Kojun Hamada
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Kojun Hamada has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Mitsuyoshi Yanagihara
Graduate School of Economics, Nagoya University, Nagoya, Japan
5 shared publications- Mitsuyoshi Yanagihara
Nagoya University
4 shared publications Takao Ohkawa
Faculty of Economics Ritsumeikan University Kusatsu Japan
4 shared publicationsMakoto Okamura
Economics Department Hiroshima University, Higashi‐Hiroshima Hiroshima Japan
3 shared publications- Akihiko Kaneko
Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan
2 shared publications - Makoto Okamura
Hiroshima University, Hiroshima, Japan
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 28 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Surviving Firms After a Common Demand or Cost Shock Occurs: A Free-entry Cournot Oligopoly with Firm Heterogeneity
This study investigates what kinds of firms survive in a free-entry Cournot equilibrium with firm heterogeneity when a common demand or cost shock occurs. Focusing on linear demand and linear costs, we show that different types of firms survive in the market depending on changes in demand and cost parameters. First, the types of firms that survive do not change when the demand intercept increases, whereas firms that have higher marginal costs and lower fixed costs are more likely to survive when the demand slope increases. Second, the types of firms that survive do not change when the marginal costs of both firms increase by the same amount, whereas firms with lower marginal costs and higher fixed costs are more likely to survive when the marginal costs increase at the same rate. Third, when the fixed costs of both firms increase by the same amount (at the same rate), firms that have lower (higher) marginal costs and higher (lower) fixed costs are more likely to survive. Furthermore, we specify the types of firms that survive when the marginal costs and fixed costs of both firm types change proportionally.
- 28 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessSurviving Firms After a Common Demand or Cost Shock Occurs: A Free-entry Cournot Oligopoly with Firm Heterogeneity
This study investigates what kinds of firms survive in a free-entry Cournot equilibrium with firm heterogeneity when a common demand or cost shock occurs. Focusing on linear demand and linear costs, we show that different types of firms survive in the market depending on changes in demand and cost parameters. First, the types of firms that survive do not change when the demand intercept increases, whereas firms that have higher marginal costs and lower fixed costs are more likely to survive when the demand slope increases. Second, the types of firms that survive do not change when the marginal costs of both firms increase by the same amount, whereas firms with lower marginal costs and higher fixed costs are more likely to survive when the marginal costs increase at the same rate. Third, when the fixed costs of both firms increase by the same amount (at the same rate), firms that have lower (higher) marginal costs and higher (lower) fixed costs are more likely to survive. Furthermore, we specify the types of firms that survive when the marginal costs and fixed costs of both firm types change proportionally.
- 10 January 2025
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 46 (3) , 1763-1773
Privatization Versus Managerial Delegation: Revisiting Delegation in a Mixed Duopoly
This study revisits the issue of managerial delegation in a mixed oligopoly by focusing on whether a private firm's managerial delegation can increase firm profit and social welfare. Unlike the previous research that has focused on the effect of privatization on social welfare, we examine the impact of managerial delegation by a private firm on profit and social welfare. Using a model in which the degrees of partial privatization and managerial delegation are endogenously determined in a mixed duopoly, we derive the equilibrium degrees and demonstrate the following results. First, partial privatization is always chosen instead of full privatization or nationalization and the equilibrium degree of privatization is not monotonic with the cost‐efficiency parameter. Second, profit‐maximizing behavior is never chosen as a managerial delegation strategy. When marginal cost does not rise sharply with production, the private firm's owner incentivizes its manager toward a higher production cost so that the manager chooses the firm's output level more aggressively. Third, managerial delegation necessarily increases social welfare, whereas whether it increases the private firm's profit depends on the cost‐efficiency parameter. When marginal cost does not rise sharply with production, a managerial delegation strategically implemented by a private firm not only increases private benefits but also contributes to enhancing public interest.
