Adrian Vatter
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Adrian Vatter has a total of 29 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Rahel Freiburghaus
University of Lausanne Institut d'études politiques Lausanne
7 shared publications - Sean Mueller
University of Lausanne
6 shared publications - Isabelle Stadelmann-Steffen
University of Bern
3 shared publications - Alexander Arens
Institute of Political Science, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland
2 shared publications - Deniz Danaci
Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Universität Bern, Bern 9, Schweiz
2 shared publications - Markus Freitag
Institute of Political Science University of Bern Bern Switzerland
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 26 June 2026
- Published by Wiley in Swiss Political Science Review
- Vol. 32 (2) , 412-430
How the Electoral System Influences Personalization and Individual Campaign Spending: Evidence from Switzerland's First‐Time Finance Disclosure Regulations
Personalization—greater candidate‐centeredness at the expense of political parties—is a defining feature of 21st‐century electoral politics. But to what extent does the electoral system shape this trend? We develop a theoretical argument rooted in the design of open‐list proportional representation (OLPR). Because OLPR combines proportional seat allocation with intra‐party competition, it creates opportunities for candidates to cultivate a personal vote. We argue that when the institutional potential for individual preference votes to shape electoral outcomes is high, candidates respond by investing more in personalized campaigning, reflected in higher individual campaign spending. We test this argument using novel data from the 2023 Swiss federal elections, the first held under mandatory campaign finance disclosure rules. Our findings show that greater voter ability to allocate individual preference votes is associated with higher in‐dividual campaign spending, demonstrating how electoral systems influence candidate behavior and the role of money in politics.
- 26 June 2026
- Published by Wiley in Swiss Political Science Review
- Vol. 32 (2) , 412-430
Open AccessHow the Electoral System Influences Personalization and Individual Campaign Spending: Evidence from Switzerland's First‐Time Finance Disclosure Regulations
Personalization—greater candidate‐centeredness at the expense of political parties—is a defining feature of 21st‐century electoral politics. But to what extent does the electoral system shape this trend? We develop a theoretical argument rooted in the design of open‐list proportional representation (OLPR). Because OLPR combines proportional seat allocation with intra‐party competition, it creates opportunities for candidates to cultivate a personal vote. We argue that when the institutional potential for individual preference votes to shape electoral outcomes is high, candidates respond by investing more in personalized campaigning, reflected in higher individual campaign spending. We test this argument using novel data from the 2023 Swiss federal elections, the first held under mandatory campaign finance disclosure rules. Our findings show that greater voter ability to allocate individual preference votes is associated with higher in‐dividual campaign spending, demonstrating how electoral systems influence candidate behavior and the role of money in politics.
- Open Access
- 29 October 2024
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 410-428
Power concentration and power diffusion: a new typology of political-institutional patterns of democracy
In research spanning several decades, Arend Lijphart has analysed ‘consociational’ democracy and ‘patterns’ of democracy. Drawing on his enormous effort, we have proposed a theory of ‘power diffusion’ and a new empirical and methodological variation. In this contribution, we review the concept in the light of the recent literature and recalculate measures of ‘power diffusion’ relying on an updated database between 1990 and 2022, with a special focus on the potential convergence of models of democracy.
- 29 October 2024
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 410-428
Open AccessPower concentration and power diffusion: a new typology of political-institutional patterns of democracy
In research spanning several decades, Arend Lijphart has analysed ‘consociational’ democracy and ‘patterns’ of democracy. Drawing on his enormous effort, we have proposed a theory of ‘power diffusion’ and a new empirical and methodological variation. In this contribution, we review the concept in the light of the recent literature and recalculate measures of ‘power diffusion’ relying on an updated database between 1990 and 2022, with a special focus on the potential convergence of models of democracy.
- Open Access
- 29 October 2024
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 1-21
Introduction: past, present, and future of the comparative study of political institutions
Tackling global political challenges such as climate change, polarization, inequality, de-democratization, or the rapid advancement of technology involves political institutions across all levels, making them an omnipresent feature of our politics. Emphasizing the three-fold significance of studying political institutions, this editorial introduction highlights the need for a deliberately comparative approach, a genuine perspective grounded in political science, and a holistic examination encompassing both classic, long-standing and emerging, more recent political institutions. The chapter outlines the structure, approach, and main goals of the Handbook of Comparative Political Institutions, offering a comprehensive, authoritative, and state-of-the-art overview. Through a review of common themes in the current and future study of comparative political institutions, it charts a forward-looking agenda for the further advancement of this burgeoning field.
