Harish Krishnan

A project involves several participants—including clients, contractors, and subcontractors—that work concurrently on multiple projects and allocate resources among them. This interdependency creates a network of otherwise-unrelated projects. We map the network of U.S. government projects involving over 150,000 participants. We show that a seemingly localized disruption, affecting only one project site, eventually causes delays across unrelated projects. This is because participants opportunistically reallocate resources into disrupted projects, at the expense of other projects, triggering a domino effect of further reallocations in the network. Thus, the costs of on-site disruptions end up being shared by multiple participants in the network, rather than being fully absorbed by the affected project. Performance-based incentives, which reward contractors for timeliness, exacerbate these externalities by encouraging self-interested resource reallocation. This paper was accepted by Karan Girotra, operations management. Funding: This work was supported by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC) [Grant RGPIN-2017-04523]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01574 .

Sample Average Approximation in Data-Driven Newsvendor In the data-driven newsvendor problem, the manager makes sequential inventory decisions while learning the unknown demand distribution based on past demand samples. How does the widely used sample average approximation approach perform in this problem? In “Technical Note—Data-Driven Newsvendor Problem: Performance of the Sample Average Approximation,” Lin, Huh, Krishnan, and Uichanco analyze the performance of the sample average approximation as the time horizon grows, which turns out to be the best possible. The authors also examine how the local flatness of the demand distribution around the optimal order quantity affects the complexity of the problem. They show that the sample average approximation has the best achievable performance in terms of not only the time horizon, but also the local flatness of the demand distribution.

When a supplier fails to comply with social and environmental standards, the buyer’s reputation suffers. Reputation costs can typically be very high for the buyer, whereas the supplier’s liability is often limited. Conventional procurement strategies such as dual sourcing mitigate the buyer’s operational risk, but they often do so at the expense of increasing its reputation risk and sourcing costs. In this paper, we propose a risk-sharing contract for managing the buyer’s reputation concerns. We find that by sharing some of the supplier’s operational loss, the buyer may (in some conditions) decrease its reputational risk, but this has to be balanced against an increase in the operational risk. Risk sharing also reduces sourcing costs because the buyer takes on some of the worst-case loss of a wealth-constrained supplier. These results suggest that risk sharing can be superior, as a procurement strategy, to conventional approaches such as dual sourcing or penalty contracts. This is true when reputation and sourcing costs are a significant concern and operational costs are not that high. Under some conditions, the buyer may choose risk sharing even if it increases reputation risk in order to reduce procurement costs. This paper was accepted by Victor Martínez-de-Albéniz, operations management.

Law, regulation, and private standards have evolved to enhance sustainability in value chains. However, the volume of hard and soft laws has created complexity and fragmentation for consumers and firms. In addition, global value chains are increasingly disaggregated, making it difficult for consumers to enforce breaches of sustainability representations. Blockchain, as an immutable and digital record keeping system, is a tool that can deal with this growing complexity in global value chains. Documents verifying sustainability that were once in the private domain and stored in paper copy can now be made accessible in a secure and transparent blockchain platform. Despite a growing interest in the potential of blockchain to transform businesses, there are few concrete examples or scholarly literature showing how blockchain is operationalized in practice. Using a “conceptual framework analysis” approach, we develop an Evidence, Verifiability, and Enforceability (EVE) framework to illustrate how blockchain can enhance sustainability by providing information to consumers on the origin of products, assurances as to the veracity of the information, and a mechanism to enforce representations through the blockchain smart contract function. However, there need to be safeguards put in place for blockchain technology to meet its promise and we discuss some of these challenges.

“Gray markets” are unauthorized channels that distribute a branded product without the manufacturer's permission. Since gray markets are not officially sanctioned by the manufacturer, their existence is assumed to hurt the manufacturer. Yet manufacturers sometimes tolerate or even encourage gray market activities. We investigate the incentives of a manufacturer and its authorized retailer to engage in (or tolerate) gray markets. The firms need to consider the trade‐off between the positive effects of a gray market (price discrimination and cost savings) and the negative effects (cannibalization of sales and a loss in consumer valuation). Generally, gray markets can be categorized into two types: (i) a “local gray market,” where a retailer diverts products to unauthorized sellers operating in the same region as the retailer; and, (ii) “bootlegging,” where the retailer diverts products to unauthorized sellers in another market where the manufacturer sells through a direct channel. We characterize the equilibrium in each type of gray market and identify conditions under which the retailer will divert products to the gray market. Incentive problems are more complicated when the retailer bootlegs and, in this case, we show that conflicting incentives may lead to the emergence of a gray market where both the manufacturer's and retailer's profits decrease.

We investigate pricing incentives for competing retailers who distribute two variants of a manufacturer's product in a decentralized supply chain. Under a two‐dimensional Hotelling model, we derive decentralized retailers' prices for the products, and distortions in pricing when compared to centrally optimal prices. We show that price distortions decrease as consumers' travel cost between retailers increases, due to less intense competition. However, price distortions do not change monotonically in consumers' switching cost between products within stores. To fix decentralized retailers' price distortions, we construct a two‐part pricing contract that coordinates the supply chain. We show that the coordinating contract is Pareto‐improving and analyze increase in the supply chain profit under coordination.

Why do supply chain contracts take the forms that they do? Which contracts should firms adopt to coordinate incentives along a supply chain? This monograph synthesizes the theory of contracts along supply chains. It integrates developments from two largely separate literatures, the management science literature on supply chain coordination and the economic literature on vertical control.

Although there is a rich literature on single product distribution in decentralized supply chains, the incentive problems that arise in distributing a product line have largely not been investigated. In practice, most manufacturers distribute a line of products with different features and qualities and not just a single product. Consider a manufacturer who distributes a product line through competing downstream retailers. In this setting, we investigate how and why the retailers' price and inventory decisions deviate from the centrally optimal decisions. Due to substitution between different product variants, as well as between different retailers, the incentive problems associated with distributing a product line are more complicated than that of distributing a single product. We characterize retailers' incentive distortions under a residual‐claimancy contract, and construct contracts that achieve channel coordination. We show that retail price floors or inventory buybacks, appropriately tailored to each product variant, are among the contracts that can achieve coordination. Using numerical simulations, we demonstrate how the optimal contract terms (such as wholesale prices and buyback prices) for each variant are influenced by the parameters of an underlying consumer choice model.