MRMark Rider

Mark Rider

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Mark Rider has a total of 27 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Coercion and Social Welfare in Public Finance

    by Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Stanley L. Winer, Lucy F. Ackert, Robin Boadway, Giorgio Brosio, Elena Cettolin, Roger D. Congleton, Léonard Dudley, Ann B. Gillette, Bernard Grofman, et al.

    Although coercion is a fundamental and unavoidable part of our social lives, economists have not offered an integrated analysis of its role in the public economy. The essays in this book focus on coercion arising from the operation of the fiscal system, a major part of the public sector. Collective choices on fiscal matters emerge from and have all the essential characteristics of social interaction, including the necessity to force unwanted actions on some citizens. This was recognized in an older tradition in public finance which can still serve as a starting point for modern work. The contributors to the volume recognize this tradition, but add to it by using contemporary frameworks to study a set of related issues concerning fiscal coercion and economic welfare. These issues range from the compatibility of an open access society with the original Wicksellian vision to the productivity of coercion in experimental games.


  • Using Microdata to Estimate Pakistan’s Tax Gap by Type of Tax

    by Robina Ather Ahmed, Mark Rider

    This study provides estimates of Pakistan’s tax gap by type of tax. We adopt a bottom-up approach that provides detailed estimates of the tax gap by type of tax of the sort that are useful for tax administration. For fiscal year 2004–05, we estimate Pakistan’s federal tax gap to be about 40 percent of potential tax revenue. We estimate the tax gap for direct taxes to be about 60 percent of potential direct tax revenue and for indirect taxes about 25 percent of potential indirect tax revenue. Direct and indirect taxes account for about 30 percent and 70 percent, respectively, of actual tax collections. When potential tax revenues are used to measure Pakistan’s tax structure, the proportions are 45 percent and 55 percent, respectively. If the indirect tax system is more regressive than the direct tax system, then Pakistan’s tax system is less progressive in practice than by design.


  • Are benevolent dictators altruistic in groups? A within-subject design

    by Lucy F. Ackert, Ann B. Gillette, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Mark Rider

    We use a within-subject experimental design to investigate whether systematic relationships exist across distinct features of individual preferences: altruism in a two-person context, risk aversion in monetary outcomes, and social preferences in a group context. We find that altruism is related to demographic variables, including years of education, gender, and age. Perhaps most importantly, self allocation in a two-person dictator game is related to social preferences in a group context. Participants who are more generous in a dictator game are more likely to vote against their self-interest in a group tax redistribution game which we interpret to be an expression of social preferences.


  • SOCIAL PREFERENCES AND TAX POLICY DESIGN: SOME EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

    by Lucy F. Ackert, Jorge Martinez‐Vazquez, Mark Rider

    This article reports the results of a set of experiments designed to examine whether a taste for fairness affects people’s preferred tax structure. Using the Fehr and Schmidt model, we devise a simple test for the presence of social preferences in voting for alternative tax structures. The experimental results show that individuals demonstrate concern for their own payoff and inequality aversion in choosing between alternative tax structures. However, concern for redistribution decreases as the deadweight loss from progressive taxation increases. Our findings have important implications for tax policy design.(JELC92, D63, H21, H23)