- 29 October 2024
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 1-21
Open AccessIntroduction: past, present, and future of the comparative study of political institutions
Tackling global political challenges such as climate change, polarization, inequality, de-democratization, or the rapid advancement of technology involves political institutions across all levels, making them an omnipresent feature of our politics. Emphasizing the three-fold significance of studying political institutions, this editorial introduction highlights the need for a deliberately comparative approach, a genuine perspective grounded in political science, and a holistic examination encompassing both classic, long-standing and emerging, more recent political institutions. The chapter outlines the structure, approach, and main goals of the Handbook of Comparative Political Institutions, offering a comprehensive, authoritative, and state-of-the-art overview. Through a review of common themes in the current and future study of comparative political institutions, it charts a forward-looking agenda for the further advancement of this burgeoning field.
- 8 January 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Publius: The Journal of Federalism
- Vol. 54 (2) , 283-312
Assessing the Effects of Amendment Rules in Federal Systems: Australia and Switzerland Compared
The effects of formal constitutional amendment rules are still contested, yielding mixed and inconsistent findings. The key issue lies in overlooking the broader institutional context in which amending clauses are situated. This article presents a novel theoretical argument centered on the “institutional embeddedness.” Empirically, we leverage a unique, most different systems design that compares Australia and Switzerland to assess the direct and indirect effects of formal amendment clauses. Both federations implement an identical “direct-democratic model of constitutional change,” despite differences in size, the underlying societal structure, the federalism model, and form of democratic governance. Our empirical results reveal similar direct effects on minority protection, but differing indirect effects on federal dynamics differ significantly. The formal amendment rule sustains Switzerland’s decentralized federal order, while contributing to pronounced centralizing trends in Australian federalism. These findings have vital implications for constitutional design, highlighting that the specific institutional context is decisive, not just the formal amendment rule.
- 8 January 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Publius: The Journal of Federalism
- Vol. 54 (2) , 283-312
Assessing the Effects of Amendment Rules in Federal Systems: Australia and Switzerland Compared
The effects of formal constitutional amendment rules are still contested, yielding mixed and inconsistent findings. The key issue lies in overlooking the broader institutional context in which amending clauses are situated. This article presents a novel theoretical argument centered on the “institutional embeddedness.” Empirically, we leverage a unique, most different systems design that compares Australia and Switzerland to assess the direct and indirect effects of formal amendment clauses. Both federations implement an identical “direct-democratic model of constitutional change,” despite differences in size, the underlying societal structure, the federalism model, and form of democratic governance. Our empirical results reveal similar direct effects on minority protection, but differing indirect effects on federal dynamics differ significantly. The formal amendment rule sustains Switzerland’s decentralized federal order, while contributing to pronounced centralizing trends in Australian federalism. These findings have vital implications for constitutional design, highlighting that the specific institutional context is decisive, not just the formal amendment rule.
- 16 January 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 46 (6) , 1106-1132
Kinder, gentler – and crisis-proof? Consensus democracy, inclusive institutions and COVID-19 pandemic performance
Which patterns of democracy perform best? Although a decades-long research tradition has fairly robustly suggested that consensual democracies outperform their Westminster-style majoritarian counterparts, the scope of previous studies has been limited to ‘normal times’. In this article, the endogenous context of the COVID-19 pandemic is leveraged to study whether the alleged superiority of consensualism also holds during crises. It is hypothesised that, in addition to consensus democracy, inclusive institutions – i.e. cabinet size and interest-group corporatism – enhance crisis-related performance. Drawing on new and original data, cross-sectional and hierarchical time-series regression analyses show that horizontal power-sharing and the number of ministers substantively reduced excess mortality, while the structure of the interest-group system had no effect. Although established consensus democracies can draw on their built-in institutional assets even during crises, our findings indicate that majoritarian systems may, as a compensatory performance-enhancing tool, flexibly gear up for crisis-induced necessities by adding more ministers to the cabinet.
