James W. Roberts
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
James W. Roberts has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Andrew Sweeting
University of Maryland
1 shared publication - Ryan C. McDevitt
Olin Business School and Bursky School of Public Health at Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri, United States
1 shared publication - Vivek Bhattacharya
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 29 October 2014
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 45 (4) , 675-704
Regulating bidder participation in auctions
Regulating bidder participation in auctions can potentially increase efficiency compared to standard auction formats with free entry. We show that the relative performance of two such mechanisms, a standard first‐price auction with free entry and an entry rights auction, depends nonmonotonically on the precision of information that bidders have about their costs prior to deciding whether to participate in a mechanism. As an empirical application, we estimate parameters from first‐price auctions with free entry for bridge‐building contracts in Oklahoma and Texas and predict that an entry rights auction increases efficiency and reduces procurement costs significantly.
- 29 October 2014
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 45 (4) , 675-704
Regulating bidder participation in auctions
Regulating bidder participation in auctions can potentially increase efficiency compared to standard auction formats with free entry. We show that the relative performance of two such mechanisms, a standard first‐price auction with free entry and an entry rights auction, depends nonmonotonically on the precision of information that bidders have about their costs prior to deciding whether to participate in a mechanism. As an empirical application, we estimate parameters from first‐price auctions with free entry for bridge‐building contracts in Oklahoma and Texas and predict that an entry rights auction increases efficiency and reduces procurement costs significantly.
- 25 March 2014
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 45 (1) , 116-139
Market structure and gender disparity in health care: preferences, competition, and quality of care
- 25 March 2014
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 45 (1) , 116-139
Market structure and gender disparity in health care: preferences, competition, and quality of care
- 1 December 2013
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 44 (4) , 712-732
Unobserved heterogeneity and reserve prices in auctions
This article shows how reserve prices can be used to control for unobserved object heterogeneity to identify and estimate the distribution of bidder values in auctions. Reserve prices are assumed to be monotonic in the realization of unobserved heterogeneity, but not necessarily set optimally. The model is estimated using transaction prices from a used car auction platform to show that the platform enables sellers to capture a large fraction of the potential value from selling their vehicle. Individual sellers benefit mostly from access to a large set of buyers, but the magnitude depends on accounting for unobserved heterogeneity.
- 1 December 2013
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 44 (4) , 712-732
Unobserved heterogeneity and reserve prices in auctions
This article shows how reserve prices can be used to control for unobserved object heterogeneity to identify and estimate the distribution of bidder values in auctions. Reserve prices are assumed to be monotonic in the realization of unobserved heterogeneity, but not necessarily set optimally. The model is estimated using transaction prices from a used car auction platform to show that the platform enables sellers to capture a large fraction of the potential value from selling their vehicle. Individual sellers benefit mostly from access to a large set of buyers, but the magnitude depends on accounting for unobserved heterogeneity.