- 10 January 2025
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 46 (3) , 1763-1773
Privatization Versus Managerial Delegation: Revisiting Delegation in a Mixed Duopoly
This study revisits the issue of managerial delegation in a mixed oligopoly by focusing on whether a private firm's managerial delegation can increase firm profit and social welfare. Unlike the previous research that has focused on the effect of privatization on social welfare, we examine the impact of managerial delegation by a private firm on profit and social welfare. Using a model in which the degrees of partial privatization and managerial delegation are endogenously determined in a mixed duopoly, we derive the equilibrium degrees and demonstrate the following results. First, partial privatization is always chosen instead of full privatization or nationalization and the equilibrium degree of privatization is not monotonic with the cost‐efficiency parameter. Second, profit‐maximizing behavior is never chosen as a managerial delegation strategy. When marginal cost does not rise sharply with production, the private firm's owner incentivizes its manager toward a higher production cost so that the manager chooses the firm's output level more aggressively. Third, managerial delegation necessarily increases social welfare, whereas whether it increases the private firm's profit depends on the cost‐efficiency parameter. When marginal cost does not rise sharply with production, a managerial delegation strategically implemented by a private firm not only increases private benefits but also contributes to enhancing public interest.
- 26 January 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in International Economics and Economic Policy
- Vol. 21 (1) , 207-226
Impact of PAYG pensions on country welfare through capital accumulation
- 26 January 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in International Economics and Economic Policy
- Vol. 21 (1) , 207-226
Impact of PAYG pensions on country welfare through capital accumulation
- 5 October 2023
- Published by Wiley in Bulletin of Economic Research
- Vol. 76 (1) , 251-266
The optimal specific or ad valorem tax when the other tax is exogenously imposed in a free‐entry Cournot oligopoly market
This study examines how optimal specific or ad valorem taxation in a free‐entry Cournot oligopoly market is affected by a change in another exogenously given tax. We derive the sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the optimal tax rate, which are related to the concavity of the marginal revenue and the log‐concavity of the first derivative of the average cost function. By guaranteeing the uniqueness, we can conduct a comparative statics analysis on the optimal tax rate. We show that a marginal increase in another tax can paradoxically reduce prices and decrease the optimal tax rate.
- 5 October 2023
- Published by Wiley in Bulletin of Economic Research
- Vol. 76 (1) , 251-266
The optimal specific or ad valorem tax when the other tax is exogenously imposed in a free‐entry Cournot oligopoly market
This study examines how optimal specific or ad valorem taxation in a free‐entry Cournot oligopoly market is affected by a change in another exogenously given tax. We derive the sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the optimal tax rate, which are related to the concavity of the marginal revenue and the log‐concavity of the first derivative of the average cost function. By guaranteeing the uniqueness, we can conduct a comparative statics analysis on the optimal tax rate. We show that a marginal increase in another tax can paradoxically reduce prices and decrease the optimal tax rate.
- 28 June 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Research in Economics
- Vol. 77 (3) , 390-401
Organizational structure and technological investment revisited: An explanation based on the property rights approach
- 28 June 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Research in Economics
- Vol. 77 (3) , 390-401
Organizational structure and technological investment revisited: An explanation based on the property rights approach
- 25 May 2023
- Published by Wiley in Scottish Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 70 (4) , 391-397
Edgeworth's taxation paradox when firms engage in cost‐reducing investment
This study examines whether and when Edgeworth's taxation paradox, that taxation decreases the equilibrium price, occurs in a free‐entry Cournot oligopoly with cost‐reducing investment. In contrast to the fact that no paradox occurs in the short‐run equilibrium, the paradox can occur in the long‐run equilibrium, in which the number of firms is endogenous. However, the conditions under which the paradox occurs are restrictive when there is no investment. By incorporating cost‐reducing investments into the model, we demonstrate that the paradox is likely to occur under less restrictive conditions, irrespective of whether the tax is specific or ad valorem.
- 25 May 2023
- Published by Wiley in Scottish Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 70 (4) , 391-397
Edgeworth's taxation paradox when firms engage in cost‐reducing investment
This study examines whether and when Edgeworth's taxation paradox, that taxation decreases the equilibrium price, occurs in a free‐entry Cournot oligopoly with cost‐reducing investment. In contrast to the fact that no paradox occurs in the short‐run equilibrium, the paradox can occur in the long‐run equilibrium, in which the number of firms is endogenous. However, the conditions under which the paradox occurs are restrictive when there is no investment. By incorporating cost‐reducing investments into the model, we demonstrate that the paradox is likely to occur under less restrictive conditions, irrespective of whether the tax is specific or ad valorem.