- 16 January 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 46 (6) , 1106-1132
Kinder, gentler – and crisis-proof? Consensus democracy, inclusive institutions and COVID-19 pandemic performance
Which patterns of democracy perform best? Although a decades-long research tradition has fairly robustly suggested that consensual democracies outperform their Westminster-style majoritarian counterparts, the scope of previous studies has been limited to ‘normal times’. In this article, the endogenous context of the COVID-19 pandemic is leveraged to study whether the alleged superiority of consensualism also holds during crises. It is hypothesised that, in addition to consensus democracy, inclusive institutions – i.e. cabinet size and interest-group corporatism – enhance crisis-related performance. Drawing on new and original data, cross-sectional and hierarchical time-series regression analyses show that horizontal power-sharing and the number of ministers substantively reduced excess mortality, while the structure of the interest-group system had no effect. Although established consensus democracies can draw on their built-in institutional assets even during crises, our findings indicate that majoritarian systems may, as a compensatory performance-enhancing tool, flexibly gear up for crisis-induced necessities by adding more ministers to the cabinet.
- Open Access
- 3 January 2023
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 254-264
Switzerland: real federalism at work
This chapter offers comprehensive resources for teaching Swiss federalism at undergraduate and post-graduate levels. All over the world, Switzerland is admired for its distinct power-sharing system that serves as a model of conflict settlement in multicultural societies. However, knowledge transfer is often complicated by dangerous 'Sonderfall rhetorics' that think of Switzerland as an 'exceptional country'. In this chapter, international students and teachers are thus encouraged to engage with Swiss federalism as 'a case of' rather than a 'deviant or special case'. They learn to appreciate the specific answers it has in store for major questions raised by wider federalism research (e.g., regarding shared rule, federal dynamics). Teachers will find a step-by-step guide how problem-based learning can be fruitfully applied to explore both the challenges and potential solutions for Swiss federalism in a real-world setting. Moreover, encompassing reading lists, a portfolio evaluation, and ready-to-use examination questions are provided. (148 words)
- 3 January 2023
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 254-264
Open AccessSwitzerland: real federalism at work
This chapter offers comprehensive resources for teaching Swiss federalism at undergraduate and post-graduate levels. All over the world, Switzerland is admired for its distinct power-sharing system that serves as a model of conflict settlement in multicultural societies. However, knowledge transfer is often complicated by dangerous 'Sonderfall rhetorics' that think of Switzerland as an 'exceptional country'. In this chapter, international students and teachers are thus encouraged to engage with Swiss federalism as 'a case of' rather than a 'deviant or special case'. They learn to appreciate the specific answers it has in store for major questions raised by wider federalism research (e.g., regarding shared rule, federal dynamics). Teachers will find a step-by-step guide how problem-based learning can be fruitfully applied to explore both the challenges and potential solutions for Swiss federalism in a real-world setting. Moreover, encompassing reading lists, a portfolio evaluation, and ready-to-use examination questions are provided. (148 words)
- 10 November 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of Legislative Studies
- Vol. 29 (2) , 312-336
A new index of bicameralism: taking legitimacy seriously
Second chambers frequently form part of national institutional configurations, but their impact on policy making can vary from negligible to all-important veto players. The standard approach is to assess their importance via two dimensions: formal powers and compositional differences vis-à-vis the first chamber. In this paper, we conceptualise a third dimension: the legitimacy of second chambers. We subsequently measure the strength of second chambers in 14 countries and develop a new index of bicameralism. Running several quantitative analyses with a total sample of 29 OECD countries, we show how this index is significantly correlated to lower state intervention in the economy and greater regional autonomy.
- 10 November 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of Legislative Studies
- Vol. 29 (2) , 312-336
A new index of bicameralism: taking legitimacy seriously
Second chambers frequently form part of national institutional configurations, but their impact on policy making can vary from negligible to all-important veto players. The standard approach is to assess their importance via two dimensions: formal powers and compositional differences vis-à-vis the first chamber. In this paper, we conceptualise a third dimension: the legitimacy of second chambers. We subsequently measure the strength of second chambers in 14 countries and develop a new index of bicameralism. Running several quantitative analyses with a total sample of 29 OECD countries, we show how this index is significantly correlated to lower state intervention in the economy and greater regional autonomy.
- Top Cited Papers
- 3 November 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Government and Opposition
- Vol. 57 (2) , 353-369
‘Stretched But Not Snapped’: A Response to Russell and Serban on Retiring the ‘Westminster Model’
This article engages with Meg Russell and Ruxandra Serban's (2021) argument that the Westminster model is ‘a concept stretched beyond repair’ that deserves ‘to be retired’. We examine the logic, theory and methods that led to such a powerful, potent and provocative argument. We suggest their approach may have inadvertently ‘muddied’ an already muddled concept. We assess the implications of ‘muddying’ for their conclusion that the Westminster model is, in essence, a dead concept in need of a decent funeral. We suggest the concept is ‘stretched but not snapped’ by developing a simple four-perspective broadening of the analytical lens. This approach aids understanding about what the concept covers, how it is operationalized and why it remains useful in comparative research.
