Nathalie Giger
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Nathalie Giger has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Adrian Vatter
University of Bern
1 shared publication - Jan Rosset
School of Social Work HES‐SO University of Applied Sciences and Arts Western Switzerland Switzerland
1 shared publication Julian Bernauer
1 shared publication- Julian Bernauer1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 3 July 2014
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 20-37
New Patterns of Democracy in the Countries of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 2
The chapter introduces a new database on political-institutional patterns of democracy used in the contributions to the book. It provides an update and extension of Lijphart’s (1999, 2012) measurement of consensus and majoritarian democracy for the countries of the second wave of the CSES during the period 1997–2006, using 11 partly improved indicators. The chapter explores patterns of democracy by the means of factor analysis, construct additive indices, and present the resulting country scores of consensus and majoritarian democracy graphically. Two variants are presented, one featuring Lijphart’s (1999) classic ‘executives–parties’ and ‘federal–unitary’ dimensions, and another incorporating direct democracy into the framework, yielding an additional ‘cabinets–direct democracy’ dimension.
- 3 July 2014
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 20-37
New Patterns of Democracy in the Countries of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 2
The chapter introduces a new database on political-institutional patterns of democracy used in the contributions to the book. It provides an update and extension of Lijphart’s (1999, 2012) measurement of consensus and majoritarian democracy for the countries of the second wave of the CSES during the period 1997–2006, using 11 partly improved indicators. The chapter explores patterns of democracy by the means of factor analysis, construct additive indices, and present the resulting country scores of consensus and majoritarian democracy graphically. Two variants are presented, one featuring Lijphart’s (1999) classic ‘executives–parties’ and ‘federal–unitary’ dimensions, and another incorporating direct democracy into the framework, yielding an additional ‘cabinets–direct democracy’ dimension.
- 10 April 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Representation
- Vol. 48 (1) , 47-61
THE POOR POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE POOR IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Due to diverging levels of political influence of various income groups, political institutions likely reflect the policy preferences of certain groups of citizens better than others, independently of their numerical weight. This runs counter the egalitarian principle of ‘one citizen, one vote’. The present article documents a general trend of underrepresentation of the preferences of relatively poor citizens both by parties and by governments across Western democracies, although important cross-national differences exist.
- 10 April 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Representation
- Vol. 48 (1) , 47-61
THE POOR POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE POOR IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Due to diverging levels of political influence of various income groups, political institutions likely reflect the policy preferences of certain groups of citizens better than others, independently of their numerical weight. This runs counter the egalitarian principle of ‘one citizen, one vote’. The present article documents a general trend of underrepresentation of the preferences of relatively poor citizens both by parties and by governments across Western democracies, although important cross-national differences exist.
- 13 May 2011
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in European Sociological Review
- Vol. 28 (5) , 691-700
Is Social Policy Retrenchment Unpopular? How Welfare Reforms Affect Government Popularity
This article investigates an established proposition in the welfare literature, namely whether retrenchment is indeed unpopular among the citizenry. Additional to the hypothesis that retrenchment has a negative impact on general government popularity, this article presents a more refined hypothesis: retrenchment is influential only for those citizens highly interested in social policy. This study analyses government performance data derived from election studies (CSES data) in a multilevel design and tests the influence of actual retrenchment initiatives. The findings indicate that retrenchment is not generally unpopular; however, it has a negative impact on the opinions of those interested in the topic.
- 13 May 2011
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in European Sociological Review
- Vol. 28 (5) , 691-700
Is Social Policy Retrenchment Unpopular? How Welfare Reforms Affect Government Popularity
This article investigates an established proposition in the welfare literature, namely whether retrenchment is indeed unpopular among the citizenry. Additional to the hypothesis that retrenchment has a negative impact on general government popularity, this article presents a more refined hypothesis: retrenchment is influential only for those citizens highly interested in social policy. This study analyses government performance data derived from election studies (CSES data) in a multilevel design and tests the influence of actual retrenchment initiatives. The findings indicate that retrenchment is not generally unpopular; however, it has a negative impact on the opinions of those interested in the topic.