Mark Rider
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Mark Rider has a total of 27 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Lucy F. Ackert
Department of Economics and Finance Michael J. Coles College of Business Kennesaw State University Kennesaw Georgia
3 shared publications - Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
Georgia State University
2 shared publications Ann B. Gillette
1 shared publication- Ann B. Gillette
Kennesaw State University
1 shared publication - Arno M. Riedl
CESifo, IZA, Netspar and Maastricht University, Department of Microeconomics and Public Economics (MPE), P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands
1 shared publication Bernard Grofman
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 28 August 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 29 (3) , 751-787
Fiscal fragmentation and crime control: Is there an efficiency-equity tradeoff?
- 28 August 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 29 (3) , 751-787
Fiscal fragmentation and crime control: Is there an efficiency-equity tradeoff?
- 22 May 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Coercion and Social Welfare in Public Finance
Although coercion is a fundamental and unavoidable part of our social lives, economists have not offered an integrated analysis of its role in the public economy. The essays in this book focus on coercion arising from the operation of the fiscal system, a major part of the public sector. Collective choices on fiscal matters emerge from and have all the essential characteristics of social interaction, including the necessity to force unwanted actions on some citizens. This was recognized in an older tradition in public finance which can still serve as a starting point for modern work. The contributors to the volume recognize this tradition, but add to it by using contemporary frameworks to study a set of related issues concerning fiscal coercion and economic welfare. These issues range from the compatibility of an open access society with the original Wicksellian vision to the productivity of coercion in experimental games.
- 22 May 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Coercion and Social Welfare in Public Finance
Although coercion is a fundamental and unavoidable part of our social lives, economists have not offered an integrated analysis of its role in the public economy. The essays in this book focus on coercion arising from the operation of the fiscal system, a major part of the public sector. Collective choices on fiscal matters emerge from and have all the essential characteristics of social interaction, including the necessity to force unwanted actions on some citizens. This was recognized in an older tradition in public finance which can still serve as a starting point for modern work. The contributors to the volume recognize this tradition, but add to it by using contemporary frameworks to study a set of related issues concerning fiscal coercion and economic welfare. These issues range from the compatibility of an open access society with the original Wicksellian vision to the productivity of coercion in experimental games.
- 19 February 2013
- Published by SAGE Publications in Public Finance Review
- Vol. 41 (3) , 334-359
Using Microdata to Estimate Pakistan’s Tax Gap by Type of Tax
This study provides estimates of Pakistan’s tax gap by type of tax. We adopt a bottom-up approach that provides detailed estimates of the tax gap by type of tax of the sort that are useful for tax administration. For fiscal year 2004–05, we estimate Pakistan’s federal tax gap to be about 40 percent of potential tax revenue. We estimate the tax gap for direct taxes to be about 60 percent of potential direct tax revenue and for indirect taxes about 25 percent of potential indirect tax revenue. Direct and indirect taxes account for about 30 percent and 70 percent, respectively, of actual tax collections. When potential tax revenues are used to measure Pakistan’s tax structure, the proportions are 45 percent and 55 percent, respectively. If the indirect tax system is more regressive than the direct tax system, then Pakistan’s tax system is less progressive in practice than by design.
- 19 February 2013
- Published by SAGE Publications in Public Finance Review
- Vol. 41 (3) , 334-359
Using Microdata to Estimate Pakistan’s Tax Gap by Type of Tax
This study provides estimates of Pakistan’s tax gap by type of tax. We adopt a bottom-up approach that provides detailed estimates of the tax gap by type of tax of the sort that are useful for tax administration. For fiscal year 2004–05, we estimate Pakistan’s federal tax gap to be about 40 percent of potential tax revenue. We estimate the tax gap for direct taxes to be about 60 percent of potential direct tax revenue and for indirect taxes about 25 percent of potential indirect tax revenue. Direct and indirect taxes account for about 30 percent and 70 percent, respectively, of actual tax collections. When potential tax revenues are used to measure Pakistan’s tax structure, the proportions are 45 percent and 55 percent, respectively. If the indirect tax system is more regressive than the direct tax system, then Pakistan’s tax system is less progressive in practice than by design.
- 1 September 2011
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 14 (3) , 307-321
Are benevolent dictators altruistic in groups? A within-subject design
We use a within-subject experimental design to investigate whether systematic relationships exist across distinct features of individual preferences: altruism in a two-person context, risk aversion in monetary outcomes, and social preferences in a group context. We find that altruism is related to demographic variables, including years of education, gender, and age. Perhaps most importantly, self allocation in a two-person dictator game is related to social preferences in a group context. Participants who are more generous in a dictator game are more likely to vote against their self-interest in a group tax redistribution game which we interpret to be an expression of social preferences.
- 1 September 2011
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 14 (3) , 307-321
Are benevolent dictators altruistic in groups? A within-subject design
We use a within-subject experimental design to investigate whether systematic relationships exist across distinct features of individual preferences: altruism in a two-person context, risk aversion in monetary outcomes, and social preferences in a group context. We find that altruism is related to demographic variables, including years of education, gender, and age. Perhaps most importantly, self allocation in a two-person dictator game is related to social preferences in a group context. Participants who are more generous in a dictator game are more likely to vote against their self-interest in a group tax redistribution game which we interpret to be an expression of social preferences.
- 22 March 2007
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 45 (3) , 487-501
SOCIAL PREFERENCES AND TAX POLICY DESIGN: SOME EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
This article reports the results of a set of experiments designed to examine whether a taste for fairness affects people’s preferred tax structure. Using the Fehr and Schmidt model, we devise a simple test for the presence of social preferences in voting for alternative tax structures. The experimental results show that individuals demonstrate concern for their own payoff and inequality aversion in choosing between alternative tax structures. However, concern for redistribution decreases as the deadweight loss from progressive taxation increases. Our findings have important implications for tax policy design.(JELC92, D63, H21, H23)
- 22 March 2007
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 45 (3) , 487-501
SOCIAL PREFERENCES AND TAX POLICY DESIGN: SOME EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
This article reports the results of a set of experiments designed to examine whether a taste for fairness affects people’s preferred tax structure. Using the Fehr and Schmidt model, we devise a simple test for the presence of social preferences in voting for alternative tax structures. The experimental results show that individuals demonstrate concern for their own payoff and inequality aversion in choosing between alternative tax structures. However, concern for redistribution decreases as the deadweight loss from progressive taxation increases. Our findings have important implications for tax policy design.(JELC92, D63, H21, H23)