- 3 November 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Government and Opposition
- Vol. 57 (2) , 353-369
Top Cited Papers‘Stretched But Not Snapped’: A Response to Russell and Serban on Retiring the ‘Westminster Model’
This article engages with Meg Russell and Ruxandra Serban's (2021) argument that the Westminster model is ‘a concept stretched beyond repair’ that deserves ‘to be retired’. We examine the logic, theory and methods that led to such a powerful, potent and provocative argument. We suggest their approach may have inadvertently ‘muddied’ an already muddled concept. We assess the implications of ‘muddying’ for their conclusion that the Westminster model is, in essence, a dead concept in need of a decent funeral. We suggest the concept is ‘stretched but not snapped’ by developing a simple four-perspective broadening of the analytical lens. This approach aids understanding about what the concept covers, how it is operationalized and why it remains useful in comparative research.
- Open Access
- 13 July 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Policy Sciences
- Vol. 54 (3) , 663-690
Do governments delay the implementation of parliamentary requests? Examining time variation in implementing legislative requests in Switzerland
This paper investigates time variations in the implementation of legislative requests by the Swiss government. Combining the literature on executive–legislative relations with findings from implementation research, we focus on the procedural level and argue that implementation delays can occur because the government does not want to, cannot or should not implement faster. We test these mechanisms using a unique database, which enables us to analyse a systematic collection of all legislative requests that have been approved between the parliament’s 2003 winter session and its 2018 spring session. Our results show that the considerable variation in the time needed for the legislative mandates’ implementation is mostly related to the Swiss government’s inability to transpose faster, i.e. to factors like highly busy administrative offices or complex and controversial issues. In contrast, there is no support for the ideas that the government “shall not” or “does not want to” transpose faster.
- 13 July 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Policy Sciences
- Vol. 54 (3) , 663-690
Open AccessDo governments delay the implementation of parliamentary requests? Examining time variation in implementing legislative requests in Switzerland
This paper investigates time variations in the implementation of legislative requests by the Swiss government. Combining the literature on executive–legislative relations with findings from implementation research, we focus on the procedural level and argue that implementation delays can occur because the government does not want to, cannot or should not implement faster. We test these mechanisms using a unique database, which enables us to analyse a systematic collection of all legislative requests that have been approved between the parliament’s 2003 winter session and its 2018 spring session. Our results show that the considerable variation in the time needed for the legislative mandates’ implementation is mostly related to the Swiss government’s inability to transpose faster, i.e. to factors like highly busy administrative offices or complex and controversial issues. In contrast, there is no support for the ideas that the government “shall not” or “does not want to” transpose faster.
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Weblaw in Richterzeitung
- No. 1
Parteilose statt geloste Richterinnen und Richter
Der Beitrag analysiert das geltende Verfahren und die heutige Praxis der Richterbestellung in der Schweiz aus einer politikwissenschaftlichen Perspektive. Dabei werden die Stärken und Schwächen der demokratischen Wahl der Bundesrichterinnen und Richter durch das Parlament dem Losentscheid im Sinne der «Justiz-Initiative» gegenübergestellt. Kritisch beleuchtet wird zudem die faktisch zwingende Parteimitgliedschaft als Voraussetzung zur Wahl an das Bundesgericht. Der Autor unterbreitet abschliessend drei Reformvorschläge für das zukünftige Wahlverfahren der obersten Gerichtsbehörden in der Schweiz.
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Weblaw in Richterzeitung
- No. 1
Parteilose statt geloste Richterinnen und Richter
Der Beitrag analysiert das geltende Verfahren und die heutige Praxis der Richterbestellung in der Schweiz aus einer politikwissenschaftlichen Perspektive. Dabei werden die Stärken und Schwächen der demokratischen Wahl der Bundesrichterinnen und Richter durch das Parlament dem Losentscheid im Sinne der «Justiz-Initiative» gegenübergestellt. Kritisch beleuchtet wird zudem die faktisch zwingende Parteimitgliedschaft als Voraussetzung zur Wahl an das Bundesgericht. Der Autor unterbreitet abschliessend drei Reformvorschläge für das zukünftige Wahlverfahren der obersten Gerichtsbehörden in der Schweiz.