David Schmeidler
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
David Schmeidler has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Itzhak Gilboa
Tel-Aviv University
4 shared publications - Larry Samuelson
Department of Economics, Yale University
3 shared publications - Andrew Postlewaite
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
2 shared publications - Dan Levin
The Ohio State University
1 shared publication - Dov Samet
Coller School of Management, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
1 shared publication - Gary Charness
University of California, Santa Barbara
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 7 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 94 (1) , 1-33
Desirability relations in Savage’s model of decision making
- 7 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 94 (1) , 1-33
Desirability relations in Savage’s model of decision making
- 18 February 2020
- Published by CAIRN.INFO in Revue économique
- Vol. 71 (2) , 365-385
States and Contingencies: How to Understand Savage without Anyone Being Hanged
Models of decision-making under uncertainty gain much of their power from the specification of states so as to resolve all uncertainty. However, this specification can undermine the presumed observability of preferences on which axiomatic theories of decision-making are based. We introduce the notion of a contingency. Contingencies need not resolve all uncertainty, but preferences over functions from contingencies to outcomes are (at least in principle) observable. In sufficiently simple situations, states and contingencies coincide. In more challenging situations, the analyst must choose between sacrificing observability in order to harness the power of states that resolve all uncertainty, or preserving observability by working with contingencies. JEL Codes: D8.
- 18 February 2020
- Published by CAIRN.INFO in Revue économique
- Vol. 71 (2) , 365-385
States and Contingencies: How to Understand Savage without Anyone Being Hanged
Models of decision-making under uncertainty gain much of their power from the specification of states so as to resolve all uncertainty. However, this specification can undermine the presumed observability of preferences on which axiomatic theories of decision-making are based. We introduce the notion of a contingency. Contingencies need not resolve all uncertainty, but preferences over functions from contingencies to outcomes are (at least in principle) observable. In sufficiently simple situations, states and contingencies coincide. In more challenging situations, the analyst must choose between sacrificing observability in order to harness the power of states that resolve all uncertainty, or preserving observability by working with contingencies. JEL Codes: D8.
- 4 January 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 86 (3-4) , 339-359
What are axiomatizations good for?
- 4 January 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 86 (3-4) , 339-359
What are axiomatizations good for?
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 179, 73-98
An experimental study of estimation and bidding in common-value auctions with public information
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 179, 73-98
An experimental study of estimation and bidding in common-value auctions with public information
- 1 January 2014
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 82 (4) , 1405-1442
No-Betting-Pareto Dominance
- 1 January 2014
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 82 (4) , 1405-1442
No-Betting-Pareto Dominance
- 19 October 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 187 (1) , 11-31
Rationality of belief or: why savage’s axioms are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality
- 19 October 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 187 (1) , 11-31
Rationality of belief or: why savage’s axioms are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality