THE COMBINED EFFECT OF SALARY RESTRICTIONS AND REVENUE SHARING IN SPORTS LEAGUES
- 23 September 2010
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 49 (2) , 447-463
Abstract
Many major sports leagues are characterized by a combination of cross‐subsidization mechanisms like revenue‐sharing arrangements and payroll restrictions. Up to now, the effects of these policy tools have only been analyzed separately. This article provides a theoretical model of a team sports league and analyzes the combined effect of salary restrictions (caps and floors) and revenue sharing. It shows that the effect on club profits, player salaries, and competitive balance crucially depends on the mix of these policy tools. Moreover, the invariance proposition does not hold even under Walrasian‐conjectures if revenue sharing is combined with a salary cap or floor. (JEL L83, C72, L11)Keywords
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