The Ohio State University, Department of Economics, 1945 N. High St., Columbus, Ohio 43210‐1172, U.S.A. e‐mail:‐state.edu
2 shared publications - Asen Ivanov
Virginia Commonwealth University, 301 West Main Street, Room B3149, Richmond, VA 23284, U.S.A.
1 shared publication - David Schmeidler
Coller School of Management, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 February 2023
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 15 (1) , 171-200
Misbehavior in Common Value Auctions: Bidding Rings and Shills
- 1 February 2023
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 15 (1) , 171-200
Misbehavior in Common Value Auctions: Bidding Rings and Shills
- 1 March 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 69 (2) , 337-365
Stable unions
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 179, 73-98
An experimental study of estimation and bidding in common-value auctions with public information
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 179, 73-98
An experimental study of estimation and bidding in common-value auctions with public information
- 1 February 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
- Vol. 52 (1) , 47-64
Ellsberg paradox: Ambiguity and complexity aversions compared
- 1 February 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
- Vol. 52 (1) , 47-64
Ellsberg paradox: Ambiguity and complexity aversions compared
- 11 May 2012
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 12 (1)
Dominance Solvability of Large k-Price Auctions
In an environment of independent private values, we show that k-price auctions (k>2) with a large number of bidders are dominance solvable in two steps. Specifically, if bidders are rational and are certain that their opponents are rational (but without requiring deeper levels of reasoning), then bids converge to true valuations as the economy gets larger. Our model allows for heterogeneity in bidders' attitudes to risk and in the distributions from which valuations are drawn.
- 11 May 2012
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 12 (1)
Dominance Solvability of Large k-Price Auctions
In an environment of independent private values, we show that k-price auctions (k>2) with a large number of bidders are dominance solvable in two steps. Specifically, if bidders are rational and are certain that their opponents are rational (but without requiring deeper levels of reasoning), then bids converge to true valuations as the economy gets larger. Our model allows for heterogeneity in bidders' attitudes to risk and in the distributions from which valuations are drawn.
- 30 November 2011
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 73 (2) , 301-309
Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions
- 30 November 2011
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 73 (2) , 301-309
Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions
- 14 July 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 41 (2) , 397-426
Auctions with synergy and resale
- 14 July 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 41 (2) , 397-426
Auctions with synergy and resale
- 1 August 2009
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 99 (4) , 1484-1507
Hindsight, Foresight, and Insight: An Experimental Study of a Small-Market Investment Game with Common and Private Values
We experimentally test an endogenous-timing investment model in which subjects privately observe their cost of investing and a signal correlated with the common investment return. Subjects overinvest, relative to Nash. We separately consider whether subjects draw inferences, in hindsight, and use foresight to delay profitable investment and learn from market activity. In contrast to Nash, cursed equilibrium, and level-k predictions, behavior hardly changes across our experimental treatments. Maximum likelihood estimates are inconsistent with belief-based theories. We offer an explanation in terms of boundedly rational rules of thumb, based on insights about the game, which provides a better fit than quantal response equilibrium. (JEL C72, D82, D83, G11)
- 1 August 2009
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 99 (4) , 1484-1507
Hindsight, Foresight, and Insight: An Experimental Study of a Small-Market Investment Game with Common and Private Values
We experimentally test an endogenous-timing investment model in which subjects privately observe their cost of investing and a signal correlated with the common investment return. Subjects overinvest, relative to Nash. We separately consider whether subjects draw inferences, in hindsight, and use foresight to delay profitable investment and learn from market activity. In contrast to Nash, cursed equilibrium, and level-k predictions, behavior hardly changes across our experimental treatments. Maximum likelihood estimates are inconsistent with belief-based theories. We offer an explanation in terms of boundedly rational rules of thumb, based on insights about the game, which provides a better fit than quantal response equilibrium. (JEL C72, D82, D83, G11)
- 20 February 2009
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 57 (1) , 167-196
QUALITY DISCLOSURE AND COMPETITION*
We analyze costly quality disclosure with horizontally differentiated products under duopoly and a cartel, and characterize the effect of competition on disclosure and welfare. We show that expected disclosure is higher under a cartel than under duopoly, and the welfare comparison depends on the level of disclosure cost: when the disclosure cost is low, welfare is higher under a cartel than duopoly, but when the disclosure cost is high, welfare is higher under duopoly. In either market structure, disclosure is excessive in terms of total surplus, but insufficient in terms of consumer surplus.
- 20 February 2009
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 57 (1) , 167-196
QUALITY DISCLOSURE AND COMPETITION*
We analyze costly quality disclosure with horizontally differentiated products under duopoly and a cartel, and characterize the effect of competition on disclosure and welfare. We show that expected disclosure is higher under a cartel than under duopoly, and the welfare comparison depends on the level of disclosure cost: when the disclosure cost is low, welfare is higher under a cartel than duopoly, but when the disclosure cost is high, welfare is higher under duopoly. In either market structure, disclosure is excessive in terms of total surplus, but insufficient in terms of consumer surplus.
- 1 November 2008
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 143 (1) , 114-139
Investment dynamics with common and private values
- 1 November 2008
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 143 (1) , 114-139
Investment dynamics with common and private values