Helmut M. Dietl
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Helmut M. Dietl has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Markus Lang
University of Lausanne
7 shared publications - Alexander Rathke
Rathke: Research Associate, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Winterthurerstrasse 30, 8006 Zurich, Switzerland. Phone +41‐44‐6343569, Fax +41‐446343599
2 shared publications - Egon Franck
University of Zürich
2 shared publications - Martin Grossmann
Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
2 shared publications - Stephan Werner
Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich, Plattenstrasse 14, 8032 Zurich, Switzerland
1 shared publication Susanne Royer
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 14 October 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 150 (3-4) , 691-713
Asymmetric contests with liquidity constraints
- 14 October 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 150 (3-4) , 691-713
Asymmetric contests with liquidity constraints
- 23 September 2010
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 49 (2) , 447-463
THE COMBINED EFFECT OF SALARY RESTRICTIONS AND REVENUE SHARING IN SPORTS LEAGUES
Many major sports leagues are characterized by a combination of cross‐subsidization mechanisms like revenue‐sharing arrangements and payroll restrictions. Up to now, the effects of these policy tools have only been analyzed separately. This article provides a theoretical model of a team sports league and analyzes the combined effect of salary restrictions (caps and floors) and revenue sharing. It shows that the effect on club profits, player salaries, and competitive balance crucially depends on the mix of these policy tools. Moreover, the invariance proposition does not hold even under Walrasian‐conjectures if revenue sharing is combined with a salary cap or floor. (JEL L83, C72, L11)
- 23 September 2010
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 49 (2) , 447-463
THE COMBINED EFFECT OF SALARY RESTRICTIONS AND REVENUE SHARING IN SPORTS LEAGUES
Many major sports leagues are characterized by a combination of cross‐subsidization mechanisms like revenue‐sharing arrangements and payroll restrictions. Up to now, the effects of these policy tools have only been analyzed separately. This article provides a theoretical model of a team sports league and analyzes the combined effect of salary restrictions (caps and floors) and revenue sharing. It shows that the effect on club profits, player salaries, and competitive balance crucially depends on the mix of these policy tools. Moreover, the invariance proposition does not hold even under Walrasian‐conjectures if revenue sharing is combined with a salary cap or floor. (JEL L83, C72, L11)
- 22 January 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 36 (1) , 17-36
Revenue Sharing and Competitive Balance in a Dynamic Contest Model
- 22 January 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 36 (1) , 17-36
Revenue Sharing and Competitive Balance in a Dynamic Contest Model
- 1 January 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research
- Vol. 62 (S62) , 63-83
Erfolgsstrategien im Plattformwettbewerb
- 1 January 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research
- Vol. 62 (S62) , 63-83
Erfolgsstrategien im Plattformwettbewerb
- 1 October 2009
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 76 (2) , 375-396
Social Welfare in Sports Leagues with Profit‐Maximizing and/or Win‐Maximizing Clubs
This article develops a contest model to compare social welfare in homogeneous leagues in which all clubs maximize identical objective functions with mixed leagues in which clubs maximize different objective functions. We show that homogeneous leagues in which all clubs are profit maximizers dominate all other leagues. Mixed leagues in which small‐market clubs are profit maximizers and large‐market clubs are win maximizers (type‐I mixed leagues) are dominated by all other leagues. From a welfare perspective, large‐market clubs win too often in (purely) win‐maximizing and type‐I mixed leagues; whereas, small‐market clubs win too many games in (purely) profit‐maximizing leagues and in mixed leagues in which large‐market clubs are profit maximizers and small‐market clubs are win maximizers (type‐II mixed leagues). These results have important policy implications: Social welfare will increase if clubs are reorganized from non‐profit member associations to profit‐maximizing corporations. Moreover, we show that revenue sharing decreases (increases) social welfare in mixed (homogeneous) leagues.
- 1 October 2009
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 76 (2) , 375-396
Social Welfare in Sports Leagues with Profit‐Maximizing and/or Win‐Maximizing Clubs
This article develops a contest model to compare social welfare in homogeneous leagues in which all clubs maximize identical objective functions with mixed leagues in which clubs maximize different objective functions. We show that homogeneous leagues in which all clubs are profit maximizers dominate all other leagues. Mixed leagues in which small‐market clubs are profit maximizers and large‐market clubs are win maximizers (type‐I mixed leagues) are dominated by all other leagues. From a welfare perspective, large‐market clubs win too often in (purely) win‐maximizing and type‐I mixed leagues; whereas, small‐market clubs win too many games in (purely) profit‐maximizing leagues and in mixed leagues in which large‐market clubs are profit maximizers and small‐market clubs are win maximizers (type‐II mixed leagues). These results have important policy implications: Social welfare will increase if clubs are reorganized from non‐profit member associations to profit‐maximizing corporations. Moreover, we show that revenue sharing decreases (increases) social welfare in mixed (homogeneous) leagues.
- 1 June 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research
- Vol. 61 (4) , 439-462
Wertschöpfungsorganisation und Differenzierungsdilemma in der Automobilindustrie
- 1 June 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research
- Vol. 61 (4) , 439-462
Wertschöpfungsorganisation und Differenzierungsdilemma in der Automobilindustrie
- 1 April 2009
- Published by SAGE Publications in California Management Review
- Vol. 51 (3) , 24-48
Value Creation Architectures and Competitive Advantage: Lessons from the European Automobile Industry
- 1 April 2009
- Published by SAGE Publications in California Management Review
- Vol. 51 (3) , 24-48
Value Creation Architectures and Competitive Advantage: Lessons from the European Automobile Industry
- 12 March 2009
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 9 (1)
The Effect of Salary Caps in Professional Team Sports on Social Welfare
This paper provides a theoretical model of a team sports league and studies the welfare effect of salary caps. It shows that salary caps will increase competitive balance and decrease overall salary payments within the league. The resulting effect on social welfare is counter-intuitive and depends on the preference of fans for aggregate talent and for competitive balance. A salary cap that binds only for large-market clubs will increase social welfare if fans prefer aggregate talent despite the fact that the salary cap will result in lower aggregate talent. If fans prefer competitive balance, on the other hand, any binding salary cap will reduce social welfare.
- 12 March 2009
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 9 (1)
The Effect of Salary Caps in Professional Team Sports on Social Welfare
This paper provides a theoretical model of a team sports league and studies the welfare effect of salary caps. It shows that salary caps will increase competitive balance and decrease overall salary payments within the league. The resulting effect on social welfare is counter-intuitive and depends on the preference of fans for aggregate talent and for competitive balance. A salary cap that binds only for large-market clubs will increase social welfare if fans prefer aggregate talent despite the fact that the salary cap will result in lower aggregate talent. If fans prefer competitive balance, on the other hand, any binding salary cap will reduce social welfare.
- 5 October 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal of Law and Economics
- Vol. 26 (3) , 419
Why football players may benefit from the ‘shadow of the transfer system’
- 5 October 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal of Law and Economics
- Vol. 26 (3) , 419
Why football players may benefit from the ‘shadow of the transfer system’
- 18 July 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal of Law and Economics
- Vol. 26 (2) , 129-151
Why football players may benefit from the ‘shadow of the transfer system’
- 18 July 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal of Law and Economics
- Vol. 26 (2) , 129-151
Why football players may benefit from the ‘shadow of the transfer system’