Mitsuyoshi Yanagihara
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Mitsuyoshi Yanagihara has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Hideya Kato
Ryukoku University
4 shared publications - Kojun Hamada
Faculty of Economic Sciences Niigata University Niigata Japan
4 shared publications - Tsuyoshi Shinozaki
Tohoku Gakuin University
3 shared publications - Akihiko Kaneko
Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan
1 shared publication Chen Lu
Nagoya University
1 shared publicationHideya Kato
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 3 September 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Research in Economics
- Vol. 77 (4) , 518-525
Vertical fiscal externality in public education inputs: When federal and state governments have different time perspectives
- 3 September 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Research in Economics
- Vol. 77 (4) , 518-525
Vertical fiscal externality in public education inputs: When federal and state governments have different time perspectives
- 29 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 33-53
Consumption of Leisure Goods, Leisure Time, and Inheritance of Tastes for Leisure in an Overlapping Generations Model
- 29 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 33-53
Consumption of Leisure Goods, Leisure Time, and Inheritance of Tastes for Leisure in an Overlapping Generations Model
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Japan Section of the Regional Science Association International in Studies in Regional Science
- Vol. 51 (2) , 175-195
Gift Competition in the “Furusato Nouzei System”:A Theoretical Approach in the Framework of Tax Competition
The so-called “Furusato Nouzei System” (hometown tax donation) has been introduced in Japan since 2008. This system provides tax deductions to people donating money to a local government they choose as the recipient. This system has brought about regional competition across local governments, and its competition has become more and more fierce by providing attractive gifts to encourage people to donate more. In fact, some local governments’ tax revenues are decreased by tax deductions and local governments gathering the donations. Many papers criticize that this system decreases the total amount of local tax revenues due to regional (gift) competitions. In contrast, there are no theoretical studies on the effects of the system. Therefore, this paper examines how various variables under the “Furusato Nouzei System” or population movement from a larger population region to a smaller population region affects effective tax rates, including the gift for “Furusato Nouzei”, of both local governments and the tax revenues of local and central governments. In order to examine these effects, we constructed a simple two-region tax competition model considering the degree of attachment to the region in which residents live. The main results are as follows. First, “Furusato Nouzei” is done from the larger population region to the smaller population region. Second, the population movement from the smaller population region to the larger population region promotes fierce competition in the effective tax rate. That is, if the population difference between two regions is not large enough, its movement can decrease not only the tax revenue of the small population region but also the tax revenue of the larger population region. Third, a rise in the upper limit of tax deduction decreases the tax revenues of the larger population region. If the population of the larger population region is not large enough, a rise in the upper limit of tax deductions can decrease the tax revenue in the smaller population region. Lastly, the population movement or a rise in all variables except the lower limit of tax deductions decreases the tax revenue of the central government. JEL Classifications:H31, H71, H77, N45
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Japan Section of the Regional Science Association International in Studies in Regional Science
- Vol. 51 (2) , 175-195
Gift Competition in the “Furusato Nouzei System”:A Theoretical Approach in the Framework of Tax Competition
The so-called “Furusato Nouzei System” (hometown tax donation) has been introduced in Japan since 2008. This system provides tax deductions to people donating money to a local government they choose as the recipient. This system has brought about regional competition across local governments, and its competition has become more and more fierce by providing attractive gifts to encourage people to donate more. In fact, some local governments’ tax revenues are decreased by tax deductions and local governments gathering the donations. Many papers criticize that this system decreases the total amount of local tax revenues due to regional (gift) competitions. In contrast, there are no theoretical studies on the effects of the system. Therefore, this paper examines how various variables under the “Furusato Nouzei System” or population movement from a larger population region to a smaller population region affects effective tax rates, including the gift for “Furusato Nouzei”, of both local governments and the tax revenues of local and central governments. In order to examine these effects, we constructed a simple two-region tax competition model considering the degree of attachment to the region in which residents live. The main results are as follows. First, “Furusato Nouzei” is done from the larger population region to the smaller population region. Second, the population movement from the smaller population region to the larger population region promotes fierce competition in the effective tax rate. That is, if the population difference between two regions is not large enough, its movement can decrease not only the tax revenue of the small population region but also the tax revenue of the larger population region. Third, a rise in the upper limit of tax deduction decreases the tax revenues of the larger population region. If the population of the larger population region is not large enough, a rise in the upper limit of tax deductions can decrease the tax revenue in the smaller population region. Lastly, the population movement or a rise in all variables except the lower limit of tax deductions decreases the tax revenue of the central government. JEL Classifications:H31, H71, H77, N45
- 12 March 2019
- Published by Wiley in Review of International Economics
- Vol. 27 (3) , 765-785
International trade and capital accumulation in an overlapping generations model with a public intermediate good
We investigate the effects of a public intermediate good on trade patterns, capital accumulation, and the gains from trade in a two‐country, three‐sector overlapping generations model. A public intermediate good affects not only the productivity of private production but capital accumulation; thus, the results differ from those obtained in previous studies. First, opening to trade may accelerate capital accumulation in the higher‐savings country. Additionally, the country producing a public intermediate good more (which is labor‐intensive) may be the importer of the investment good (which is the most capital‐intensive). Finally, the lower‐savings country may have lower steady‐state welfare under trade.
- 12 March 2019
- Published by Wiley in Review of International Economics
- Vol. 27 (3) , 765-785
International trade and capital accumulation in an overlapping generations model with a public intermediate good
We investigate the effects of a public intermediate good on trade patterns, capital accumulation, and the gains from trade in a two‐country, three‐sector overlapping generations model. A public intermediate good affects not only the productivity of private production but capital accumulation; thus, the results differ from those obtained in previous studies. First, opening to trade may accelerate capital accumulation in the higher‐savings country. Additionally, the country producing a public intermediate good more (which is labor‐intensive) may be the importer of the investment good (which is the most capital‐intensive). Finally, the lower‐savings country may have lower steady‐state welfare under trade.
- 24 February 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 263-277
Political Economics of Public Pricing of Final and Intermediate Goods
- 24 February 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 263-277
Political Economics of Public Pricing of Final and Intermediate Goods
- 24 February 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 29-47
Cross-Border Shopping with Fiscal Externalities
- 20 April 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics
- Vol. 122 (3) , 279-301
Aspirations and the transfer paradox in an overlapping generations model
- 20 April 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics
- Vol. 122 (3) , 279-301
Aspirations and the transfer paradox in an overlapping generations model
- 4 October 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 191-206
Market Expansion by Advertising and a Mixed Oligopoly
- 4 October 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 191-206
Market Expansion by Advertising and a Mixed Oligopoly
- 4 October 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 45-56
Physical Capital Accumulation and Partial Privatization
- 4 October 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 45-56
Physical Capital Accumulation and Partial Privatization
- 4 October 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 149-163
Regional Differences and Privatization