- 1 May 2022
- Published by Wiley in Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique
- Vol. 55 (2) , 1166-1192
Optimal taxation in a free‐entry Cournot oligopoly: The average cost function approach
This study examines the optimal taxation in a free‐entry Cournot oligopoly using the average cost function and aggregative games approach when either a specific tax, an ad valorem tax, or both, is imposed. When either a specific or an ad valorem tax is imposed, we obtain the following results. First, the business‐stealing (business‐augmenting) effect in the free‐entry equilibrium makes the optimal tax rate positive (negative). Second, social welfare under the optimal specific tax is lower than that under the optimal ad valorem tax. Third, when both taxes are imposed, marginally increasing a positive ad valorem tax (negative specific tax) improves social welfare when the optimal specific (ad valorem) tax is initially imposed. Finally, the optimal combination of a specific subsidy and ad valorem tax depends on the shape of the average cost function.
- 1 May 2022
- Published by Wiley in Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique
- Vol. 55 (2) , 1166-1192
Optimal taxation in a free‐entry Cournot oligopoly: The average cost function approach
This study examines the optimal taxation in a free‐entry Cournot oligopoly using the average cost function and aggregative games approach when either a specific tax, an ad valorem tax, or both, is imposed. When either a specific or an ad valorem tax is imposed, we obtain the following results. First, the business‐stealing (business‐augmenting) effect in the free‐entry equilibrium makes the optimal tax rate positive (negative). Second, social welfare under the optimal specific tax is lower than that under the optimal ad valorem tax. Third, when both taxes are imposed, marginally increasing a positive ad valorem tax (negative specific tax) improves social welfare when the optimal specific (ad valorem) tax is initially imposed. Finally, the optimal combination of a specific subsidy and ad valorem tax depends on the shape of the average cost function.
- 14 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Asia-Pacific Journal of Regional Science
- Vol. 6 (2) , 837-862
Commodity tax competition and cross-border shopping in a tripoint model
- 14 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Asia-Pacific Journal of Regional Science
- Vol. 6 (2) , 837-862
Commodity tax competition and cross-border shopping in a tripoint model
- 12 May 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Economic Journal
- Vol. 35 (3) , 323-343
Location Tax/Subsidy Competition: When Governments Set Their Policies After Firms Choose Their Locations
In this study, we examine the location tax/subsidy competition between two countries when governments set tax or subsidy policies after firms have decided their location using a third-market model. The previous literature on tax competition with the choice of production location of firms has relied on a model in which governments set tax/subsidy policies before firms choose their production location between countries. However, if governments cannot commit to their policies in advance, the timing of decision-making changes so that governments determine their tax/subsidy rates after firms choose their location. Considering the different timings of the game, we show the following results. First, firms choose to stay in the countries in which they were originally established and governments subsidize the firms located in their countries. As a result, exporting countries fall into excessive subsidization competition, whereas firms can obtain higher profits than in the no-subsidization case. Second, when tax/subsidy authorities are tax-revenue maximizers, there are two different equilibria in tax competition in which each firm chooses to locate in different countries. Social welfare is larger when governments are tax-revenue maximizers than when they are social-welfare maximizers, whereas firms' profits are smaller when governments are tax-revenue maximizers.
- 12 May 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Economic Journal
- Vol. 35 (3) , 323-343
Location Tax/Subsidy Competition: When Governments Set Their Policies After Firms Choose Their Locations
In this study, we examine the location tax/subsidy competition between two countries when governments set tax or subsidy policies after firms have decided their location using a third-market model. The previous literature on tax competition with the choice of production location of firms has relied on a model in which governments set tax/subsidy policies before firms choose their production location between countries. However, if governments cannot commit to their policies in advance, the timing of decision-making changes so that governments determine their tax/subsidy rates after firms choose their location. Considering the different timings of the game, we show the following results. First, firms choose to stay in the countries in which they were originally established and governments subsidize the firms located in their countries. As a result, exporting countries fall into excessive subsidization competition, whereas firms can obtain higher profits than in the no-subsidization case. Second, when tax/subsidy authorities are tax-revenue maximizers, there are two different equilibria in tax competition in which each firm chooses to locate in different countries. Social welfare is larger when governments are tax-revenue maximizers than when they are social-welfare maximizers, whereas firms' profits are smaller when governments are tax-revenue maximizers.
- 5 January 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in The Japanese Economic Review
- Vol. 74 (1) , 199-214
Generalization of strategic delegation
- 5 January 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in The Japanese Economic Review
- Vol. 74 (1) , 199-214
Generalization of strategic delegation