Thérèse Rebière
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Thérèse Rebière has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Frédéric Gavrel
CREM UMR 6211 CNRS University of Caen Normandy Esplanade de la Paix 14000 Caen France
3 shared publications - Isabelle Lebon
Compte-rendu de l'expérimentation des votes par approbation et par note lors des élections Saint-Étienne 2012 Strasbourg et Louvigny
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
On the equilibrium and welfare consequences of getting ahead of the Smiths
This paper provides an analysis of the social consequences of people seeking to get ahead of the Smiths. All individuals attempt to reach a higher rank than the Smiths, including the Smiths themselves. This attitude gives rise to an equilibrium in which all individuals have equal utilities but unequal (gross) incomes. Due to a rat-race effect, individuals devote too much energy to climbing the social scale. However, laissez-faire equilibrium is an equal-utility constrained social optimum. Conversely, a utilitarian social planner would not choose utility equality. Unexpectedly, this social ambition theory fairly well accounts for empirical intermediate wage inequality.
Open AccessOn the equilibrium and welfare consequences of getting ahead of the Smiths
This paper provides an analysis of the social consequences of people seeking to get ahead of the Smiths. All individuals attempt to reach a higher rank than the Smiths, including the Smiths themselves. This attitude gives rise to an equilibrium in which all individuals have equal utilities but unequal (gross) incomes. Due to a rat-race effect, individuals devote too much energy to climbing the social scale. However, laissez-faire equilibrium is an equal-utility constrained social optimum. Conversely, a utilitarian social planner would not choose utility equality. Unexpectedly, this social ambition theory fairly well accounts for empirical intermediate wage inequality.
- Open Access
On the Equilibrium and Welfare Consequences of Going Ahead of the Smiths
This paper provides an analysis of the social consequences of people seeking to go ahead of the Smiths. All individuals attempt to reach a higher rank than the Smiths, including the Smiths themselves. This attitude gives rise to an equilibrium in which all individuals have equal utilities but unequal (gross) incomes. Due to a rat-race effect, individuals devote too much energy to climbing the social scale. However, laissez-faire equilibrium is an equal-utility constrained social optimum. Conversely, an utilitarian social planner would not choose utility equality. Unexpectedly, this social ambition theory fairly well accounts for empirical intermediate wage inequality.
Open AccessOn the Equilibrium and Welfare Consequences of Going Ahead of the Smiths
This paper provides an analysis of the social consequences of people seeking to go ahead of the Smiths. All individuals attempt to reach a higher rank than the Smiths, including the Smiths themselves. This attitude gives rise to an equilibrium in which all individuals have equal utilities but unequal (gross) incomes. Due to a rat-race effect, individuals devote too much energy to climbing the social scale. However, laissez-faire equilibrium is an equal-utility constrained social optimum. Conversely, an utilitarian social planner would not choose utility equality. Unexpectedly, this social ambition theory fairly well accounts for empirical intermediate wage inequality.
- 30 April 2010
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 107 (1) , 30-32
Layoff taxes and minimum wage: Two complementary public policies
- 30 April 2010
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 107 (1) , 30-32
Layoff taxes and minimum wage: Two complementary public policies