Jeroen Hinloopen
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Jeroen Hinloopen has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Charles van Marrewijk
Utrecht University - Utrecht University School of Economics; International Business School Suzhou at XJTLU
6 shared publications- Adriaan R. Soetevent
University of Groningen; Tinbergen Institute
5 shared publications - Sander Onderstal
University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute
4 shared publications - Florian Wagener
Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance (CeNDEF), Universiteit van Amsterdam, NJ Amsterdam, The Netherlands
3 shared publications - Grega Smrkolj
Newcastle University (UK) - Business School
3 shared publications - Stephen Martin
Purdue University, West Lafayette, USA
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 9 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 65 (3) , 627-648
The Hotelling Line at 95: Introduction to the Special Issue
- 9 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 65 (3) , 627-648
The Hotelling Line at 95: Introduction to the Special Issue
- Open Access
- 29 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 63 (2) , 111-122
Corporate Leniency Programs for Antitrust: Past, Present, and Future
This special issue marks the 25th anniversary of the introduction of a leniency program for antitrust in the EU and contains five original papers: Each paper examines the effects of design parameters of leniency programs on their performance. Before introducing each contribution separately, we put them in perspective by introducing readers to the existing theoretical, empirical, and experimental literature on corporate leniency programs for antitrust.
- 29 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 63 (2) , 111-122
Open AccessCorporate Leniency Programs for Antitrust: Past, Present, and Future
This special issue marks the 25th anniversary of the introduction of a leniency program for antitrust in the EU and contains five original papers: Each paper examines the effects of design parameters of leniency programs on their performance. Before introducing each contribution separately, we put them in perspective by introducing readers to the existing theoretical, empirical, and experimental literature on corporate leniency programs for antitrust.
- Open Access
- 1 December 2020
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 68 (4) , 819-856
(Non-)Insurance Markets, Loss Size Manipulation and Competition: Experimental Evidence*
- 1 December 2020
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 68 (4) , 819-856
Open Access(Non-)Insurance Markets, Loss Size Manipulation and Competition: Experimental Evidence*
- Open Access
- 25 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Cartel Stability in Experimental Auctions
Using laboratory experiments, we compare the stability of bidding rings in the English auction and the first-price sealed-bid auction in a heterogeneous-value setting. In both a re-matching condition and a fixed-matching condition, we observe that biddings rings are more stable in the English auction than in the first-price sealed-bid auction. In both conditions, the first-price sealed-bid auction dominates the English auction in terms of average revenue and the revenue spread. The English auction outperforms the first-price sealed-bid auction in terms of efficiency.
- 25 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCartel Stability in Experimental Auctions
Using laboratory experiments, we compare the stability of bidding rings in the English auction and the first-price sealed-bid auction in a heterogeneous-value setting. In both a re-matching condition and a fixed-matching condition, we observe that biddings rings are more stable in the English auction than in the first-price sealed-bid auction. In both conditions, the first-price sealed-bid auction dominates the English auction in terms of average revenue and the revenue spread. The English auction outperforms the first-price sealed-bid auction in terms of efficiency.
- Open Access
- 11 November 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Insuring Product Markets
We formally link insurance markets with product markets and identify a demand effect of insurance: if risk-averse consumers can buy insurance against possible product failure, there will be some additional consumers that buy the product because they can also purchase protection. The concomitant upward pressure on price is further fueled by those consumers that have a higher willingness to pay if they can also buy insurance. But a higher price causes those consumers to leave the market that would have bought the product absent insurance. Introducing insurance thus has an ambiguous effect on price, consumers' surplus, and total surplus.
- 11 November 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessInsuring Product Markets
We formally link insurance markets with product markets and identify a demand effect of insurance: if risk-averse consumers can buy insurance against possible product failure, there will be some additional consumers that buy the product because they can also purchase protection. The concomitant upward pressure on price is further fueled by those consumers that have a higher willingness to pay if they can also buy insurance. But a higher price causes those consumers to leave the market that would have bought the product absent insurance. Introducing insurance thus has an ambiguous effect on price, consumers' surplus, and total surplus.
- 2 August 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 51 (2) , 147-149
Introduction to the Special Issue
- 2 August 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 51 (2) , 147-149
Introduction to the Special Issue
- Open Access
- 5 July 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
- Vol. 174 (2) , 567-612
Research and Development Cooperatives and Market Collusion: A Global Dynamic Approach
- 5 July 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
- Vol. 174 (2) , 567-612
Open AccessResearch and Development Cooperatives and Market Collusion: A Global Dynamic Approach
- Open Access
- 26 April 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
(Non-)Insurance Markets, Loss Size Manipulation and Competition - Experimental Evidence
The common view that buyer power of insurers may effectively counteract provider market power critically rests on the idea that consumers and insurers have a joint interest in extracting price concessions. However, in markets where the buyer is an insurer, the interests of insurers and consumers to reduce prices may be importantly misaligned. The positive dependence between loss size and the insurer's expected profits limits the insurer's incentives to reign in loss sizes; in markets with small initial loss sizes, insurers may try to raise these in order to create demand for insurance. After having defined insurance and non-insurance markets based on the initial loss size, we develop theory to show that insurers with buyer power have incentives to create insurance markets. Insurer competition will push their profits to zero but markets do not return to the initial non-insurance state. This constitutes a welfare loss. We design experimental insurance markets to test our theory and find support. Monopolistic insurer-subjects in non-insurance markets increase loss sizes to establish insurance markets. Insurer competition eliminates profits but not the loss size to uninsured consumers. This provides an additional reason to be careful in granting insurers buyer power.
- 26 April 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open Access(Non-)Insurance Markets, Loss Size Manipulation and Competition - Experimental Evidence
The common view that buyer power of insurers may effectively counteract provider market power critically rests on the idea that consumers and insurers have a joint interest in extracting price concessions. However, in markets where the buyer is an insurer, the interests of insurers and consumers to reduce prices may be importantly misaligned. The positive dependence between loss size and the insurer's expected profits limits the insurer's incentives to reign in loss sizes; in markets with small initial loss sizes, insurers may try to raise these in order to create demand for insurance. After having defined insurance and non-insurance markets based on the initial loss size, we develop theory to show that insurers with buyer power have incentives to create insurance markets. Insurer competition will push their profits to zero but markets do not return to the initial non-insurance state. This constitutes a welfare loss. We design experimental insurance markets to test our theory and find support. Monopolistic insurer-subjects in non-insurance markets increase loss sizes to establish insurance markets. Insurer competition eliminates profits but not the loss size to uninsured consumers. This provides an additional reason to be careful in granting insurers buyer power.
- 31 March 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 46 (3) , 205-207
Introduction: 40 Years of Areeda–Turner
- 31 March 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 46 (3) , 205-207
Introduction: 40 Years of Areeda–Turner
- 10 October 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics
- Vol. 116 (2) , 129-135
Stability, strategic substitutes, strategic complements
- 10 October 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics
- Vol. 116 (2) , 129-135
Stability, strategic substitutes, strategic complements